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0.1 Abbreviations
Al := {1, 2, 3.....l}
N := {1, 2, 3.....}, the set of natural numbers starting with 1
Nk := {k, k + 1, k + 2.....}, the set of natural numbers starting with k
CFG Characteristic Form Game
EBA Equilibrium Binding Agreement
EEBA Extended Equilibrium Binding Agreement
ICB Independent Commission on Banking
IMF International Monetary Fund
PFG Partition Form Game
P.O. Pareto Optimum
SME Small and Medium Enterprises
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Abstract
Following the recent international ﬁnancial crisis, a number of policy proposals
have been made: one of which is the partitioning of banks into modules (groups),
to contain ﬁnancial shocks. The ﬁrewalls, which surround modules, prevent ﬁ-
nancial contagion: when a shock hits a bank it spreads to other banks in the
same module, but not to banks in other modules. Conditional on bank modules
avoiding shocks, businesses can achieve their latent business opportunities. The
optimal banking system has a cost-beneﬁt trade oﬀ: increased module size allows
for more lucrative business opportunities, but increases systemic banking risk.
This thesis, using a theoretical approach, assesses the importance of the distri-
bution of business opportunities when using modules. When the distribution is
uniform, the optimal structure of the banking industry is fully characterised: it
surprisingly takes only two forms, either one all-encompassing module (contain-
ing all the banks), or atomistic modules (each module contains only one bank).
The intuition behind this sharp characterisation is the increasing marginal re-
turns that modules have on social welfare. A counter-example is constructed
where, with a non-uniform matching of business opportunities, conversely, the
eﬃcient solution does have multiple modules each containing multiple banks.
The model’s policy recommendation is that the banking system needs to be
designed in accordance with the ﬁnancial requirements of businesses.
Keywords: Financial Regulation, Financial Stability, Network, Markov Chain,
Contagion, Bank Run
JEL Classiﬁcation: E44, D85, G01, G20, G21
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Chapter 1
The Standard Model
1.1 Summary
This chapter starts by considering ﬁnancial contagion: what it is, and how it
has been modelled, both pre-crisis (customer liquidity shocks, see Allen and Gale
(2000)), and post crisis (random networks of banks, where an exogenous nega-
tive shock disables a single bank, and the shock propagation is then calculated
computationally, see Gai and Kapadia (2010)). It then considers the Haldane
(2010) policy response: the partitioning of bank networks into modules (separate
groups). It argues that banking modules need to be formed ex-ante, not ex-post
(before shocks arrive, not afterwards), unlike for example Stiglitz (2010b).
My model uses cost-beneﬁt analysis in the form of a welfare function to consider
the optimality of bank modularisation. A Markov process is formed from the
stochastic disabling banking shocks, and re-enabling module recoveries. As in
Gintis (2012), such systems generically converge rapidly to a unique stationary
distribution. This limiting state of the system gives the asymptotic probability
that each module is enabled. These probabilities then micro-found an ex-ante
welfare speciﬁcation for every partition.
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This chapter formulates a standard model under the assumption of a uniform
distribution of business opportunities. The main result is that the use of modules
is rejected, for all parametrisations. Speciﬁcally, any proper partition, (with
both multiple modules and multiple banks per module), is ineﬃcient. Hence,
the eﬃcient partition is either the grand coalition, (one big module containing
all the banks), or the atomistic partition (each bank in its own separate singleton
module).
The four step outline of the proof, which rejects not just symmetric interior
partitions but also non-symmetric interior partitions, is as follows. First the
bank one utility maximisation programme is considered where, without loss of
generality, bank one is in module one. Second it is proven that the model has
negative externalities: a merger between modules two and three always makes
bank one worse oﬀ. This implies that the bank one argmax is of the form {x1, 1,
1, 1, ..1}. Third it is proven that the bank one utility function, v1[x1], has quasi-
convexity, and hence that the bank one optimal partition is on the boundary.
Fourth, by symmetry, this boundary partition is also welfare maximising.
This chapter then considers partition formation, and it shows that if agents are
farsighted, then the Extended Equilibrium Binding Agreement (EEBA), from
Diamantoudi and Xue (2007), results in the eﬃcient partition being formed
(Chapter 2 considers other partition formation solution concepts in Section
2.3.3). Finally, for realistic parametrisations, Section 1.9 argues that it is the
atom partition that is eﬃcient rather than the grand coalition.
1.2 Introduction
The 2007-09 ﬁnancial crisis initially manifested itself in one place; one mar-
ket: the US sub-prime mortgage market. However, the shock was contagious,
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and spread to aﬀect banks world wide. This resulted in a number of major
banks either collapsing, being bailed out or being nationalised. This included
US investment banks, such as Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, and UK re-
tail banks, such as Northern Rock, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), and Halifax
Bank of Scotland (HBOS). However, banks worldwide were aﬀected, and they
dramatically reduced their lending: due to a lack of conﬁdence and in order to
rebuild capital buﬀers. The resulting credit crunch meant that businesses could
no longer borrow, and hence there was a large opportunity cost from wasted
business opportunities. Due to the large social cost of the crisis there is a strong
political sense that, ‘there must be a better way’, and hence there is a search
for policy responses: for example, in the UK by the Independent Commission
on Banking (ICB). In this introduction, I will examine ﬁrstly, contagion (both
non-ﬁnancial and ﬁnancial), and then secondly the policy response of grouping
banks into modules.
The concept of contagion comes from epidemiology: the study of disease trans-
mission. If Albert has a disease, and he has contact with Bill, then Bill in turn is
infected.1 This process is repeated, and there is a cascade eﬀect, so that the dis-
ease is spread across the whole population. Similarly, ﬁnancial contagion occurs
when a negative shock hits one bank in a network, and that shock then spreads
system wide.2 During the crisis there are many factors that enabled the ﬁnancial
contagion to occur, these include: high levels of bank leverage, the complexity
of the derivative market, and banker misbehaviour. However, one critical factor
is high bank inter-connectedness: this thesis focuses on that factor.
1This assumes the disease is completely contagious. In a more complex model, the diﬀusion
occurs probabilistically.
2The term contagion has been used in multiple contexts in economics. For example co-
movements in stock markets. Here I am using the term restricted to banks in-line with the
original deﬁnition (see Bagehot (1873)). See Moser (2003) for a survey of the use of contagion
in economics.
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Pre-crisis the main model of ﬁnancial contagion was the “early-late” consumer
model of Allen and Gale (2000). However, their model is focused on explaining
how ﬁnancial contagion can happen, rather than assessing policy responses; has
shocks to consumer liquidity demand rather than banks assets; and is restricted
only to very small networks: those with four banks. Further, the crisis has cast
doubt on a number of the model’s conclusions: for example, that the complete
network (where every bank lends to every other bank), is the most stable.
Post-crisis a second stream of literature has emerged, for example Gai and Kapa-
dia (2007), that has focused on the mechanisms which propagate shocks between
banks. The criticism of the mechanism approach is that these are positive, rather
than normative, models: the only agents are banks; there are no businesses (or
consumers). So, it studies negative externalities between banks, but not of banks
on businesses, and hence it does not model the eﬀect of bank failures on the real
economy. In contrast, this thesis develops a model containing businesses and
derives a micro-founded welfare function which leads to the ability to assess
eﬃciency.
Unlike Allen and Gale (2000), whose “central aim .. is to provide some microe-
conomic foundations for ﬁnancial contagion”, my aim is to take things to the
next stage: take the existence of ﬁnancial contagion as given, and assess a po-
tential policy response. There are two main types of policy response: the ﬁrst is
to reduce the probability of an initial bank failure, for example through higher
capital requirements, or ring fencing (separating retail and investment divisions
of banks); the second is to reduce the probability of propagation between banks.
My model assesses such a containment proposal from Haldane (2009, 2010): the
use of modules to partition banks, so that banks within the same module are
connected, but banks in diﬀerent modules are not connected.
So, a banking module is a group of banks that are close together: in good states
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of the world, banks in the same module can do business at low cost; but in
bad states, one ﬁnancial shock disables all the banks in a module. An histori-
cal example of banking modules comes from the USA. In the USA, pre World
War One, “the US system was based on unit banking - geographically isolated
single-oﬃce banks” (Calomiris, 2010). Post World War One state banks, (which
are licensed under state law), faced increasing competition from national banks,
(which are licensed under federal law). However, the 1927 McFadden law, parti-
tioned the USA into 49 modules: it conﬁrmed that national banks were allowed
branches, but restricted them to operating only in the state of their headquar-
ters.3 In 1956 this law was replaced by the Douglas Amendment to the 1956
Bank Holding Company (HC) Act, which let individual states decide whether to
allow out of state banks to operate in their state. However, “until 1978, every
state in the union barred banks from other states, so instead of one national
banking system, we had more like 50 little banking systems, one per state”, but
“By 1992, all states but Hawaii had passed reciprocal entry laws of some sort.”
(Morgan, Rime and Strahan, 2004).4 Further, the ﬁnancial system became more
internationalised through an interconnected network of bank lending (for exam-
ple, EU banks holding sub-prime debt issued by American banks), and so, by the
time of the 2007 crisis, the banking system was one all-encompassing module.
However, despite this, my thesis is that the risk of ﬁnancial contagion is not a
suﬃcient argument for partitioning banks into (proper) modules.
In diﬀerent contexts modules can be formed at diﬀerent times: ex-post (after
a shock hits), or ex-ante (only before a shock hits). The idea of modules in
disease control is that we separate uninfected people from those who are infected.
This is the concept of quarantine: we isolate infected countries, for example,
3There are currently 50 states plus Washington, District of Columbia; however, Alaska and
Hawaii did not achieve statehood until 1959.
4“In 1978 Maine passed a law allowing entry by bank holding companies from any state
that allowed entry by Maine banks.” (Morgan, Rime and Strahan, 2004)
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by cancelling transport links ex-post. However, in contrast, modules in some
other environments need to be created ex-ante: there are ﬁrebreaks in forests
to stop the spread of ﬁre; and bulkheads in ships to form separate watertight
compartments, so that one breach of the hull does not sink the ship. But these
modules need to be ex-ante: we cannot wait until there is a ﬁre before forming
a ﬁrebreak (bulldozers move slowly; ﬁre spreads fast); and we cannot install
bulkheads in a ship that is sinking.5
Similarly, it is my contention that banking is such an environment, where mod-
ules need to be created ex-ante, not ex-post. In contrast, it is arguably feasible
for countries to employ “circuit breakers”: state contingent capital controls (see
Stiglitz 2010b).6 This is because governments determine their own laws, and
there is a divide between national and international investors.7 So, after such
a policy change, there can remain a functioning internal economy. Whilst with
banks, taking a topical example, suppose the regulator lets European banks hold
American bonds as collateral, but then gets a signal that American debt is go-
ing bad. So the regulator decides to partition European from American banks,
and orders them to get a new asset base. In order to buy new assets, European
banks will need to sell oﬀ their American bonds. However, the price of American
bonds will already have been lowered by the negative signal, and will be further
decreased by the rush of European banks to sell. This ﬁre sale means they will
be unable to aﬀord new assets, and thus will need re-ﬁnancing: the same require-
ment as without the ex-post partitioning. Hence, I will be modelling modules
5The Internal Examiner has noted that “Actually, one way to ﬁght a large forest ﬁre is
precisely to bulldoze ﬁrebreaks after the ﬁre has broken out, but far enough away and soon
enough so that they will indeed stop the ﬁre spreading beyond them. One also ’ﬁghts with ﬁre’
by deliberately lighting minor back ﬁres intended to remove fuel that would otherwise burn in
the major ﬁre.”. This spoils the analogy somewhat!
6Stiglitz(2010b) does not have productive inter-country links. This may aﬀect his results.
7The clarity of this dividing line may be unclear, for example in the case of the EU. But
that is argument for ex-ante country modules; rather than an argument for ex-post banking
modules.
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in banking as being ex-ante, and further I will be considering ex-ante eﬃciency
rather than interim eﬃciency or ex-post eﬃciency. Speciﬁcally, I am additionally
assuming that, for reasons either of feasibility or preference, after the arrival of
a disabling shock there is no change in the partitioning of the banks that remain
enabled: once modules are in place they are not altered conditional on shocks,
not just for one or two periods, but over an inﬁnite time horizon.
Andrew Haldane, director of ﬁnancial stability at the Bank of England, in 2009,
2010 policy papers, both recognises the potential for ﬁnancial contagion, and via
a watchmaker analogy from Simon (1962) advocates the use of modules. The
analogy shows that, a watchmaker in an environment with stochastic shocks,
has a much lower expected completion time, when he uses modules.8 Hence
he concludes: “What is second nature to the watch-maker needs to become
second nature to the watchdog”. In response, my model assesses the usefulness
of this analogy: I use the welfare function to consider the optimality of bank
modularisation.
My work here makes two main contributions to our understanding of the use of
modules as a policy response to the risk of ﬁnancial contagion. Firstly, the ﬁrst
chapter shows that, under the standard assumption of a uniform distribution of
business opportunities, the use of modules is rejected, for all parametrisations.
Speciﬁcally, any proper partition (both multiple modules and multiple banks per
module), is ineﬃcient. Hence, the eﬃcient partition is either the grand coalition
(one big module containing all the banks), or the atomistic partition (each bank
in its own separate singleton module).
Secondly, the second chapter shows that, varying the structure of business op-
8Note this is not the same argument as advocated in Smith (1776), which gives the famous
example of a pin factory where each worker specialises in one task and a more than 240 fold
increase in productivity is achieved (see I.1.3). Instead with Simon (1962), modules reduce
the amount of work in progress lost when an adverse shock hits the manufacturing process.
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portunities can vary the optimal policy choice. For example, section 2.2.1.1
considers a variant model where matches are no longer distributed uniformly:
instead banks are arranged in a circle, and matches are always between imme-
diate neighbours. Under this model, generally the eﬃcient partition is proper:
there will be multiple modules, and each module will have multiple member
banks. This shows the importance of understanding the ﬁnancial requirements
of businesses when designing bank networks.
1.3 Literature Review
There are two parts to this literature review. First, I will overview the literature
on the policy of containing ﬁnancial shocks. Within this part, I consider hier-
archies, Haldane (2009), Simon (1962); modularisation, Haldane (2010), Stiglitz
(2010b), Leitner (2005); neighbourhoods, Castiglionesi and Navarro (2007); the
diﬀerential potential roles of banks (Allen and Carletti (2009)), and the require-
ment to consider the ﬁnancial needs of businesses when designing the bank-
ing system (Mayer (2011)); and the ICB report (Independent Commission on
Banking (2011). Then, in the second part, I consider the modelling of ﬁnancial
contagion, both using the traditional consumer liquidity model, Allen and Gale
(2000); and the post crisis propagation mechanism literature which considers:
diﬀerent possible shock transmission pathways, Nier et al (2008); the robust yet
fragile network characterisation, Gai and Kapadia (2010); the eﬀect of multiple
asset classes, May and Arinaminpathy (2010); and the eﬀect of diﬀerent network
designs, Gai, Haldane and Kapadia (2011) and Georg (2011).
Haldane in two policy papers, Haldane (2009) and (2010), advocates splitting
the banking system into components. Haldane (2009) argues for a hierarchical
approach: he uses an analogy from Simon (1962), which compares two watch-
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makers. Tempus and Hora are each making identical watches from the same
1000 elements: it is just that their production processes are organised diﬀer-
ently. Tempus, simply has one task of assembling all the elements together
into a watch. By contrast, Hora has a hierarchy of tasks. In particular, Hora
manufactures recursively : at each level the same number (10) of lower level com-
ponents are used. So, Hora has 100 sub-assembly formation tasks, where each
sub-assembly is formed from 10 elements; then Hora has 10 tasks of forming
assemblies, where each assembly consists of 10 sub-assembles; and then one ﬁnal
task of forming the watch from the 10 assemblies.
Is it better to make watches with, or without hierarchies? This is in a stochastic
environment, where disabling shocks can hit the watchmaker. If a shock hits,
then previously completed tasks are unaﬀected; but all progress on the current
task is lost. The watchmakers want to minimise expected completion time. The
result of the model is that, Hora through using a hierarchical approach, is over
1000 times faster than Tempus. Haldane (2009) advocates the applicability of
this example to banking, but is watchmaking an appropriate comparison? As
Simon (1962) states: “Metaphor and analogy can be helpful, or they can be
misleading. All depends on whether the similarities the metaphor captures are
signiﬁcant or superﬁcial”.
Haldane (2010) talks about the beneﬁts of modules (non-hierarchical structures
where the whole system is broken down into modules, but modules are not
further broken down), as a policy response to potential shocks, for example
using ﬁrebreaks to protect forests against ﬁre. He again suggests this applies to
banking: “(banking) has many of the same basic ingredients as other network
industries, in particular the potential for viral spread and periodic systemic
collapse.”
Stiglitz (2010b) has a number of models containing modules; these are principally
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between countries, but are claimed to also apply to banks. Here is a stylised ver-
sion of his modelling. There are a number of countries and a single consumption
good: each country i has constant absolute risk aversion preferences (represented
by utility function u(x) = 1 − exp[αx], where x is consumption), and an initial
endowment C.9 This risk aversion is a diﬀerence from both Haldane (2010) and
my model. The timings are as follows. Firstly, the social planner assigns the
countries into modules. Secondly, within a module, countries agree state con-
tingent goods transfers. Thirdly, each country then receives a shock 
i which is
either small (mean 0, variance σ2) or big (negative inﬁnity):10

i
iid∼
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
D(0, σ2) probability (1− p)
−∞ probability p
The big shock case represents contagion: the big shock wipes out all countries in
a module, and they all get a utility of 0. If all countries in a module only receive
small shocks, then the state contingent transfers take place, and consumption
occurs.
The program can be solved through backwards induction as follows. At the
second stage, as the countries are ex-ante identical (in preferences, endowments
and their shock distribution), and risk averse, there will be complete consumption
smoothing within each module. At the ﬁrst stage, module size x is chosen to
maximise the expected utility of a sample country:
EU = (1− p)xE[1− exp(α[C + 1
x
x∑
i=1

i])]
9Note that the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion is −u′′[x]u′[x] = −−α
2 exp[αx]
−α exp[αx] = −α, and so
the requirement for agents to be risk averse (rather than risk loving) means that α < 0.
10The D(0, σ2) notation for the small shock case represents some probability distribution
with mean 0 and variance σ2.
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Taking a 2nd order Taylor approximation gives:11
EU = (1− p)x
(
1− (1 + 0.5
x
σ2α2) exp[αC]
)
Log-linearising gives:
ln[EU ] = x ln(1− p)− (1 + 0.5
x
σ2α2) exp[αC]
and the ﬁrst order condition for a maximum then gives
x2 = −0.5σ
2α2 exp[αC]
ln[1− p]
There is a trade oﬀ in module size between risk aversion and contagion avoidance:
the risk aversion creates a desire for consumption smoothing, and hence large
modules; whilst the risk of contagion creates a demand for small modules. Note,
that there are decreasing returns from larger modules: expected consumption is
already close to the optimal level (in the good state of no contagion). There is
only one class of goods, so ex-post, every transfer makes one country better oﬀ,
but another country worse oﬀ. This contrasts with both normal trade, where
there are gains for both the buyer and the seller (the buyer values the good at
higher than the transaction price; the seller at lower than the transaction price),
and my model, which has Pareto improving investment opportunities. Hence,
the Stiglitz model has a lower desire for large modules, and so in general has an
interior solution.
Leitner (2005), like this thesis, directly assesses the idea of bank modules. It
models how the threat of contagion, may induce interbank support, when there is
11using f(a + h) ≈ f(a) + hf ′(a) + 0.5h2f ′′(a) and so E[f(a + h)] ≈ f(a) + E[h]f ′(a) +
0.5E[h2]f ′′(a) where there is uncertainty in h but not in a.
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neither pre-commitment nor a repeated game. However, it assumes that, illiquid
banks (hit by shocks) can be saved by liquid banks (which avoided shocks): “To
allow for some beneﬁts from mutual insurance, I also assume that by pooling
resources, the liquid banks can come up with the extra funds required for helping
the illiquid bank, so that in the ﬁrst best, no bank, whether liquid or illiquid,
goes bankrupt”. This is an environment with private bail-ins by other banks;
rather than public bailouts by the government. So, Leitner (2005) is considering
less severe shocks than in this thesis: when a bank is hit by a bad shock, it is
possible for contagion to be prevented. In reality, when the illiquid bank gets
very big, bail-ins become much less feasible: the private bail-in of LTCM (Long
Term Capital Management) cost $3.6 Billion, and the positions formerly held by
LTCM were successfully liquidated by their rescuers for a small proﬁt (Partnoy,
2003); whilst, when Lehman Brothers applied for Chapter 11 bankruptcy it cited
debt of $613 billion, but currently it is estimated that creditors will be paid $65
Billion, (New York Times 30th August 2011)).
Leitner (2005) has a multi-stage model, where the network for the n banks has
to be chosen before the endowments are known: stage 1) social planner decides
the bank network; stage 2) bank endowments are resolved; stage 3) banks make
transfers to other banks; stage 4) banks invest (if they have enough money); stage
5) if all banks in a module invested then they each get return R. Leitner (2005)
does not get completely conclusive results; it constructs an example where a non-
trivial solution is best: the optimal network is neither empty nor fully connected.
But the intuition is that: if the expected bank endowment is large, then we want
fully connected bank networks to smooth out stochastic shocks that leave a few
banks illiquid; conversely, if the expected endowment is small, then we want an
empty network so the rare liquid banks can invest, without being stopped by the
many illiquid banks. Leitner proves that the fully connected network is ex-ante
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strictly preferred to the empty network, if and only if,12
Prob(
n∑
i=1
min(ei, R)≥n) > Prob(e1≥1)
Castiglionesi and Navarro (2007) is a ﬁnancial fragility network model, not a
ﬁnancial contagion partition model, and includes both the potential for bank
moral hazard and liquidity shocks. The setup has two types of agents, (depositors
and shareholders), and a network of inter-bank links between (some) of the
banks. Each bank can then invest in either a safe asset or a risky asset. Safe
assets always generate enough returns to pay back the bank’s depositors. In
contrast, the risky assets may fail, in which case the depositor loses their deposit;
or may succeed, in which the shareholders make extra proﬁts, which gives the
model its moral hazard feature. Banks that invest in risky assets are called
gamblers, and the setup of the model is such that banks only have an incentive
to gamble if their capital endowment is below a critical level.
There is a stochastic environment consisting of both negative liquidity shocks
and failures of risky projects. The network of inter-bank links has both beneﬁts
(in providing resilience to liquidity shocks), and costs (when projects fail). If a
bank receives a liquidity shock then that can be smoothed out by a linked liquid
bank, (similar to the Leitner (2005) bail-in mechanism). If a risky project fails
then the bank that gambled on that project fails, along with all its immediate
neighbours (those with direct links to it), irrespective of their own investment
choices and capital endowments. However, the shock can never propagate fur-
ther: speciﬁcally, it does not take out any banks that are not the hit bank’s
neighbours, but are only neighbours of its neighbours or even more remote. This
limited propagation means that this is a ﬁnancial fragility model, not a ﬁnancial
12This preference condition reﬂects an additional complication: as the highest return a bank
can get is R, the highest they are prepared to invest (directly or in transfers), is R.
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contagion model: a single shock cannot have systemic global eﬀect; it can only
have local eﬀects. And hence this is a model where the outcome depends on the
network of neighbours that each bank has; rather than on how the banks are
partitioned into modules.
The form of the eﬃcient network depends on the parametrisation, but the format
is always a core and a periphery. If there is high aggregate bank capital then there
is a complete network, and every bank is in the core for maximum resilience to
liquidity shocks. Further, each bank is allocated enough capital to be incentivised
to invest safely. Alternatively, if there is low aggregate bank capital, then the
social planner ﬁnances as many banks as possible to the level where they will
invest safely. Completed links are formed between these safe banks to form a
core. The residual capital is split amongst the remaining banks, who will then
gamble and form the periphery. Each peripheral bank will be connected to some
core banks and to some peripheral banks. 13
Haldane and May (2011) models the mechanics of how shocks move around
system of banks, and so how ﬁnancial contagion can occur; however, there are
no businesses and no modules. Further, the model does not assign a social value
to banks: it does not say how they matter. So, it is silent on questions of the
type: “is it better to have some banks enabled all the time, or all the banks
enabled some of the time?”. Despite these diﬃculties, the conclusion of Haldane
and May (2011) is pro-module:
“modularity protects the systemic resilience of both natural and con-
structed networks. The same principles apply in banking.”
Johnson (2011), in a direct response to Haldane and May (2011), cautions that:
“Policy-makers may never fully appreciate a model’s limitations... (so without
13What links the gambling banks form depends on the parameter values.
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careful application) ... we simply increase risk, rather than reduce it”. The ﬁnan-
cial crisis, was in part caused by complex ﬁnancial derivative products created
using physics models. So it would be ironic (and potentially tragic), if cen-
tral bankers through inappropriate use of physics models of ﬁnancial contagion,
made policy mistakes in response. In using physics, there are two particular
methodological issues. Firstly, economists do like to see themselves as scien-
tists (studying how the world works), but economics has another aspect: policy
work. And policy work is more engineering (problem solving), than science.14 As,
Keynes (1931) opined, “If economists could manage to get themselves thought of
as humble, competent people on a level with dentists, that would be splendid.”,
and whilst there is a scientiﬁc aspect to dentistry, its primary role is treat-
ment. Secondly, there is a diﬀerence in falsiﬁability between economic-science
and physics: physicists can run laboratory experiments to test their models;
whilst economics is an observational science like astronomy, so economists rely
on real world data with all the ethical and practical issues that implies.15
The Allen and Carletti (2009) survey paper identiﬁes four potential explanations
for the existence of banks (or other ﬁnancial intermediaries), in addition to, or
instead of, a more decentralised ﬁnancial market. The ﬁrst is the traditional
intertemporal risk-smoothing pathway: banks issue long term loans to business
and householders, whilst oﬀering accounts with short notice periods to savers.
Because of the maturity mismatch between their assets and liabilities, however,
banks are subject to the possibility of runs and systemic risk.
The other three explanations are borrower monitoring , (banks have the informa-
14See Mankiw (2006) for a discussion on the twin roles of an economist: scientist and
engineer. Interestingly, writing before the recent ﬁnancial crisis, he uses the example of the
Great Depression to argue that the policy economist’s toolkit has not moved forward much in
the last 50 years.
15There has been a recent growth in laboratory economics, but that is new and there are
issues, for example of external validity.
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tion about their client business to ensure that they are trustworthy; in contrast
market-based ﬁnanciers face a free rider problem with respect to monitoring
business eﬀort); economic growth, (in a bank-based system there are close re-
lationships between banks and businesses resulting in high growth; in contrast
in a market-based system there are distant relationships between ﬁnanciers and
businesses resulting in low growth); and corporate governance (in a bank based
system there are long-term relationship between a bank and its client ﬁrm, the
holding of both debt and equity by the bank, and the active intervention of the
bank should its client become ﬁnancially distressed). My work includes the risk
of systemic bank failure, (without the microfoundations of risk-smoothing, or
the mechanics of liquidity shocks); requires banks to fund businesses in order for
them to grow; and the inability for businesses to move banks can motivated in
terms of borrower monitoring.
Mishkin (2007), p181, identiﬁes that “A healthy and vibrant economy requires a
ﬁnancial system that moves funds from people who save to people who have pro-
ductive investment opportunities.”, and establishes, from Hackethal and Schmidt
(2004), eight stylised facts: 1) stocks provide only small amount of business ﬁ-
nance ( about 10%); 2) bonds provide only small amount of business ﬁnance
(about 10-15%); 3) indirect ﬁnance (where there is an intermediary between
saver and borrower), is more important than direct ﬁnance (no intermediary
between saver and borrower); 4) ﬁnancial intermediaries (especially banks) pro-
vide most Finance; 5) there is a lot of ﬁnancial regulation; 6) only big businesses
use stock or bond markets; 7) collateral is important; and 8) debt contracts are
complicated. My model is inline with the ﬁrst six of these facts: 1) has no stock
market; 2) has no bond market; 3) has indirect ﬁnance; 4) uses banks to provide
ﬁnance; 5) considers another possible form of regulation: modularisation; and 6)
focuses on businesses too small to use the stock market.
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Mayer (2011) claims that: “One of the best-established associations in economics
is between ﬁnancial development and growth – countries with well-developed ﬁ-
nancial systems grow faster”.16 He argues that businesses need ﬁnance to grow,
and that banks are especially important for ﬁnancing medium sized businesses:
small businesses are family funded; whilst large businesses use the stock mar-
ket. He emphasises the importance of local banking; for example, in ﬁnanc-
ing the industrial revolution during 19th century Britain. The strength of local
banks is that they oﬀer long term relationships to Small and Medium Enterprises
(SMEs).17 However, local banks are smaller and hence riskier.18 In response to
this riskiness, regulatory changes have made banks larger and hence safer; but
also more distant from their business customers: resulting in a lack of funding
for SMEs. He concludes, post crisis, “that the focus is ... on the immediate issue
of avoiding another failure of the banks”, whilst it should be on ensuring “that
British banks provide suﬃcient ﬁnancing for SMEs”. This motivates, ﬁrstly my
model’s use of cost beneﬁt analysis to assess the eﬀect that diﬀerent structures of
the ﬁnancial sector have on the business sector, and thus on the overall welfare
of society; secondly my model’s use of banks to ﬁnance businesses; and thirdly
the inability of businesses in my model to change which bank they use.
It could be argued that this story about the dependence of businesses on banks
can be undermined using Modigliani and Miller (1958), whose main result is the
Modigliani-Miller Theorem, “a ﬁrm’s valuation is the same whether ﬁnanced by
equity or debt”. However, Modigliani and Miller (1958) themselves caution that
“Misinterpretation .... can be avoided by remembering that this Proposition tells
16Colin Mayer is the Peter Moores dean and professor of management studies at Saïd Busi-
ness School, University of Oxford.
17The internal examiner Professor Peter Hammond raised the interesting question of the
eﬀect of competition amongst local banks. The competition eﬀect would reduce business
lending costs, but the eﬀect of ﬁrms changing banks to reduce costs would be to erode long
term bank-business relationships.
18In the sense of higher chance of individual bank failure due to high exposure to local shocks
rather than in the systematic sense of ﬁnancial contagion.
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us only that the type of instrument used to ﬁnance an investment is irrelevant
to the question of whether or not the investment is worth while. This does not
mean that the owners (or the managers) have no grounds whatever for preferring
one ﬁnancing plan to another; or that there are no other policy or technical issues
in ﬁnance at the level of the ﬁrm.”
Further, their results rely on strong assumptions such as, the absence of borrow-
ing constraints, symmetric information, the absence of (distorting) taxes, the
absence of agency costs, and complete markets. The complete market assump-
tion is particularly onerous as it needs to apply over uncertainty, and that further
requires state of world veriﬁcation. As Mayer (1988) says, Modigliani and Miller
(1958) require that “all contingencies must be appropriately contracted; there
must be a complete set of (Arrow–Debreu State) contingent contracts.” Fur-
ther, Freixas and Rochet (1997) demonstrate “the discouraging fact that banks
are useless in the Arrow–Debreu world”. They show, that in a general equilib-
rium environment with complete market, banks make zero proﬁts and “the size
of bank’s balance sheets have no impact on other economic agents”, and thus
conclude that “the Arrow–Debreu paradigm leads to a world in which banks are
redundant institutions”.19 This shows the particular importance of the complete
markets assumption in the Modigliani–Miller Theorem.
One of the primary concerns of the ICB was to prevent shocks jumping from in-
vestment banking to retail banking. Hence, their main proposal is ring-fencing:
this is the internal separation of retail and investment divisions of universal
19Within the general equilibrium framework, the internal examiner, Peter Hammond,
pointed out the potential relevancy of Green (1974), which has bankruptcy contagion in a
temporary equilibrium model. Green (1974) is a continuation of Green (1973), which con-
sidered temporary equilibria in a multiple period environment. Green (1974) considers what
happens if today it is not feasible for an agent to implement a transaction he agreed yesterday
because today’s endowment is found to be too small, and hence has to declare bankruptcy.
Within this environment each agent can be a debtor to some agents but a creditor some other
agents, leading to the potential for contagion.
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banks; not the external separating of banks by ﬁrewalls.20 As Kay (2011) said,
in his evidence at the Treasury Select Committee hearings into the ﬁnal version
of the ICB report, “I think the ICB was asking what is the minimal change to
the structure industry, that they could propose, that would achieve the objective
of eliminating or reducing the taxpayer’s subsidy to investment banking”. Sim-
ilarly, Hahn (2011) said to the committee, of the ICB report, “this is tinkering
rather than stepping back (and making more wholesale changes)”. For example
they propose that inside the ring fence banks would be allowed to lend within
the EEA (European Economic Area), but not outside: “(they would) not be
allowed to engage in trading or other investment banking activities, provide ser-
vices to ﬁnancial companies, or services to customers outside the EEA”, (ICB)
2011. Their justiﬁcation for this proposed modularisation is that, “The UK’s
international treaty obligations make the appropriate geographic scope the EEA
rather than the UK.” Of course, the UK should respect its treaty obligations,
however, it is feasible for treaties to be re-negotiated, and it should be assessed
whether there are net beneﬁts from such changes.
The Independent Commission on Banking (ICB), rather than choosing an opti-
mal design for the banking system, were trying to reduce the size and frequency
of governmental bail-outs of banks: “The package of banking reforms .. is de-
signed to reduce the probability and impact of ﬁnancial crises in the future”,
ICB (2011). Their approach was based on empirical judgement rather than
mathematical modelling. They give three explanations for not using models.
The ﬁrst is “because no model exists which can both reliably account for the
frequency and incidence of ﬁnancial crises and encompass the eﬀects of reform
recommendations.”, ICB (2011). And, clearly there are diﬃculties in modelling
ﬁnancial systems and the eﬀectiveness of possible policy reforms. However, I feel
20Given this signiﬁcant diﬀerence I would not consider the modularisation of banks as being
an example of ring-fencing.
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this is too pessimistic, particularly when considering policies to reduce the like-
lihood of ﬁnancial contagion, rather than prevent an initial bank failure: with
such policies we can take the initial ﬁnancial shock as exogenous. The second
explanation implicitly assumes that models are sensitive to parameter values:
“Even if such a model did exist, suﬃcient empirical historical data about the
relation between the recommendations and the frequency or impact of ﬁnancial
crises is not available to populate it.”, ICB (2011). However, with my model, as
the eﬃcient partition always takes one of two forms, the policy implication is
not generally critically dependent on parameter values. The third explanation
is more philosophical, “attempts to quantify these eﬀects are inherently limited,
because ... future risks which will certainly arise but whose precise scale and
nature is fundamentally unknowable.”, ICB (2011). Again, in this aspect my
model is resilient, for example the results are robust to the inclusion of common
shocks that eﬀect all banks directly.
I am now going to consider contagion, which consists of three parts: the ﬁrst is
initiation, the shock starts at only one node of a system; the second is propaga-
tion, the shock spreads node by node in an iterative process, (it is not just the
initial node that can infect other nodes; every node, once infected, can spread
the shock onto it’s neighbours); and the third is the result , all of, or a signiﬁcant
proportion of, a network is aﬀected. The term ﬁnancial contagion is used when
this concept is applied to a banking network: the initiation consists of an initial
negative liquidity shock to one bank; and the shock is propagated through the
inter-bank links.21
Pre-crisis Allen and Gale (2000) used the variable consumer liquidity demand
21The term contagion has been used in multiple contexts in economics. For example co-
movements in stock markets. Here I am restricting the term to banks in-line with the original
deﬁnition (see Bagehot (1873)). See Moser (2003) for a survey of the use of contagion in
economics.
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story of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), both to motivate the existence of a network
of inter-bank lending, and explain how that network can result in contagion. In
their model inter-bank lending normally adds value, as it facilitates consump-
tion smoothing. However, in the rare bad states of the world, when there is a
large liquidity shock, this is propagated from one bank to the whole banking
network; resulting in all consumers getting adversely aﬀected. This is the cost of
inter-bank lending: without it, the shock would have been contained to just the
customers of a single bank, and there would have been no ﬁnancial contagion.
Notwithstanding this, the conclusion of the model is that if the state of the world
where contagion occurs is rare enough, then inter-bank lending is ex-ante wel-
fare enhancing. In the context of the present crisis, however, their model has a
number of issues. Firstly, it is focused on explaining how ﬁnancial contagion can
happen, rather than assessing policy responses; for example, ﬁnancial contagion
in their model is a zero probability outcome.22 Secondly, their model has shocks
to consumer liquidity demand rather than banks’ assets. Thirdly, the crisis has
cast doubt on a number of the model’s conclusions: for example, that the com-
plete network (where every bank lends to every other bank), is the most stable.
Fourthly, their analysis is restricted only to very small networks: speciﬁcally,
those with four banks.23
The aim of Allen and Gale (2000) is to provide micro foundations for ﬁnancial
contagion, rather than to asses policy responses. The set-up has banks which
smooth consumer consumption, but do not enable business investment. So, there
are customers, but no non-ﬁnancial businesses. Each bank has speciﬁed explicit
22Diamond and Dybvig (1983), that Allen and Gale (2000) uses for its model of bank runs,
has multiple equilibrium; whilst Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) provides a bank run model
where customers receive noisy signals that has a unique equilibrium (they use a method related
to Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998)). Dasgupta (2004) uses this
noisy signal approach to extend Allen and Gale (2000), and assess the probability of contagion.
23An extension to the paper claims that the arguments extend to the case of many banks;
but few details are given.
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inter-bank and bank-consumer lending. The inter-bank lending can take diﬀerent
network structures. However, due to the number of banks being restricted to
four, only three diﬀerent network structures can be analysed.24 In increasing
order of robustness to ﬁnancial shocks, these are shown to be: circular, bilateral
and complete. There are strong foundations to these results: the welfare function
is derived from the preferences of consumers and all results are found using
analytical methods.
In economics, the ﬁrst contagion paper that theoretically considers the inter-bank
propagation mechanism is Iori, Jafarey and Padilla (2006), which examines the
potential for the interbank market to propagate liquidity crises.25 Their model
is behavioural, and they assess diﬀerent networks using numerical simulations.
Their results are that with homogeneous banks, “no evidence of the potential
for contagion is found” and their conclusion for this case is that “an interbank
market unambiguously stabilizes the system”. Contrastingly, with heterogenous
banks, the network has the characteristic later described by Gai and Kapadia
(2010) as “robust but fragile”: robustness as “interbank lending contributes to a
lower incidence of bank failures through the mutual insurance role”; fragility as
“at the same time, (inter-bank lending) does create the tendency for the system
to display avalanches (episodes of multiple bank collapse)”. The authors identify
that shock transmission occurs through both direct (“the failure of one bank has
24The consumer liquidity shocks are perfectly negatively correlated between the odd num-
bered banks (1, 3) and the even numbered banks (2, 4): in state s1 the proportion of consumers
demanding liquidity are (wh, wl, wh, wl), whilst with state s2 the proportions are (wl, wh, wl,
wh). So ﬁrstly eﬃciency excludes the possibility of a disconnected bank. Secondly, risk is
traded on the open market using state contingent Arrow-Debreu bonds. Hence, trading re-
lationships may or may not be symmetric. Let x → y represent the situation where bank x
buys a state contingent bond from bank y which pays out when bank x receives a negative
liquidity shock. If the relationship is mutual then this represented by x ↔ y. And so we
need to consider the following directed networks: i) bilateral network (1 ↔ 2, 3 ↔ 4), ii)
complete network (1 ↔ 2, 1 ↔ 3, 1 ↔ 4, 2 ↔ 3, 2 ↔ 4, 3 ↔ 4), and iii) circular network
(1 → 2 → 3 → 4 → 1).
25This paper is an expansion of the earlier Iori and Jafarey (2001) which was published in an
econophysics journal. Further see Furﬁne (2003) for an early empirical contagion paper that
considers US banks in February-March 1998.
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knock-on eﬀects on its creditors”), and indirect (“bank failures tend to weaken the
system and drive it to an unstable state in which it becomes susceptible to further
simultaneous failures”) pathways. There are two main results on avalanches. The
ﬁrst is that “increasing inter-bank connectivity leads to increased probability of
large avalanche sizes”.26 The second is that avalanche behaviour has a power
law relationship: the log-log plot of the statistical distribution of avalanche size
is linear (see the below ﬁgure from Iori and Jafarey (2001)). The existence of
this power law relationship is consistent with the predictions of Self Ordered
Criticality (SOC) theory, (see Bak, Chen, Scheinkman and Woodford, 1993).27
26An avalanche of size k occurs when an exogenous shock is applied that causes one bank to
fail, results in a total of k− 1 further banks failing after the full shock transmission eﬀects are
considered. For example, suppose an exogenous shock disables bank 1, that the knock on eﬀects
from that disable banks 2 and 3, and that the knock on eﬀects from banks 2 and 3 disabling
in turn disable banks 4 and 5. If there are no further knock-on eﬀects then k = 1+ 2+ 2 = 5.
27Note that under SOC power-law relationships apply at the limiting state of the system.
However, the Iori et al. results are not from the limiting state of the system: with the their
model defaulting banks are never re-enabled, in the limiting state all banks are in default, and
there can be no avalanches.
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Figure 1.1: Iori and Jafarey (2001) Log-Log plot of avalanche size
However, it is not until post-crisis, that the propagation mechanism literature
has fully emerged: this focuses on considering the mechanics of how the 2007
ﬁnancial crisis could have been propagated worldwide from the US sub-prime
market. In this literature there a number of major diﬀerences compared with
Allen and Gale (2000): ﬁrstly, there is an arbitrary banking network, (there
are an arbitrary number of banks, and the network of inter-bank lending is ex-
ogenous and irrational: the lending is not microfounded, as the preferences of
banks are not speciﬁed); secondly, for each bank there is a balance sheet, (which
speciﬁes assets (loans to other banks, and external asset holdings), and liabili-
ties (customer deposits, and loans from other banks)); thirdly, the initial shock
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aﬀects bank assets rather than bank liquidity, (rather than a bank’s customers
withdrawing deposits, a bank’s investments have failed). Fourthly, this litera-
ture instead of considering social welfare, speciﬁes a propagation rule, and then
constructs impulse response functions (the cascade resulting from shocking one
bank). This is typically found using numerical simulations, although additionally
Gai and Kapadia (2010), includes a probability generating function approach,
and May and Arinaminpathy (2010), includes a mean ﬁeld approximation.28 In
contrast, my model includes bank-business externalities and assesses eﬃciency.
Mechanism papers often consider diﬀerent inter-bank propagation channels, other
than just the direct inter-bank lending channel. For example, Nier, Yang, Yorul-
mazer, and Alentorn (2007) identiﬁes four possible contagion channels: 1) inter-
bank lending, 2) asset ﬁre-sales, 3) asymmetric information (imperfect informa-
tion about bank exposures, leading to a general drop in conﬁdence), and 4) a
common source of risk. In terms of my model it is helpful to consider the pos-
sible pathways that contagion can take, in order to understand the implications
for what modularisation means in practical terms. The deﬁnition of a module is
that it contains shocks within itself: so, for modularisation to be a feasible policy
response to the ﬁrst three pathways, the following are needed respectively: 1) no
inter-module bank lending, 2) banks in separate modules hold separate classes
of assets, and 3) common knowledge on bank exposures (inter-bank lending and
bank assets).29 In terms of the fourth pathway, common risk, modules do not
28The concept of a mean ﬁeld approximation is that we ignore the distribution of a random
variable, X. So E[f(X)] ≈ f(E[x]). Hence, here the mean ﬁeld approximation means that
every bank has the same number of both credit and debtor banks. The idea of using mean
ﬁeld approximations is to ignore stochastic variation when making predictions; this contrasts
with “First order equivalence”, Malinvaud (1969), where stochastic variation is ignored when
making decisions. For another economics example of a mean ﬁeld approximation see Jackson
(2008) pp125− 129, which considers a poison network with growth. Jackson explains, “While
we might prefer to calculate things like degree distributions analytically, this usually turns out
to be intractable for all but the starkest of models.”; whilst cautioning, “Analytically, we know
distressingly little about when such approximation are good and when they are not.”
29In terms of preventing asset ﬁre-sales, we might think it suﬃcient to partition banks by
what risky assets they have, but let all bank hold a common portfolio of safe assets. The
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help.30
The stylised results of Gai and Kapadia (2010) are that, banking systems are
robust (many shocks spread to few other banks), yet fragile (some shocks spread
to many, or even all, banks). This fragility means the system has the capacity
for ﬁnancial contagion. For example, one model in Gai and Kapadia (2010)
considers when propagation occurs through both the direct (inter-bank defaults),
and indirect (asset price decreases due to ﬁre sales), channels. Their results can
be characterised in terms of z: the average degree.31 In the region of z = 1
the extent of shock propagation jumps from approximately 0% of banks, to
approximately 100% of banks.32
The main model of May and Arinaminpathy (2010) has multiple asset classes.
Each bank holds n diﬀerent assets: n− c of which are idiosyncratic; whilst c are
in a shared asset class. Each shared asset class has assets shared amongst g + 1
banks. The initial shock is assumed to cause one asset of one bank to lose all its
value. As in Gai and Kapadia (2010), the shock is then propagated through both
a direct inter-bank lending channel, and an indirect liquidity channel. However,
here the liquidity channel takes 2 forms: strong (ﬁre sales: experienced by banks
holding other assets in the same class), and weak (conﬁdence eﬀect: experienced
by banks holding other assets in diﬀerent classes). With the inclusion of these
weak liquidity eﬀects, May and Arinaminpathy (2010) generically rejects inter-
mediate propagations: “(with high initial bank net worth) very few simulations
problem here is that a shock to a certain type of risky asset, for example US sub-prime
mortgages, will cause banks holding them to experience a liquidity shock, and hence tend to
sell their liquid safe assets, for example US treasury bonds. This will decrease the value of US
treasury bonds, and hence other banks holding those assets will experience a negative shock.
So to prevent ﬁnancial contagion spreading between modules via an asset ﬁre-sales channel,
requires complete separation in terms of what assets banks in diﬀerent modules hold.
30Although it may be case that the common risk is not truly innate; so if we restrict bank
lending by class then what was a common risk becomes a bank speciﬁc risk.
31The average degree is deﬁned as follows: there is a directed network of n banks and a
typical bank i has lent money to j(i) other banks. So let z := 1/n
∑n
i=1 j(i)
32See ﬁgure 8 in Gai and Kapadia (2010)
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have any failure other than the initiating one, but the few simulations that do
show failures bring the entire system down, and thus have disproportionate ef-
fects on the average number of failures; quite small further decreases in g (initial
bank net worth), result in a much higher proportion of all banks having failed
(but still no intermediate propagations).”
So both, Gai and Kapadia (2010), and May and Arinaminpathy (2010), motivate
the assumption in my model that ﬁnancial contagion is full and immediate: a
shock hits one bank, and is then immediately propagated to all the other banks
connected to it (directly or indirectly). Similarly, in my model modularisation
is also completely eﬀective. Hence, when contagion occurs it always aﬀects all
banks in the aﬀected module, but never spreads across module boundaries. This
high cost-beneﬁt ratio gives modularisation the most chance of being an eﬀective
policy.
Gai, Haldane and Kapadia (2011) is a recent mechanism paper which contains
two innovations. Firstly it compares two diﬀerent distributions for the random
ﬁnancial network: Poisson and geometric. In a Poisson network every inter-bank
link exists with probability p and so the node degree has a Poisson distribution:
P (node degree k) = zk ∗ exp(−z)/k!
where z = p ∗ n is the average degree and n is the number of nodes.33 An
alternative random network is the geometric, or scale free network, which has
fat tails: there are more nodes with high degree than in the Poisson network.
One method of generating a geometric network is as follows: the initial network
consists of a fully connected network of m + 1 nodes; the other n − m nodes
are then added sequentially. Each of those added nodes, i, forms links with
33See Newman et al (2001) page 4.
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exactly m existing nodes, and the probability of connecting to existing node j is
proportional to the existing degree of node j. So, if dj is the existing degree of
node j, then
P (i connect to j:dj=d) = d ∗ P (i connect to j:dj=1)
The ﬁnal node distribution after all the n −m nodes have been added is given
by
P (node degree k) = 2(m2)k−3
and this can be generalised to the geometric function
P (node degree k) = γ(mγ)k−γ−1
The following motivation of this generalisation is given by Jackson (2008) on
p133. Suppose that at each time t, rather than a single node being introduced,
that a group of new nodes are introduced. Suppose that a fraction α of links are
from new nodes to existing nodes, and that a fraction 1 − α of links are from
new nodes to new nodes. This leads to the case γ ≡ 2
α
.
The second innovation is it considers haircuts: if a bank has AL liquid assets
and can borrow up to (1 − h)AL, then h is the haircut. Either a single bank
may receive an idiosyncratic haircut shock or all banks may receive an aggregate
haircut shock.
Gai, Haldane and Kapadia (2011) consider 6 diﬀerent experiments and 4 diﬀerent
policy exercises. Each of these experiments and exercises speciﬁes a calibration
of the 20 parameters. The average node degree, z, is varied and for each choice
of z, 1000 diﬀerent realisations of both the random network and the node hit by
the liquidity shock are selected. The extent of shock dissipation in each of the
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trials can then be measured. This enables the authors to estimate the average
dissipation levels for diﬀerent levels of connectivity within each experiment or
exercise.
They often ﬁnd that if a bank has more partners then a shock to any one partner
has less eﬀect, so there are tipping points z∗: if z < z∗ then Prob(contagion) ≈ 1
and if z > z∗ then Prob(contagion) ≈ 0. Experiment 1 considers a Poisson
network and then “shocks a single bank into receiving a very large adverse id-
iosyncratic haircut shock which causes it to start hoarding liquidity”. This gives
a baseline result and the tipping point z∗ ≈ 7.5. In Experiment 2, the network is
still Poisson but all banks face an increased haircut: 10% pre-shock to 20% post
crisis. As expected an initial shock now has more eﬀect and the tipping point
moves to approximately 15.
The other four experiments consider geometric networks. In Experiment 3,
shocks are randomly (uniformly) distributed. The network demonstrates re-
silience, as there is no tipping point: for all values of the average node degree,
the Prob(contagion) is less than 1 and its maximum is approximately 0.5. In
Experiment 4, the haircut shock is targeted on the highest degree node. The
result is that there is now a tipping point and it has a very high value: approx-
imately 60. Both these results are inline with the network literature: fat-tailed
networks are robust to random shocks; but vulnerable to targeted shocks.34 In
Experiment 5, there is a return to random shocks but unsecured interbank lia-
bilities are increased from 15% to 25% of the balance sheet. As in Experiment
3 there is no tipping point but the maximum probability of contagion increases
from 0.5 to 0.7. Experiment 6 ﬁxes the average connectivity, at 50, but varies the
pre-shock aggregate haircut h; the post-shock aggregate haircut is ﬁxed at 0.25.
The result is that the contagion probability is 1 for h less than approximately
34See for example (Anderson and May, 1991; Albert et al., 2000)
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0.06, and then the contagion probability decreases linearly for h up to 0.20.
Policy Exercise 1 considers the eﬀect of tougher liquidity requirements. There
is an increase in liquid asset holdings for all banks from 2% to 3.5%; resulting
in increased resilience: the maximum Prob(contagion) drops to 0.2 from 0.5
compared with Experiment 3. Policy Exercise 2, considers systemic liquidity
requirements, where banks that lend more are required to hold greater liquidity:
banks are required to hold a minimum of 2% liquid assets, plus an amount
equal to 10% of their total interbank assets. As average interbank assets are
15%, this implies average liquid asset holdings of 3.5%: the same as Policy
Exercise 1. The result is that maximum Prob(contagion) drops to 0.1 from
0.2. The interpretation is that it is eﬀective to focus liquidity requirements on
high connectivity banks. Policy Exercise 3 considers counter-cyclical liquidity
requirements to oﬀset decreases in haircuts. There is a tough rule in which
liquid assets are required to rise from 2% of total assets at an aggregate haircut
of 0.25 to 4.5% when haircuts are zero, and an alternate weak rule, in which the
liquid asset requirement only rises to 3.25%. Both rules show increased resilience
compared with Experiment 6: the maximum contagion probability is below 0.1
under the tough rule, and below 0.5 under the weak rule. Policy Exercise 4,
considers the eﬀect of more restrained behaviour by shocked banks, for example
because they have more conﬁdence in the systemic integrity of the ﬁnancial
system due to increased network transparency. So shocked banks, instead of
withdrawing all their liquidity from other banks, withdraw their liquidity needs
plus 50% of the remainder. The result is that then the probability of contagion
reduces to below 0.2 for all connectivities.
Ladley (2011) is a mechanism paper with ﬁrms as well as banks and house-
holds. Every agent has a utility function, however, agents’ actions do not have
rational microfoundations: ﬁrms and households follow behavioural rules; whilst
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the network of inter-bank lending is random. The paper considers the eﬀec-
tiveness of three diﬀerent policy responses: increasing equity ratios, increasing
reserve ratios, and constraining the maximum funds a bank may lend to a single
counter-party; but not the eﬀectiveness of modules.35 The paper includes three
robustness checks: ﬁrstly, parameter sensitivity; secondly, adding in a bank con-
ﬁdence channel, (during a crisis banks have less conﬁdence that their loans will
be repaid); and thirdly, adding in a creditworthiness channel, (riskier banks are
charged a higher interest rate when they borrow). However, ﬁrstly, the paper
has no eﬃciency assessment, and secondly, it relies on computational calculations
providing no closed form solutions.
Bank regulators get blamed more for bank failures than they are praised for suc-
cessful lending by banks to businesses. As Hahn (2011) said in his evidence to the
ICB, “The regulatory regime is always going to be penalised for failures of banks;
(but) it won’t get a reward for the economy doing well. The Government gets
the upside and the downside; the regulator only gets the downside”. A number
of the mechanism papers in this literature review have had contributions from
Bank of England employees such as, Andrew Haldane, Sujit Kapadia, Erlend
Nier, Jing Yang and Tanju Yorulmazer.36 This may partly explain the propa-
gation mechanism literature’s modelling of inter-bank externalities, rather than
bank-business externalities; lack of a business sector; lack of a welfare function;
and its focus on bank capital losses, rather than the real economy.
The policy literature, the propagation mechanism literature and the recent em-
pirical evidence, all motivate the assumption of the existence of ﬁnancial con-
tagion that this thesis makes. My aim in this thesis is to assess the validity
35Increasing equity ratios means requiring banks to hold more capital relative to their hold-
ings of risky assets; increasing the reserve ratio means forcing banks to hold more of their
assets in liquid form (for example as reserves with the central bank).
36 The Bank of England is the British central bank and (partly) responsible for bank regu-
lation.
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of the pro-module hypothesis: it will explicitly compare bank networks with or
without modules. A partition of modules can be thought of as a network with
disconnected regions, where each region has full internal links.37 In line with
Allen and Gale (2008) p19, a cost beneﬁt approach will be followed: “the costs
of avoiding crises must be traded oﬀ against the costs of allowing crises”. Whilst
bank bail outs are large in absolute terms, they are small in size relative to the
real economy costs; so in my model the cost of ﬁnancial contagion is forgone
investment opportunities, and hence is rooted in the real economy.38 Therefore,
this thesis abstracts from modelling bank balance sheets.
As in the propagation mechanism literature, I have an arbitrary number of banks.
There are three key features in common with Allen and Gale (2000): ﬁrstly, the
models have non-banks (consumers in Allen and Gale; non-ﬁnancial businesses
in this thesis); secondly, analytical methods are used; and thirdly, the results are
interpreted using a welfare function micro-founded in stakeholder utility. Under
the standard model, with a uniform distribution of business opportunities, the
conclusion is contrary to Haldane and May (2011): for all parametrisations the
use of modules is rejected as ineﬃcient. In contrast, under an alternative model,
where the matches are between neighbouring banks, the use of proper modules
is eﬃcient.
Allen and Gale (2008) p2 accepts that the ﬁnancial system has “a basic function
of allocating investment”. A credit crunch has a much greater eﬀect on businesses
than householders. Householders are unable to get extra credit (for example to
enter, or move up, the housing market), but they have got long term credit line
availability, for example through 25 year mortgages. In contrast, businesses have
ﬂoating credit lines on much shorter term lengths: this can result in them being
37Equivalently consider networks with transitive links where if x is connected to y and y is
connected to z then x is connected to z.
38Further, bank bail outs are “mostly transfers” Allen and Gale (2008) p19.
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unable to grow, or even carrying on trading. In the UK, the hearings into the
ICB interim report (Treasury Select Committee 2011a, 2011b), demonstrated a
similar focus as they asked many questions about the eﬀect the credit crunch
was having on businesses, but none on its eﬀect on consumer credit. Therefore,
my model focuses on businesses not consumers.
A third class of ﬁnancial systemic risk models, exempliﬁed by Garratt, Mahadeva
and Svirydzenka (2011), rather than using particular experimental simulations, is
more empirical in form: the aim is to summarise relevant features of the network
without imposing too many assumptions. Their approach is to use lending data
to infer contagion probabilities and hence formulate modules. The data they use
is bilateral lending claims between banks in 21 countries, on a quarterly basis
for the period 1985 Q1 to 2009 Q3. The data set was supplied by the Bank for
International Settlements and data is aggregated at the country level, with each
bank being associated with the country where their headquarters are located.
The countries present are Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Cayman Is-
lands, Switzerland, Germany, Greece, Denmark (excluding Faeroe Islands and
Greenland), Spain, Finland, France (including Monaco), United Kingdom (ex-
cluding Guernsey, Isle of Man and Jersey), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the United States.
Garratt, Mahadeva and Svirydzenka (2011) model shocks as being transmitted
through 2 channels: a credit channel (a bank defaulting on its loans transmits
stress to its creditors) and a funding channel (when a bank is hit by a shock
it reduces the funding it provides to banks it has previously lent to). In the
network, each of the n countries is represented by 2 nodes a (C)redit node and
a (F )unding node: country i has nodes Fi and Ci. So there are 4 contagion
channels between each pair of countries: considering countries 1 and 2, i) if 1
defaults then 2 has reduced funding (contagion ﬂow F1 to C2), ii) if 2 defaults
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then 1 has reduced assets (contagion ﬂow from C2 to F1), iii) if 2 defaults then
1 has reduced funding (contagion ﬂow from F2 to C1), and iv) if 1 defaults then
2 has reduced assets (contagion ﬂow from C1 to F2).
Garratt, Mahadeva and Svirydzenka (2011) use an ad hoc model to translate
funding and credit levels into contagion probabilities. Recalling that there are
both credit and funding nodes: let x be a 2n∗2n matrix representing the absolute
amount of bilateral lending for each pair of nodes. Lending is always between
funding and credit nodes so x(Fi, Fj) = 0 and x(Ci, Cj) = 0. Further, the
amount lent from Fi to Cj is the same as the amount received by Cj from Fi. So
x(Fi, Cj) = x(Cj, Fi) represents the value of loans that banks in country j have
made to banks in country i.
Except for the special case of within country contagion (contagion between fund-
ing and credit nodes of the same country), contagion weight v is the same as
the bilateral lending. So between funding and credit nodes in diﬀerent countries,
contagion weight is given by the lending level. So v(Fi, Cj) = x(Fi, Cj) = v(Cj,
Fi) = x(Cj, Fi). There is no intra-funding or intra-credit node contagion: so
v(Fi, Fj) = 0 and v(Ci, Cj) = 0. In the special case of intra-country contagion,
the weight is given by the total level of outside funding that the country has:
v(Fi, Ci) =
∑n
j=1 x(Fi, Cj). The contagion weights v, are normalised to form the
contagion probabilities π, π(Ci, Fj) =
v(Ci,Fj)∑n
k=1 v(Ck,Fj)
and π(Fi, Cj) =
v(Fi,Cj)∑n
k=1 v(Fk,Cj)
.
The prestige pCi or pFi of a node is deﬁned as the steady state probability of
a shock being at that node. So the prestige vector p over all 2n nodes is a
steady state solution of the π transition matrix, hence: p = πp. Similarly, pm,
the prestige of module m is given by the sum of the prestiges of all the nodes
contained in module m. This prestige can be thought of as the frequency with
which shocks visit the module.
Finally modules are formed from the contagion probabilities. The nodes are
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classiﬁed using 2 types of book: a single index book and (generically) multiple
code books. In the index book, each module has a single entry. There is one
code book per module, and each code book has 1 entry for each bank in that
module. For intra-module travel, where a shock travels between 2 nodes in the
same module, just the single code book is used. Whilst with inter-module travel,
where a shock jumps to a new module, both the index book and the code book
for the new module is used. It is more costly to use 2 books than 1, but it is also
more costly to use nodes which have higher entry numbers in a code book. So
the question is how can nodes be arranged into modules to minimise this cost?
Garratt, Mahadeva and Svirydzenka (2011) ﬁnd the best partition using an
entropy method. The entropy cost of a probability measure z is given by, H(z) =∑
zi ∗ Log[zi]. The entropy cost of a partition M, consisting of M modules, is
given by L(M) = q ∗ H(Q) +∑Mm=1 pm ∗ H(Pm), where q is the aggregate exit
probability of all the modules, H(Q) is the entropy cost of the index book, pm
is the prestige of module m and H(Pm) is the entropy cost of the module m
codebook.
Clustering is done at each date from 1985 Q1 to 2009 Q3. The results suggest a
great deal of instability in the modularisation: there are 25 diﬀerent partitions
over the 99 quarters:
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Table 1.1: Garratt, Mahadeva and Svirydzenka (2011) Number of Modules by
quarter
Starting Number of Number of
Quarter Quarters Lifetime Modules
1985 Q1 6 19
1986 Q3 4 18
1987 Q3 7 17
1989 Q2 1 18
1989 Q3 1 17
1989 Q4 9 19
1992 Q1 1 19
1992 Q2 1 19
1992 Q3 5 19
1993 Q4 13 18
1997 Q1 1 16
1997 Q2 8 18
1999 Q2 5 17
2000 Q3 1 16
2000 Q4 1 17
2001 Q1 4 16
2002 Q1 4 17
2003 Q1 6 16
2004 Q3 2 17
2005 Q1 1 16
2005 Q2 10 17
2007 Q4 4 17
2008 Q4 1 18
2009 Q1 1 17
2009 Q2 2 18
Given that there are 21 countries, in every period the estimated partition is close
to the atomistic partition. We can simplify the picture by abstracting away from
some of the non-key modules: these mainly consist of geographic relationships
or of a small country’s banks being interlinked with those of a big neighbour.
Firstly, the Cayman Islands are in the same module as the US in every quarter.
Garratt, Mahadeva and Svirydzenka (2011) acknowledge this as, “reﬂecting the
fact that the Cayman Islands is an oﬀshore centre for US banking. The IMF
(International Monetary Fund) recently estimated that 57% of the assets of the
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Cayman Islands banking system are overnight sweep accounts in branches of
US banks.”. Secondly, Luxembourg is in a two member module with Germany
for 89 of the 99 quarters: in one of the other quarters it shares a module with
Switzerland and in the other 9 it is in a singleton module. Thirdly, for one
quarter Canada shares a module with the US: the rest of the time Canada is in
a singleton Module. Fourthly, for 5 quarters the Netherlands and Belgium are in
a 2 member module: the rest of the time they are in singleton modules. Fifthly,
since 1999 q2, in every quarter Finland and Sweden have been in the same
module, and since 2001 q1 for every quarter they have been joined by Denmark.
Ignoring these links leaves the following signiﬁcant non-singleton modules:
Table 1.2: Garratt, Mahadeva and Svirydzenka (2011)
Signiﬁcant non-singleton Modules by quarter
Period Signiﬁcant
Period Lifetime non-Singleton Modules
1985 Q1 6
1986 Q3 4 UK, Japan
1987 Q3 7 UK, Japan, US
1989 Q2 1 UK, Japan
1989 Q3 1 UK, Japan, US
1989 Q4 9
1992 Q1 1 UK, Switzerland
1992 Q2 1
1992 Q3 38 UK, Switzerland
2002 Q1 4
2003 Q1 6 UK, Switzerland
2004 Q3 21
This table shows that there are 2 signiﬁcant deviations from the atomistic par-
tition. The authors note the ﬁrst of these: the series of modules in the 3 year
period from 1986 Q3 to 1989 Q3, involving Japan, the United Kingdom, the
United States and the Cayman Islands: “In the late 1980s four important ﬁ-
nancial centres formed one large supercluster”. The second is the UK Swiss
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relationship covering 45 of the 50 of the quarters starting with 1992 Q1.
One of the robustness checks that Garratt, Mahadeva and Svirydzenka (2011)
carried out was to, “(employ) the map equation on the data set before splitting
into funding and credit arms to see if that could generate some interesting mod-
ular structure without splitting out these two channels that allow for intrabank
claims.” However, when this was done, their algorithm always reported that
there is only one module for every period. So in this case they have found the
other boundary solution of the grand coalition.
My model is parsimonious, and assesses a speciﬁc policy proposal in a believ-
able, internally consistent scenario; it is not an attempt to do a multi-channel
calibrated model of, for example the 2007–2009 ﬁnancial crisis. This gives the
standard model tractability (through a quasiconvexity argument); the variations
considered in the second chapter are harder to do algebraically, but computa-
tional methods still give clear results.
1.4 Model Overview
This section starts with a visualisation story, and then continues with an overview
of the model, the solution methodology, and its results. Subsequent sections then
formally deﬁne the model and derive the results.
Imagine a small town consisting of a series of two storey buildings, each occu-
pied by a single married couple. The wife works downstairs as a banker, and the
husband upstairs as a businessman. The husband creates an invention which is
clever and interesting; but not necessarily useful. The wife takes the invention
and searches for another wife, whose husband has produced a compatible inven-
tion, which it can be matched with, in order to produce a completed sellable
ﬁnished product.
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The buildings are arranged in rows and each row forms a street.39 Wives have
close social connections to women in their own street, but are more distant from
women in other streets. So, if a matching invention is present in the same street,
then the match is certain to be successfully completed, but if the matching
invention is in a diﬀerent street, then the match may fail to occur.
The buildings can receive negative shocks in the form of lightning strikes: every
period, each building has an independent and identical probability of being hit by
a lightning strike. The eﬀect of a strike is communal within streets (a lightning
strike to one building burns down all buildings in a street), but idiosyncratic
between streets (streets are separated enough so that ﬁre cannot spread inter-
street). Couples from a ﬁre-damaged building cannot operate commercially until
their house is repaired.
Fire-damaged streets require planning permission before they can be rebuilt, and
each period each ﬁre-damaged street has an independent and identical probabil-
ity of getting planning permission. When the repairs occur, all houses in a street
are repaired at once. Since ﬁre and repairs both aﬀect all the houses in a street
simultaneously, at any time all the buildings in a street will be in the same state:
either all operating normally, or all ﬁre-damaged and non-operational.
The cost of ﬁre and the beneﬁts of business matches generate a trade oﬀ: if a
street has a lot of buildings, then ﬁre has a large cost; conversely, if a street
contains only a few buildings, then it is harder to complete matches. So the
question facing a town planner in this environment is: “What is the best town
plan?”. The model constructed in this chapter, answers that, the town planner
always rejects proper partitions: street plans where there are both more than
one street, and more than one house per street. My model argues, speciﬁcally,
that for all parameterisations every interior partition is strictly dominated by at
39We allow the extreme case of a street consisting of a single building: a row of length one.
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least one of the boundary partitions, so the eﬃcient partition is always either the
grand coalition (one street with all the buildings in it), or the atomistic partition
(one building per street).40 This choice between these 2 partitions depends on
the parameter values.41
Now, I will overview the banking model, which is formed by a simple equivalence
from the town planning model in terms of: stakeholders (husbands become busi-
nesses, wives become banks, and the town planner becomes the social planner);
business opportunities (go from needing both of a matched pair of husbands to
needing both of a matched pair of business); negative shocks initiation (exoge-
nous stochastic lightning strikes become exogenous stochastic disabling ﬁnancial
shocks); shock propagation (ﬁre transferring between adjoining buildings be-
comes shocks passing between connected banks); the negative eﬀect of shocks
(couples unable to take advantage of their invention become businesses unable
to take advantage of their business opportunities); and the recovery process (the
stochastic planning permission granting process becomes a stochastic bank re-
covery process).
The banking model in this thesis has two classes of stakeholders: banks and
(non-ﬁnancial) businesses. In the standard model, banks and businesses have
aligned interests, so mathematically, it would be possible to construct the model
with only one class. However, it is more natural to use two classes as there are
two sectors to the economy (ﬁnancial and business), and it makes interpretation
cleaner as the investment opportunities are then clearly rooted in the business
sector. Further, it lets us more easily consider extensions, where banks and
businesses have diﬀerent interests.
The role of businesses is to produce socially beneﬁcial products; the role of banks
40This result holds for all shock probabilities, all recovery probabilities, all ratios of inter-
street to within-street match values, and all population sizes.
41For a critical curve of parameters both the boundary partitions are eﬃcient
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is to facilitate investment between businesses. The stakeholders are risk neutral,
both for tractability, and in line with the Haldane-Simon watchmaker analogy.
There is no bank–business strategic interaction: each bank has a representative
client business, (section 2.2.2.2 shows that there are still boundary solutions
when we allow multiple businesses per bank.); businesses do not move between
banks, (a motivation for this would be that, when a module is enabled there is no
incentive for them to move, and when a module is disabled it is not feasible); and
there is an exogenous split of investment returns between banks and businesses,
(the eﬃciency results are robust to the addition of negotiation between banks
and businesses over the distribution of investment returns, as long as the scenario
where business opportunities are lost because negotiations break down does not
occur).
The businesses are using banks to facilitate business investment. So, it is more
natural to think of businesses which are medium sized; rather than small (which
are family funded, for example by personal mortgages), or large (which have
access to the stock market). The business opportunities come in the form of
matches that requires two ﬁrms: for example, a ﬁnished product that requires
both a manufacturing company and a service company.42 The value of matches
depends on whether the matches are inside (banks in same module), or outside
(banks in diﬀerent modules). Inside matches are of greater value than outside
matches, because for example outside matches have higher transaction or search
costs. The distribution of matches between businesses is independent of which
banks the businesses use. Each match is identically distributed, and so we can
just consider the value of a single sample business transaction.
Banks are either enabled or disabled : enabled banks can facilitate; disabled
42In the Fire-Invention analogy, the wives actively match inventions; whilst in the bank-
business model, banks are required to provide banking services to businesses, in order for their
exogenous matches to be productive.
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banks cannot. Disabled banks need not be insolvent: they may be rebuilding
their capital buﬀers and hence be unable to lend. Both businesses in the match
need banking services, so in order for a match to be productive, both banks need
to be enabled. So if either one or both banks are disabled, then the match is
unproductive, and of no value.43 When productive, the social beneﬁt of an inside
match is 2, whilst that of an outside match is 2θ < 2.
The model assumes risk neutrality and comparable utility, so the micro-allocation
of returns is not relevant for welfare. However, for notational simplicity, assume
that returns are split equally into four quarters: each bank and each business
in the match gets a quarter of the total. So with an inside match each bank or
business gets 0.5, and with an outside match each gets 0.5θ.
The ﬁnancial economy is at risk of being hit by negative disabling ﬁnancial
shocks: these cause enabled banks to become disabled. Similarly, there is a
stochastic recovery process that repairs disabled banks, and thus re-enables
them. These disabling and enabling shocks combine to form a Markov process.44
Each module is modelled as being at this Markov process’s stationary distribu-
tion. The intertemporal model in section 2.4.1 shows that this assumption is
robust.
The ﬁnancial shocks will be formulated in discrete time, before considering the
model in continuous time. In the discrete version, each period each enabled bank
is independently with probability q hit by a shock. If a shock arrives, it then
spreads to all other banks in the same module immediately, and with certainty.
43One motivation for a business not being able to borrow from an outside bank would be the
use of relationship lending, (banks making lending decisions using information collected both
historically and at the time of the lending decision); rather than transaction lending, (banks
making lending decisions using information collected only at the time of the lending decision),
(see Berger (2010) and DeYoung (2010)).
44The idea of a Markov process is that the current state, but not past state(s), matter in
determining future states. The formal deﬁnition of Markov chains (the type of Markov process
used in this thesis), is given in appendix B.
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Each period a disabled module gets re-enabled with probability ρ. So, all banks
in the same module are in the same state. Taking a continuous time limit of
this process has two gains: it is more realistic and more tractable. The Markov
process only has two states, so to align the discrete and continuous time versions
we just need to equate the leaving times of each state.45
There is a trade oﬀ in module size: the beneﬁt of large modules is that more of
the matches are inside one module, and hence (when productive), are of higher
value; the cost of large modules is that shocks have larger eﬀects, so large modules
are less likely to be enabled, and hence matches are less likely to be productive.
The decision maker, whether the social planner or the banker, makes this choice
under an ex-ante basis: they know the parameter values and the probability
distribution of both shocks and business opportunities; but do not know the
actual future realisations of either the shocks, or the business opportunities.
The standard model assumes that the system is already at the limiting state of
the Markov process of shocks. So when the economy is centralised, the social
planner makes the choice of bank partition using a farsighted utilitarian welfare
function; in contrast, when the economy is decentralised, modules are formed by
banks playing one of the games described in sections 1.8 and 2.3.3.
This stochastic formulation can be motivated in terms of modelling methodology,
stakeholders’ preferences, and the feasibility constraints that bank regulators
face. There are two methodological reasons. Firstly, Appendix C shows that
the Markov process converges exponentially fast, which provides re-assurance
that errors in early periods from the system being far from its limiting state are
not likely to be signiﬁcant. Secondly, the Markov process formulation means
that after a disabled module is re-enabled, the social planner has no reason
to change their original choice of partition. This is because the social planner
45See Appendix C for the details.
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has gained no extra information: no learning has occurred as they started with
perfect information about the system’s parameters. Hence, they are in the same
position as when they made their initial choice.
There are two preference arguments. Firstly, choosing the structure of banking
systems is a long run decision, and the model reﬂects this: it is reasonable to
focus on the welfare of future generations. Secondly, Section 2.4.1 shows that
the results are robust to considering an intertemporal model where welfare is
summed over all time periods, rather than being evaluated just at the limiting
state.
There are three feasibility explanations: ﬁrstly, in the form of what information
the social planner receives, and how they can use it; secondly, there are lags in
the eﬀectiveness of module changes; and thirdly, the evidence of the response to
the 2007–2009 ﬁnancial crisis. In terms of information, ﬁrstly, the social planner
does not receive the signals required to manipulate the economy for short term
advantage: in the ﬁnancial sector, they cannot predict which banks will go bust;
and in the business sector, they cannot predict what the future business matches
will be. Secondly, it is not feasible to re-structure inter-bank links continually:
so even if they had short run information then they would not be able to use it.
There are lagged eﬀects both when modules merge and when they split. After
a merger, it takes time for banks that were previously in diﬀerent modules to
move closer, gain trust in each other, or communicate better. Hence, the full
business beneﬁts of being in the same module do not appear immediately in the
form of lower transaction costs, or more eﬀective matching. Similarly, after a
split, it takes time for shock propagation channels between banks to disappear.
And so the full gains that module separation oﬀers in preventing ﬁnancial shock
propagation do not appear immediately.
The response to the crisis has shown four relevant points. Firstly, during a crisis
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the regulator is ﬁre ﬁghting, not ﬁre preventing: they are focused on ﬁxing bad
banks, not changing relationships between the remaining good banks. Secondly,
re-organising banks is a slow process: it is already 5 years since the ﬁnancial crisis
started and not much change has occurred; for example 4 years had passed before
the ICB report was produced. Thirdly, the changes that are currently happening
are explained by learning (regulators were previously too optimistic about light
touch banking regulation), rather than by regulators having a pre-crisis planned
strategy of state conditional actions. Fourthly, the currently planned changes
to banking regulation are not conditional on the occurrence of bank failures.
For example, there are three diﬀerent sets of possible changes to bank reserve
requirements: 1) higher reserve requirements for all banks all the time; 2) reserve
requirements made pro business cycle, (higher when there is lots of business
lending, lower when there is less), to smooth out lending; and 3) higher reserve
requirements for banks with riskier lending. However, there is no requirement
that one bank being in crisis means that another has a diﬀerent reserve level.
The solution methodology developed in this work is as follows. There are many
possible diﬀerent partitions of n banks, and it is hard to systematically assess
them all. However, we know that a partition that maximises a utilitarian welfare
function must be Pareto optimal. So, we start by looking for Pareto optimal
partitions, and in particular for Pareto optimal partitions that maximise the
expected utility of bank 1. If the partition that maximises the expected utility
of bank 1 is symmetric, then we know that it gives the same expected utility to
all the other banks.46 Hence it is the only Pareto optimal partition, and hence
the solution to the welfare maximisation program.
46Utility is assumed to be non-transferable. If instead utility is transferable, then the social
planner ex-ante will still want to maximise the total expected value of all business matches,
and ex-post will give all the surplus to bank 1. Hence the social planner will still choose the
same (trivial) partition.
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Without loss of generality, we assume that bank 1 is in module 1. We have
negative externalities: if two other modules merge then this makes bank 1 worse
oﬀ.47 So, bank 1 will want the banks not in module 1 to be in singleton modules,
and so will choose a partition of form {x1, 1, 1, ....1, 1, 1}, where x1 ∈ An := {1,
2, 3, 4.....n}. Let v1[x1] be the expected utility function for a member of module
1 (hereafter the utility function), and deﬁne x∗1 := argmaxx1∈An v1[x1]. We can
now ﬁnd x∗1 using standard single variable calculus methods.
The solution can, potentially, either be on the boundary (x∗1 = 1 or x∗1 = n),
or in the interior (1 < x∗1 < n). If x∗1 = 1 then the atomistic partition of
singletons {1, 1, .....1, 1} maximises v1, and by symmetry this partition gives all
banks the same utility. So the atomistic partition is then the only Pareto optimal
partition, and so maximises the utilitarian welfare function. Similarly, if x∗1 = n
then the grand coalition {n} maximises v1, is the only Pareto optimal partition,
and so maximises the utilitarian welfare function. Either the atomistic partition
of singletons or the grand coalition, will be called trivial partitions or boundary
partitions. Any partition which is neither the atomistic partition, nor the grand
coalition is a non-trivial partition, and also will be called an interior partition.
Conversely, if it was the case that 1 < x∗1 < n then there would be a non-trivial
Pareto optimal partition, and there might be a non-trivial partition that maxim-
ised the welfare function. However, under the standard model, such non-trivial
partitions are rejected for all parameterisations. Speciﬁcally, ﬁx a parametrisa-
tion (number of banks (n), shock probability (q), recovery probability (ρ), and
value of outside matches (θ)); then every feasible interior partition is strictly
dominated by at least one of the boundary partitions. And hence the eﬃcient
47Without loss of generality, consider a merger between modules 2 and 3, where bank 2 is a
member of module 2. Bank 2 is now less likely to be enabled due to the exposure to ﬁnancial
contagion from module 3, but bank 2 is still an outsider to bank 1. So ex-ante a match between
banks 1 and bank 2 has less expected value. Hence bank 1 is worse oﬀ.
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conﬁguration is proved to be a trivial partition: it is either the grand coalition
{n} or the atomistic partition {1, 1....1, 1}.48 Generically, the solution set will
consist of just one of the two boundary partitions; although, on a critical curve
of parameters the solution set consists of both boundary partitions.
The intuition behind these results is that there are increasing marginal returns
from more modules. If there is only one module, then P (outside match) = 0, and
P (a match is productive : one module is disabled) = 0. Whilst if the number of
modules is increased to two, then P (outside match) = 1/2, and
P (a match is productive:one module is disabled) = 1/4: productivity requires
that both the matched businesses are in the enabled module. More generally,
suppose there are k equally sized modules, then P (outside match) = (k−1)/k
and P (a match is productive:one module is disabled) = ((k−1)/k)2. This leads
to one way of understanding the rejection of interior partitions. The “cost” of
modules comes from outside matches; whilst the “beneﬁt” comes from the re-
silience the system has to shocks. So these two probabilities can be used to
estimate the cost and beneﬁt of modules. Hence the “beneﬁt” ((k−1)/k)2 is the
square of the “cost” (k−1)/k: so there are increasing marginal returns. This
explanation abstracts from a number of factors: for example, how module en-
ablement probability changes with the number of modules, and the possibility
of multiple modules being disabled. These factors are all included in the math-
ematical model given in the next section and the proofs given in subsequent
sections.
The choice between the two trivial partitions can be interpreted as follows: ce-
teris paribus , increasing n past a critical value causes a switch in the eﬃcient
solution from the grand coalition, to the atomistic partition of singletons. The
explanation is that as the number of banks increases, the probability of the one
48Eﬃcient in terms either of Pareto optimality or utilitarian welfare maximisation.
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all-encompassing module being enabled tends to zero.
A second interpretation is to consider the three cases of necessity , co-ordination
and protection. When outside matches are of low value, θ ≤ 1
n
, we need the
grand coalition to get a worthwhile return from the business opportunities. This
is the necessity story and it holds irrespective of the level of shocks. When there
are low levels of shocks, γ < 1−θ
(θn−1) , the eﬃcient solution is to co-ordinate all the
banks: keep them in sync through the grand coalition. Only if both the outside
matches are of high value, θ > 1
n
, and there are high levels of shocks, γ > 1−θ
(θn−1) ,
do we need the protection of singleton modules.49
A third interpretation is that it depends on the relative values of outside and
inside matches (θ = (θ/1)), and the relative enablement probabilities (P [n]
P [1]
). If
θ <P [n]
P [1]
, then the grand coalition is eﬃcient. If θ =P [n]
P [1]
, then both the trivial
partitions are eﬃcient. If θ >P [n]
P [1]
, then the atomistic partition is eﬃcient.
If the matching process is changed from uniform to circular (imagine a circle of
banks, where a business opportunity is always between immediate neighbours),
then for module sizes above two the welfare function is now quasi-concave, and
hence the eﬃcient solution is generally interior. This case is covered in section
2.2.1.1.
One key stability concept used is Extended Equilibrium Binding Agreement
(EEBA), from Diamantoudi and Xue (2007), which is fully deﬁned in section 1.8
below. The EEBA is an extension of Equilibrium Binding Agreement (EBA),
from Ray and Vohra (1997).50 Under the EBA modules can only split; whilst
under the EEBA there is complete ﬂexibility: not only can existing modules
split and merge, but it is feasible for any coalition to deviate, and form a new
module or modules. In both concepts, they choose to do so if it makes sense
49For completeness, with γ = 1−θ(θn−1) there is indiﬀerence between the two trivial partitions.
50If the EBA is used instead similar results are obtained, but with the EEBA interpretation
is cleaner.
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on a farsighted basis: they accurately predict how other banks will respond to
their initial deviation, and deviate if they prefer the ﬁnal state to the current
state. A partition is stable if there are no feasible deviations from it which are
farsightedly rational. Under the standard model, the trivial partitions are stable
if and only if they are eﬃcient.51 If we consider a variant model, where there are
short run banks (zero lifetimes), then for all parametrisations the grand coalition
is always stable, and no other partition is stable (see section 2.3.2.1).52
In the rest of this chapter: section 1.5 describes in detail the standard model;
section 1.7 ﬁnds its eﬃcient solutions; section 1.8 investigates their stability;
section 1.9 calculates the eﬃcient partition under diﬀerent parametrisations; and
ﬁnally section 1.10 considers the policy implications.
1.5 The Standard Model
This section formally deﬁnes the standard model. As motivated in the Model
Overview pages 58-60, we will be evaluating the model at its asymptotic steady
state. There are n identical risk neutral banks; each bank has a risk neutral
business as a client. Banks facilitate investment between ‘real’ economy busi-
nesses. Each bank is either enabled or disabled. A pair of businesses each has
half of a business opportunity. Each business needs their bank to be enabled in
order for the match to be productive.53
Unproductive matches are of value 0. Productive matches are valued diﬀer-
ently depending on whether the matched banks are in the same module (inside
51Further, under the generic case of there being a unique eﬃcient outcome, no non-trivial
partition is stable.
52This assumes that all the banks start enabled. If any are disabled then the same analysis
applies just with the disabled banks excluded.
53As the bank-business relationships are ﬁxed we can, without risk of confusion, talk about
matches between banks rather than between businesses.
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matches), or in diﬀerent modules (outside matches):
Table 1.3: Standard Model Productive Matches: Distribution of Investment
returns
Match Business 1 Bank 1 Bank 2 Business 2 Total
Inside 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 2
Outside 0.5θ 0.5θ 0.5θ 0.5θ 2θ < 2
The timings of the model are as follows:
1. Nature determines the system’s parameters (n, θ, γ), where n ∈ N is the
number of banks, θ ∈ (0, 1) is the relative value of outside matches and
γ ∈ (0,∞) is the shock parameter.54 These values are common knowledge.
2. The decision maker (social planner or any of the banks), determines a
partition (xi ∈ N1)ki=1 of N = {1, 2, 3....n}, the set of banks, such that∑k
i=1 xi = n, and (xi ≥ 1)ki=1 .55 The ﬁrst constraint means that banks can
be grouped, but not created or destroyed; the second requires a minimum
module size of one. Let P be the feasible set of partitions that satisfy both
these constraints.
3. The system is evaluated at its steady state. So Nature determines the state
of each module independently using the stationary distribution, meaning
that56
P (Module i enabled) =
1
1 + γxi
54Firstly, I exclude boundary parameter values for simplicity, but with them the key results
remain. Secondly, Appendix C shows that the continuous time model that equates to the
discrete time model has γ = −Log[1−q]−Log[1−ρ] , where q is the bank disabling shock probability and ρ
is the module re-enabling probability.
55Banks are ex-ante identical so we can identify a partition just in terms of the number of
banks in each module.
56The derivation of this form for the module enablement probability is given in Appendix C
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4. Nature allocates a random business opportunity, which is uniformly dis-
tributed on N2. So (P (b1, b2) = 1/n2)
n
b1,b2=1
.57
5. Return is stochastically distributed:
Table 1.4: Standard Model Social Return Distribution
Match Social Return Probability
Productive:- Inside 2
∑k
i=1
(
x2i
n2
P [xi]
)
Productive:- Outside 2θ
∑k
i=1
(∑
j =i
xixj
n2
P [xi]P [xj]
)
Unproductive 0 1− P (Return is 2)− P (Return is 2θ)
Consider a partition x = (xi)ki=1. Let Vi[x] be the ex-ante expected total return
to all banks in module i.58 Let vi[x]:= 1xiVi[x] be the ex-ante unit expected return:
the expected return to a single bank in module i. Let W [x] :=
∑k
i=1 Vi[x] be the
social planner’s ex-ante welfare function.
For a (generally asymmetric) partition, x:
• Bank Payoﬀ: vi[(xj)kj=1] :=
xi
n2
P [xi] +
∑
j =i θ
xj
n2
P [xi]P [xj]
• Module Worth Vi[(xj)kj=1] :=
x2i
n2
P [xi] +
∑
j =i θ
xixj
n2
P [xi]P [xj]
• Welfare: W [(xi)ki=1] :=
k∑
i=1
(
x2i
n2
P [xi] +
∑
j =i
θ
xixj
n2
P [xi]P [xj]
)
For the particular case of a symmetric partition, consisting of k modules each
with d members, then, with a slight abuse of notation, these evaluate to:
• Bank Payoﬀ vi[d] := dn2P [d] + θ
(n−d)
n2
P 2[d]
• Module Worth V i[d] := d
2
n2
P [d] + θ d(n−d)
n2
P 2[d]
• Welfare W [d] := d
n
P [d] + θ (n−d)
n
P 2[d]
57Allowing the self match (b1, b1) makes the results cleaner. Without them we still always
reject non-trivial partitions: just that the parameter condition for switching between the two
trivial partitions is more complicated.
58As the banks and the businesses get the same return we can just consider the bank return.
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So far we have been considering the return of a bank in module i, rather than
the preferences of a generic bank j. These are linked by the straightforward
condition, that j prefers the partition where its module gets the highest per
bank return. So x j x∗ if and only if vi[x] > vi∗ [x∗] : where j is in modules
i and i∗ for partitions x and x∗ respectively. This completes our deﬁnition of
what Diamantoudi and Xue (2007) call a simple coalition formation game with
externalities. It is also a symmetric game in the sense of Yi (2003).
1.6 Partition Form Games
In co-operative game theory the main focus is on coalition formation rather
than on the question of what coalition structure is the most eﬃcient. And it
is often assumed that the grand coalition will form; as Maskin (2003), in his
Presidential address to the Econometric Society, says “Perhaps one reason that
cooperative theory has not been more inﬂuential on the mainstream is that its
two most important solution concepts for games of three or more players, the
core and the Shapley value, presume that the grand coalition—the coalition of
all players—always forms.”. The formation, and eﬃciency, of the grand coalition
is often driven by the assumption of superadditivity : “A game is superadditive if
the union of two disjoint coalitions can obtain at least the sum of the payoﬀs of
the two separate coalitions”, (Maskin, 2008). A second criticism is that: “most
cooperative theory ignores externalities, the possibility that a coalition can be
aﬀected by the actions of those not in the coalition”, (Maskin, 2008). In contrast
to such characteristic form games (CFGs), with partition form games (PFGs),
there are externalities: how outside agents are grouped does aﬀect you.59 This
same diﬀerence exists between PFGs and Club Goods models: see Appendix J
59See Deﬁnition 7 in Section 1.7.
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for more details.
This section reviews the partition form game literature and explains how my
standard model from Section 1.5 ﬁts into that literature. Next, section 1.7
establishes properties for a general partition model under which the eﬃcient
partition is either the grand coalition or the atomistic partition of singletons,
and shows that Section 1.5 constructs such a model. Then Section 1.8 starts
by considering the extra diﬃculties in considering stability within PFGs; before
applying the Extended Equilibrium Binding Agreement (EEBA) to the general
partition model. The standard model is solved using four further solution con-
cepts in Section 2.3.3: the three concepts used by Yi (1997) for symmetric games
(The Simultaneous-Move Open Membership Game, The Unanimity Game and
Equilibrium Binding Agreement (EBA)); as well as a PFG developed version of
the Jackson Wolinsky (1996) network solution concept of bilateral stability.
In this section, ﬁrst I consider the literature on partition formation, and start
with attempts to extend the two main characteristic form solution concepts, the
Shapley value and the core, to partition form games. Then I consider the two
main approaches developed speciﬁcally to solve partition form games: blocking
and bargaining. Second I consider eﬃciency conditions for partition form games;
I start with superadditivity and how that condition needs to be altered in PFGs
in order to ensure grand coalition eﬃciency. Some of the applications of these
approaches to my standard model are included in the subsequent Eﬃciency and
Stability sections, which focus on hedonic games.
Maskin (2003) develops an extension of the Shapley value for superadditive par-
tition form games.60 Maskin assumes four axioms for the partition formed and
the payoﬀ allocation.61 The ﬁrst axiom requires that coalitional worth not be
60See Shapley (1953).
61The axiom descriptions are adapted from Ray(2007), as well as of course Maskin (2003).
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wasted: the payoﬀ allocation must be such that the sum of payoﬀs allocated to
members of each coalition equals the worth of that coalition. The second and
third axioms consider players’ marginal contributions: the second axiom requires
that each player be assigned to a coalition where their marginal contribution is
highest; the third requires that she indeed be allocated this marginal contribu-
tion. The fourth axiom requires inter-stage consistency: the ﬁnal payoﬀs and
partition that result if the partition of the ﬁrst j− 1 players has already formed,
should be the same as those that result if player j then joins the coalition to
which his gross marginal contribution is greatest.
Maskin (2003) argues that when there are signiﬁcant positive externalities, due
to the free rider eﬀects, it is unreasonable to assume that the grand coalition
will form; whilst conversely with negative externalities “the likelihood of the
grand coalition forming would only be strengthened”. He states three theorems.
Theorem 1 is an existence result: for any superadditive partition form game,
and any order of players there is a solution satisfying his axioms. Theorem 2 is
a grand coalition formation result: if the PFG is superadditive and has negative
externalities then the grand coalition will form. Theorem 3 is that his axioms
are indeed an extension of the Shapley Value CFG concept: if the PFG is super-
additive and there are no externalities, then taking the average over all the n!
orderings generates exactly the Shapley value. He provides detailed proofs for
the 3 player case and claims, “The extension to n > 3 (more than 3 players),
uses exactly the same methods.”. However, counter examples with 4 players
are provided in Hafalir (2007), and Cao and Yang (2011).62 This motivates
why the later papers considered below have considered stronger and diﬀerent
conditions from bilateral superadditivity , such as supermodularity , multilateral
superadditivity and grand coalition superadditivity.
62Cao and Yang (2011) provide a counter example for Theorem 1; whilst Hafalir (2007)
provides counter-examples for Theorems 2 and 3.
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The second approach used to solve characteristic form games is the core: the
set of feasible allocations v = (vj)nj=1 that cannot be blocked by any deviating
coalition D.63 And we say that D blocks v, if coalition D can deviate and make
themselves all better oﬀ. Formally, Ø  D and
(
ucfj [D] > vj
)
j∈D. Note that
here the group D of deviators don’t need to consider how the residual players
N \D respond, as it is a CFG their payoﬀ is independent of how N \D partition
themselves into coalitions.
However, in contrast, in partition form games how the residual agents structure
themselves does matter. This is a well known issue and, hence with PFGs
there are diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the core depending on how we model the other
agents structuring themselves in respond to the deviation. For example, Hafalir
(2007) provides 4 diﬀerent deﬁnitions: the ﬁrst, the s-core, is the core with
singleton expectations: the deviators D expect N \ D to partition themselves
into singletons; the second, the c-core, is the core with cautious (pessimistic;
punishing) expectations: the deviators D expect N \D to partition themselves
into the partition that minimises the value of the module D; the third, the m-
core, is the core with merging expectations: the deviators D expect the members
of N \ D to merge and form a single module in response; and the fourth, the
r-core, is the core with rational expectations: the deviators D expect N \D to
partition themselves into the partition that maximises the value of N \ D. In
models with negative externalities, such as those considered here, the punishment
response and the merging response are the same and hence the c-core and the
m-core are the same. Further, within my standard model deviating from the
eﬃcient partition makes both the deviators and the non-deviators (weakly) worse
oﬀ; hence for all 4 deﬁnitions of the core, the core contains the eﬃcient partitions
payoﬀs.
63Feasibility means that for some partition π, the payoﬀ of π is greater than or equal to∑n
j=1 vj . It often assumed that this partition is the grand coalition.
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A more subtle issue is the question of what allocations are feasible. If the Grand
Coalition is eﬃcient then the set of feasible allocations simply consists of the
v = (vj)
n
j=1 such that
∑
j∈N vj ≤ V [N, {N}], where V [N, {N}] is the worth
of the grand coalition. With PFGs there is often an implicit assumption that
the grand coalition is eﬃcient: Hafalir (2007) explicitly assumes supermodularity
which make the grand coalition eﬃcient, but then is implicit about the feasible
allocations when deﬁning the core; whilst McQuillin (2009), when describing an
extension and generalisation of Shapley approach to PFGs, acknowledges “the
implicit supposition in the (his) Eﬃciency axiom that” the grand coalition is
eﬃcient. However, if this assumption no longer holds, and it is not (necessar-
ily) the case that the grand coalition is eﬃcient, then we need to deﬁne what
are the feasible allocations. One way is as follows, and for each partition to
allow transferable utility within modules, but not between modules. So the feas-
ible allocations allowed by partition π = (πi)ki=1 are vπ = (vπj )nj=1 such that∑
j∈πi v
π
j ≤ V [πi, π], where V [πi, π] is the worth of module πi within partition π.
And an allocation is feasible in a PFG if it is feasible for some partition π.
One solution technique developed speciﬁcally for PFGs in de Clippel and Serrano
(2008A) is that of strict dominance. The concept is ﬁrst applied to coalitions:
coalition S is a strictly dominant coalition if each member of S ranks S strictly
as the best coalition, whatever the other players do.64 Speciﬁcally, if π is a
partition that contains S, π′ is a partition that does not contain S, and j is a
member of S, then require vj[π] > vj[π′]. The concept is then applied iteratively
to potentially form a strictly dominant partition as follows. The initial step is
that any strictly dominant coalitions S form. The iterative step is that, given
the existing coalitions, there maybe a new strictly dominant coalition T , which
then forms. The iterative step is repeated as often as possible. If every member
64This equates to the members of S, as in the c-core, having pessimistic expectations.
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ends up in a coalition then the resulting partition is called strictly dominant.
de Clippel and Serrano (2008A) shows the usefulness of strictly dominant par-
titions: If a strictly dominant partition exists then it is both the only member
of the pessimistic core and the equilibrium outcome of the sequential unanimity
game they develop. Applying strict dominance to my standard model gives the
following results: if the grand coalition is eﬃcient then the grand coalition is
a strictly dominant partition; however, if the atomic partition of singletons is
eﬃcient, then there are no strictly dominant coalitions.65
Yi (1997) considers symmetric games with ex-ante identical players, so it is the
number of players in each module, rather than their identities, that determines
payoﬀs. He surveys a number of diﬀerent formation games, such as the Open
Membership Game (Yi and Shin, 1995), the Inﬁnite-Horizon Coalition Unanim-
ity Game (Bloch, 1996), and the Equilibrium Binding Agreements from Ray
and Vohra (1997). These approaches to partition formation are applied to my
standard model in chapter 2 of this thesis.
In the second part of this section, we now move on from partition formation
to partition eﬃciency. Characteristic function games (CFGs) are often assumed
to be superadditive: this requires that if S and T are disjoint coalitions then
V [S ∪ T ] ≥ V [S] + V [T ]. With CFGs there are no externalities onto other
modules, so superadditivity implies that the grand coalition is eﬃcient. This
deﬁnition of bilateral superadditivity can be extended to PFGs:
65In the standard model, due to symmetry considerations, when the grand coalition is eﬃ-
cient it maximises not just the total welfare but also utility of every individual member, (see
Proposition 14 in speciﬁc and Eﬃciency section 1.7 in general). When the atomic partition is
eﬃcient, the result follows from negative externalities: if a singleton module forms then the
pessimistic response is a single module containing n−1 members; if a 2 member module forms
then the optimistic response is a n−2 singleton modules. And v1[{1, n−1}] > v1[{2, 1, 1, 1....1}]
requires 1θ + n < 3 and n > 1, which is impossible.
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Deﬁnition 1. if π = (πi)ki=1 is a partition then
V [π1 ∪ π2, {π1 ∪ π2, π2+}] ≥ V [π1, π] + V [π2, π]
where π2+ := (πi)ki=3.66
However, with PFGs bilateral superadditivity does not imply grand coalition
eﬃciency: if a PFG has negative externalities then although merging modules
always beneﬁt, outside modules may be worse oﬀ and the total payoﬀ in the
grand coalition can be less then the total payoﬀ from some other partition.67
Conversely, if a PFG has positive externalities, then super-additivity does indeed
imply the eﬃciency of the grand coalition: merging modules always beneﬁt, as
do outside modules.
In order to produce suﬃcient conditions for grand coalition eﬃciency in PFGs,
various strengthenings of bilateral superadditivity have been proposed. Ray
(2007) proposes grand coalition superadditivity : directly postulating the eﬃ-
ciency of the grand coalition. Clippel and Serrano (2008), propose multilateral
superadditivity:
Deﬁnition 2. Multilateral superadditivity requires that if π = (πi)ki=1 is a par-
tition and 1 ≤ j ≤ k then
V [ ∪
1≤i≤j
πi, { ∪
1≤i≤j
πi, πj+}] ≥
j∑
i=1
V [πi, π]
where πj+ := (πi)ki=j+1.
Note that for CFGs, by a simple iterative argument, bilateral superadditivity
implies multilateral superadditivity. However, with PFGs this is no longer the
66Theorem 28 shows that with my standard model, the grand coalition is eﬃcient when it
is bilaterally superadditive.
67See Example 1 in Hafalir (2007).
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case, as the list of outside modules changes. Taking j = k shows that multilateral
superadditivity is a suﬃcient condition for grand coalition eﬃciency, and taking
j = 2 shows that multilateral superadditivity is a suﬃcient condition for bilateral
superadditivity.
A third approach is supermodularity :
Deﬁnition 3. Suppose that π = (πi)ki=1 is a partition and S, T are any coalitions
such that S
⋃
T = π1
⋃
π2: speciﬁcally we allow S and T not to be disjoint,
allowing S
⋂
T = ∅. Without loss of generality, c := |S ∩ T |, t := |T \ S| and
s := |S \ T |. Then supermodularity requires that
V [S ∪ T, {S ∪ T, π2+}] + V [S ∩ T, {S ∩ T, S \ T, T \ S, π2+}] ≥
V [S, {S, T \ S, π2+}] + V [T, {T, S \ T, π2+}]
where π2+ := (πi)ki=3.68
Supermodularity implies both bilateral superadditivity (consider the case where
S = π1 and T = π2), and multilateral superadditivity (see Proposition 1 in
Hafalir (2007), which proves the result using induction). The supermodularity
condition can be re-arranged into a ‘convexity’ increasing increases condition:
V [S ∪ T, {S ∪ T, π2+}]− V [S, {S, T \ S, π2+}] ≥
V [T, {T, S \ T, π2+}]− V [S ∩ T, {S ∩ T, S \ T, T \ S, π2+}]
This says that the increase in module worth when t members transfer from T \S
to S forming S∪T , is greater than the increase in module worth when t members
transfer from T \ S to S ∩ T forming T . With my standard model, Theorem
68Note that this is supermodularity of the module worth function V with respect to the
embedded coalition lattice, rather than of the welfare function W with respect to the partition
lattice. This prevents the use of the Topkis (1978, 1998) results. See Appendix L for details.
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30 shows that the grand coalition is eﬃcient if and only if it is supermodular.
However, this thesis introduces a novel quasi-convexity condition, and in general
supermodularity is a stronger condition than the quasi-convexity condition in
two aspects: ﬁrstly, supermodularity is a condition on all partitions, whilst my
quasi-convexity approach is a condition only on partitions with at most one
non-singleton module; secondly, it is a convexity condition rather than a quasi-
convexity condition.
Finally, within the PFG literature there is a lack of results on the eﬃciency
of the atomic partition. Here my thesis makes a particular contribution: it
gives eﬃciency results for the atomic partition in terms of quasi-convexity and
subadditivity (Theorems 14 and 32). And for the standard model it shows that
the subadditivity condition is strictly stronger than that required for eﬃciency
of the atomic partition (Theorem 33).
1.7 Eﬃciency
In this section, I will ﬁrst abstract from the standard model and consider general
bank utility functions on the set of partitions. Then, I will consider the solution
concept of eﬃciency. Next, I will show that if the preferences satisfy the three
properties of anonymity (it is only the size of modules that count, and not
their indices), negative externalities (if modules 2 and 3 merge, then members of
module 1 are always worse oﬀ), and strict quasi-convexity (note, this is required
to hold only on the set of partitions of with at most one non-singleton module,
{x1, 1, 1, 1....1}), then any eﬃcient partition must exist on the boundary. I then
show that the standard model satisﬁes these three properties generically, and so
has boundary solutions.
I will start with a few mathematical preliminaries:
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Deﬁnition 4. A partition (Xi)ki=1 of a set X is a pairwise disjoint covering
so,
⋃
i
Xi = X and (Xi
⋂
Xj = Ø)i =j. In mathematics, partitions are important
special examples of lattices.69 In lattice theory a member X i of a partition is
often called a block. However, here, in line with the motivation given above, the
term module will be used. In contrast, the term coalition will refer to a general
subset Z of X; coalitions may or may not be modules. Generally, let Al be
the ﬁrst l strictly positive natural numbers, where l is itself a natural number:
so Al := {1, 2, 3.....l}. We restrict to consideration to symmetric models: we
have n ex-ante identical banks, and so we just specify the number xi of banks
in each module i, this gives a general partition (xi)ki=1. Note that generally i is
an index on modules, not banks. Deﬁne the grand coalition to be {n}. Deﬁne
the atomistic partition of singletons to be {1, 1, 1, 1....1}. These will be called
the two trivial partitions; they will also be referred to as boundary solutions.
Other partitions are non-trivial, and have proper or real modularisations. For a
speciﬁc, n ∈ N, let Pn be the set of all partitions of An, and let Pni be the subset
of Pn where the module i is non-empty. Let In = Pn \ {{n}, {1, 1, 1, 1...1}, be
the proper partitions of An. Finally, taking the union over possible values of n:
P :=
⋃
n∈N
Pn and Pi :=
⋃
n∈N
Pni .
Next, we deﬁne when one partition can be formed from another partition, by
merging modules:
Deﬁnition 5. Partition x is strictly coarser than y if, x and y are distinct, and
each module in x is either: a module in y, or can be formed as a merger of
modules in y. Speciﬁcally, if x has k modules and y has l modules then require
k < l and the existence of a mapping f : Al → Ak s.t.
(
xj =
∑
f(i)=j yi
)k
j=1
,
where Al = {1, 2, 3, 4.....l} and Ak = {1, 2, 3, 4.....k}. Conversely, partition x is
strictly ﬁner than y, if and only if, partition y is strictly coarser than x.
69See Appendix L which includes a presentation of the partition lattice.
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Next, we deﬁne the utility and welfare functions for this general model:
Deﬁnition 6. Consider a general partition x = (xi)ki=1 ∈ P. Let the module
utility function V gi : Pi → R, where V gi [x] is the total return to all members
of module i from partition x. Let the bank utility function vgi : Pi → R such
that vgi [x]:=
1
xi
V gi [x] is the return per member of module i. Let welfare function
W g : Pi → R and W g[x] :=
∑k
i=1 V
g
i [x] be the social planner’s utilitarian welfare
function. These three functions together form a general partition model. So
far we have been considering the return of a bank in module i, rather than the
preferences of a generic bank b. As in the standard model, these are linked by
the straightforward condition, that bank b prefers the partition where its module
gets the highest per bank return. So x gb x∗ if and only if vgi [x] > vgi∗ [x∗] : where
b is in modules i and i∗ for partitions x and x∗ respectively.
The deﬁnition of a Partition Form Game originates in Lucas (1963). The modern
notation, as in for example Hafalir (2007), is:
Deﬁnition 7. In a Partition Form Game any coalition S ⊆ N generates a value
V [S, π] where π is a partition of N and S ∈ π.
Next, I deﬁne the three conditions which are required for the boundary solutions
result to hold. The ﬁrst, anonymity, intuitively means that agents do not care
about their indices. This needs to apply both in terms of your own index and
those of other modules. Anonymity means that the model forms a symmetric
PFG. Formally:
Anonymity requires that both the following two properties hold for all x:
1. if xi = 0 then V gi [x] = V g1 [x∗], where x∗1 := xi, x∗i := x1, and x∗j = xj for all
other j.
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2. if x∗ is a permutation of x such that x∗i = xi then V
g
i [x] = V
g
i [x
∗].70
The second condition is that the model satisﬁes negative externalities in the N1
sense of Yi (1997): intuitively, if two modules a and b merge, then banks in a
third module c are always worse oﬀ. The formal deﬁnition is that:
Deﬁnition 8. The general partition model satisﬁes negative externalities, if
when modules merge to form a larger module, outside modules not involved
in the merger are strictly worse oﬀ. Speciﬁcally, if x is strictly coarser than
y, and xi = yi, then that implies that vi[x] < vi[y]. Conversely, the general
partition model satisﬁes positive externalities, if when modules merge to form a
larger module, outside modules not involved in the merger are strictly better oﬀ.
Speciﬁcally, if x is strictly coarser than y, and xi = yi, then that implies that
vi[x] > vi[y].
The third property is that partitions where at most one module is non-singleton,
must possess weak quasi-convexity. So we now deﬁne the bank utility vg1,1[x1]
for partitions where apart from a ﬁrst module of size x1, the other modules are
singletons. This is formed as a restriction of the bank payoﬀ function vg1 [x]:
Deﬁnition 9. Bank utility function vg1,1 is deﬁned by v
g
1,1 : An→ R s.t. vg1,1[x1] =
vg1[x], where x := {x1, 1, 1, 1, 1...1}.
Consider the general deﬁnition of strict and weak quasiconvexity:
Deﬁnition 10. Suppose f : S → R where S is a convex subset of Rl. Then f
is strictly quasiconvex if and only if f [λx+ (1− λ)x0] < max{f [x], f [x0]} for all
λ ∈ (0, 1) and (x, x0) ∈ S2 where x = x0.71 Then f is weakly quasiconvex if and
only if f [λx + (1 − λ)x0] ≤ max{f [x], f [x0]} for all λ ∈ (0, 1) and (x, x0) ∈ S2
where x = x0.
70x∗ = (x∗i )
k
i=1 ∈ P is a permutation of x = (xi)ki=1 ∈ P iﬀ ∃ bijection f : Ak → Ak s.t.
(x∗i = xf(i))
k
i=1
71See Deﬁnition 103 in Appendix F.
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And applied to partitions with at most one non-singleton module, where the size
of module 1 is a natural number:
Deﬁnition 11. Bank utility function with at most one non-singleton module is
strictly quasi-convex if
(
vg1,1[x1] < max{vg1,1[a], vg1,1[b]}
)b−1
x1=a+1
where a < b. Bank
utility function with at most one non-singleton module is weakly quasi-convex if(
vg1,1[x1] ≤ max{vg1,1[a], vg1,1[b]}
)b−1
x1=a+1
.
Now we deﬁne the solution concept of strict eﬃciency:
Deﬁnition 12. x∗ is strictly eﬃcient if it maximises W g[x], the utilitarian wel-
fare function.
We now consider the eﬀect of these assumptions on a general model. First, if a
model has negative externalities then a bank wants the other modules to be of
minimal size:
Proposition 13. If the partition model satisﬁes negative externalities and x∗ ∈
argmaxx∈Pn v1[x] then x∗ = {x∗1, 1, 1, 1, 1....1} for some x∗1.
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Suppose partition x∗ is not of the required form
so there exists a second non-singleton module. Form partition y by splitting that
module into singletons. However, as the model satisﬁes negative externalities,
and as x∗ is strictly coarser than y, and x∗1 = y1, then that implies that v
g
1 [x
∗] <
vg1 [y].
The following proposition shows that if there is strict quasi-convexity, then ev-
eryone is worse oﬀ at an ineﬃcient partition:72
Proposition 14. If the partition model has anonymity , negative externalities
and vg1,1[x1] is strictly quasi-convex then
72This proposition is used in the stability section 1.8.
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1. if vg1,1[1] > v
g
1,1[n] then x = {1, 1, 1...1} ⇒
(
x ≺gj {1, 1, 1....1}
)n
j=1
2. if vg1,1[n] > v
g
1,1[1] then x = {n} ⇒
(
x ≺gj {n}
)n
j=1
3. if vg1,1[1] = v
g
1,1[n] then x ∈ In ⇒
(
x ≺gj {n} and x ≺gj {1, 1, 1...1}
)n
j=1
.
Proof. Let us start by searching for the partition, or partitions, x∗ that max-
imise(s) the utility of bank 1. By anonymity we can assume, without loss of
generality, that bank 1 is in module 1, and so we want to maximise vg1[x]. The
model has negative externalities, so by Proposition 13, x∗ = {x∗1, 1, 1, 1, 1....1} for
some x∗1. Further, as v
g
1,1[x1] is strictly quasi-convex, by Deﬁnition 11, x∗ = {1, 1,
1, , , 1} or x∗ = {n}. 1) follows, as by anonymity for all i, vgi [{1, 1....1}] = vg1 [{1,
1....1}], so if vg1,1[1] > vg1,1[n] then x = {1, 1, 1....1} ⇒
(
x ≺gj {1, 1, 1....1}
)n
j=1
. 2)
follows as partition {n} only has one module, so it gives every bank the same
utility, hence if vg1,1[n] > v
g
1,1[1] then x = {n} ⇒
(
x ≺gj {n}
)n
j=1
. Similarly 3)
follows.
This is the main result, a general model with our three properties will always
reject interior partitions as ineﬃcient:
Theorem 15. If the partition model has anonymity , negative externalities and
vg1,1[x1] is weakly quasi-convex then the only possible candidate partitions to be
strictly eﬃcient are {1, , , , , 1} and {n}.
Proof. If vg1,1[x1] is not only weakly quasi-convex, but also strictly quasi-convex
then, by Proposition 14, argmaxx∈PW g[x] = argmaxx∈P v
g
1 [x] ⊆ {{1, 1, 1, 1....1},
{n}}. Now instead suppose that vg1,1[x1] is weakly quasi-convex, but not strictly
quasi-convex. Then the previous arguments about {1, , , , , 1} and {n}, still hold.
So at least one of those 2 partitions is strictly eﬃcient. However, suppose
some interior x∗1 argmax of v
g
1,1[x1] generates a further strictly eﬃcient parti-
tion x∗ = {x1, 1, 1, ...1}. Suppose vg1 [{1, 1111}] ≥ vg1 [{n}] then x∗ cannot be
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strictly eﬃcient, as banks not in module 1 strictly prefer {1, 1, , , , 1} to x∗, (due
to negative externalities), and banks in module 1 are indiﬀerent, (as both x∗ and
{1, 1, 11....1} maximise vg1 [x]).
Conversely, suppose that vg1 [{n}] > vg1 [{1, 1, 1...1}], and so {n} is both strictly
eﬃcient and an argmax for vg1 [x]. We need
(
x∗ gj {n}
)n
j=1
, (as else we could put
bank 1 in j’s module and strictly increase their utility). And so we further need(
x∗ ∼gj {n}
)n
j=1
, (as else x∗ cannot be strictly eﬃcient). So considering module
2 as a sample outside module: vg2 [x∗] = v
g
1 [{n}]. However, vg2 [x∗] < vg2 [{1, 1,
....1}], as banks not in module 1 experience negative externalities from module
1. This now gives a contradiction: vg1 [{1, 1, 1...1}] < vg1 [{n}] = vg2 [x∗] < vg2 [{1,
1....1}] = vg1 [{1, 1....1}].
Next we derive a number of results about the ineﬃciency of the boundary parti-
tions in terms of the elasticity of the module function, V g1,1[x1], rather than the
bank function vg1 [x1]. Informally, V
g
1 [x1], is the total worth of module 1, when
all other modules are singletons. Formally
Deﬁnition 16. Module utility function with at most one non-singleton module
V g1,1 : An→ R s.t. V g1,1[x1] = x1 ∗ vg1,1[x1] or equivalently V g1,1[x1] = V g1,1[x] ,
where x := {x1, 1, 1, 1, 1...1}.
We now prove two proposition linking V g1,1[x1] and v
g
1,1[x1]. With a slight abuse of
notation, we consider V g1,1[x1] with domain extended from An := {1, 2, 3, 4...n}
to the reals. This extension is required in order for point elasticities to be well
deﬁned.
Proposition 17. Suppose V g1,1[x1] is diﬀerentiable and V
g
1,1[x1] ≥ 0 . Then
vg
′
1 [x1] > 0 if and only if V
g
1,1 is elastic at x1.
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Proof. dv
g
1,1[x1]
dx1
=
d
V
g
1,1[x1]
x1
dx1
=
x1V
g′
1,1[x1]−V g1,1[x1]
x21
, where V g
′
1,1[x1] =
dV g1,1[x1]
dx1
. So dv
g
1,1[x1]
dx1
>
0 if and only if x1V g
′
1,1[x1]− V g1,1[x1] > 0 if and only if x1V
g′
1,1[x1]
V g1,1[x1]
> 1 if and only if

V g1,1,x1 > 1, where 
V g1,1,x1 :=
x1V
g′
1,1[x1]
V g1,1[x1]
is the elasticity of V g1,1 at x1.
Proposition 18. Suppose V g1,1[x1] is diﬀerentiable and V
g
1,1[x1] ≥ 0 . Then
vg
′
1 [x1] < 0 if and only if V
g
1,1 is inelastic at x1.
Proof. See the proof of Proposition 17.
Corollary 19. If the partition model has anonymity , negative externalities and
V g1,1 is elastic for all x1 then the only strictly eﬃcient partition is {n}.
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 15 and Proposition 17.
Corollary 20. If the partition model has anonymity , negative externalities and
V g1,1 is inelastic for all x1 then the only strictly eﬃcient partition is {1, 1, 1...1}.
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 15 and Proposition 18.
Corollary 21. If the partition model has anonymity , negative externalities,
V g1,1[x1] is convex and V
g
1,1[0] = 0 then the only strictly eﬃcient partition is {n}.
Proof. First note that the assumption V g1,1[0] = 0 is without loss of generality as
V g1,1 is an extension of an original function deﬁned on domain {1, 2, 3...n}. Second
we use the quasi-monotone conditions for a convex function: from Theorem 21.2
in Simon and Blume (1994), if V g1,1is convex then
V g1,1[y1]−V g1,1[x1]
y1−x1 ≤ V
g′
1,1[x1], when
y1 < x1. Taking y1 = 0 gives that V g1,1 is elastic at x1, and the result then follows
directly from Corollary 19.
Corollary 22. If the partition model has anonymity , negative externalities,
V g1,1[x1] is concave and V
g
1,1[0] = 0 then the only strictly eﬃcient partition is
{1, 1....1}.
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Proof. A similar methodology to that used in Corollary 21 shows that if V g1,1[x1]
is concave then V g1,1 is inelastic for all x1, and the result then follows directly
from Corollary 20.
Finally, we show that the standard model satisﬁes each of the required three
conditions, and hence its eﬃcient partition is always either the grand coalition
or the atomistic partition of singletons.
Proposition 23. The standard model satisﬁes anonymity for all parameter val-
ues.
Proof. We demonstrate each of the two required conditions hold for all x:
if xi = 0 then let x∗1 := xi, x∗i := x1, and x∗j := xj for all other j. Then:
V1[x
∗] = x
∗2
1
n2
P [x∗1] +
∑
j =1 θ
x∗1x
∗
j
n2
P [x∗1]P [x
∗
j ] =
x2i
n2
P [xi] +
∑
j =1 θ
xix
∗
j
n2
P [xi]P [x
∗
j ]
⇒ V1[x∗] = x
2
i
n2
P [xi] +
∑
j =1,j =i θ
xixj
n2
P [xi]P [xj] +
∑
j=i θ
xix1
n2
P [xi]P [x1]
⇒ V1[x∗] = x
2
i
n2
P [xi] +
∑
j =1,j =i θ
xixj
n2
P [xi]P [xj] +
∑
j=1 θ
xix1
n2
P [xi]P [x1]
⇒ V1[x∗] = x
2
i
n2
P [xi] +
∑
j =i θ
xixj
n2
P [xi]P [xj] = Vi[x] as required
and
Suppose x∗ is a permutation of x such that x∗i = xi then ∃ bijection f : Ak → Ak
s.t. (x∗i = xf(i))ki=1 and f(i) = i. So:
Vi[x
∗] = x
∗2
i
n2
P [x∗i ] +
∑
j =i θ
x∗i x
∗
j
n2
P [x∗i ]P [x
∗
j ]
⇒ Vi[x∗] = x
2
i
n2
P [xi] +
∑
j =i θ
xix
∗
j
n2
P [xi]P [x
∗
j ]
⇒ Vi[x∗] = x
2
i
n2
P [xi] + θ
xi
n2
P [xi]
∑
j =i x
∗
jP [x
∗
j ]
⇒ Vi[x∗] = x
2
i
n2
P [xi] + θ
xi
n2
P [xi]
∑
j =i xjP [xj] = Vi[x] as required.
Intuitively, there are negative externalities in the standard model, as a merger
between modules j and k has no beneﬁts to module i, but does have costs as
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matches between module i and j, (or i and k), are now less likely to be productive.
The formal proof is as follows:
Proposition 24. The standard model satisﬁes negative externalities for all pa-
rameter values.
Proof. By Proposition 23, the standard model has anonymity. So if we can prove
that modules 2 and 3 merging makes a bank in module 1 worse oﬀ, then we are
done. Let x be the original partition and y be the partition where modules 2 and
3 have merged, so y = (x1, x2+x3, x4, ....xk). Then v1[x]n
2
P [x1]
v1[x] = x1+θ
∑
j≥2
xjP [xj]
and v1[y]n
2
P [x1]
= x1 + θ
(
(x2 + x3)P [(x2 + x3] +
∑
j>3
xjP [xj]
)
. As γ > 0 , P [d] is
strictly decreasing in d. So x2P [x2] > x2P [x2 + x3] and x3P [x3] > x3P [x2 + x3],
and hence x2P [x2] + x3P [x3] > (x2 + x3)P [x2 + x3]. The result then follows.
Proposition 25. The standard model satisﬁes weak quasi-convexity for all parametri-
sations; is monotone for all parametrisations; and satisﬁes strict quasi-convexity
when P [n] = θP [1].
Proof. We need to show that (v1,1[x1] ≤ max{v1,1[a], v1,1[b]})b−1x1=a+1. Recall that
v1[(xj)
k
j=1] :=
x1
n2
P [x1]+
∑
j =1 θ
xj
n2
P [x1]P [xj], and so v1,1[x1] := x1n2P [x1]+θ
n−x1
n2
P [x1]P [1].
Hence ∂v1,1[x1]
∂x1
= (γ − θ − γθn + 1)P [1]P [x1]. This has the same sign for all x1:
speciﬁcally, ∂v1,1[x]
∂x1
≥ 0 if and only if P [n] ≥ θP [1]. So not only is v1,1[x1] weakly
quasi-convex, it is monotonic.
Corollary 26. Under the standard model the strictly eﬃcient partitions are as
follows: {n} is strictly eﬃcient when P [n] > θP [1]; whilst {1, 1, 1....1} is strictly
eﬃcient when P [n] < θP [1]; and both {n} and {1, 1, 1....1} are strictly eﬃcient
when P [n] = θP [1]. No other partition is ever strictly eﬃcient.
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Proof. By Propositions 23, 24 and 25 the standard model has anonymity, nega-
tive externalities, and weak quasi-convexity. So by applying Theorem 15, parti-
tions other than {n} and {1, 1, , 1...1} are rejected as ineﬃcient. Then, by com-
paring W [{1, 1...1}] and W [{n}], the results on the choice between {1, 1, 1..1}
and {n} follow.
A second proof of this result for the standard model uses a continuity argument,
and is given in Appendix F.
Finally we come to the concept of superadditivity. Bilateral superadditivity for
anonymous symmetric PFGs of the type considered in this thesis, requires simply
that the worth of a super-module, formed by merging 2 modules, is greater than
the aggregate worth of the 2 original modules, where it is assumed that the other
modules are unaltered. Speciﬁcally:
Deﬁnition 27. An anonymous symmetric PFG being bilaterally superadditive
requires that, if x = (xi)ki=1 is any partition then V
g
1 [x
′
] ≥ V g1 [x] + V g2 [x], where
x′ =
(
x1 + x2, (xi)
k
i=3
)
.
Theorem 28. The standard model is bilaterally superadditive if and only if the
grand coalition is a strictly eﬃcient partition.
Proof. Considering a general partition x and deﬁning x′ , as in the Deﬁnition 27.
The condition trivially holds if either x1 = 0 or x2 = 0. So we assume x1 ≥ 1 and
x2 ≥ 1. Then, V1[x
′
]−(V1[x]+V2[x])
(x1∗P [x1]∗x2∗P [x2]∗P [x1+x2]) = (−2θ−2γθt+γt+2)−R (γ2θt+ 2γθ),
where t := x1 + x2 and R :=
∑
i>2 xiP [xi]. The coeﬃcient on R is negative and
hence it is hardest for this expression to be positive when R is maximised. As the
model has negative externalities this occurs with R = (n−x1−x2)∗P [1]. Hence
bilateral superadditivity holds if and only if θ < θc[t] := 2γ+γ
2t+γt+2
2γ+2γn+γ2(n−t)t+2γ2t+2
for all t such that 2 ≤ t ≤ n. As dθc[t]
dt
=
γ(γ+1)(γ2t2+γ(4t−2)+2)
(2γ(n+1)+γ2t(n−t+2)+2)2 > 0, the binding
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constraint occurs with t = 2. This gives the grand coalition eﬃciency condition,
θ ∗ P [1] ≤ P [n], as required.
Deﬁnition 29. An anonymous symmetric PFG being supermodular requires
that, if x = (xi)ki=1 is any partition then V1[x1 + x2 + x3, 0, 0, x3+] + V1[x1, x2,
x3, x3+] ≥ V1[x1 + x2, x3, 0, x3+] + V1[x1 + x3, x2, 0, x3+], where x3+ = (xi)ki=4.73
Theorem 30. The standard model satisﬁes supermodularity if and only if θP [1] ≤
P [n].
Proof. Consider any partition (xi)ki=1. Then let e[x] := V1[x1+x2+x3, 0, 0, x3+]+
V1[x1, x2, x3, x3+] − (V1[x1 + x2, x3, 0, x3+] + V1[x1 + x3, x2, 0, x3+]). Trivially
e[x] = 0 if either x2 = 0 or x3 = 0. So we can restrict ourselves to partitions where
x2, x3 ≥ 1 and consider
f [x] := e[x]
P [x1+x2]P [x1+x3]P [x1]P [x1+x2+x3]x3P [x3]x2P [x2]
, where R :=
∑k
i=4 xiP [xi]. We
want to know for which parametrisations (n, θ, γ), is f [x] ≥ 0 for all partitions
x, where x2, x3 ≥ 1. Hence f [x] ≡ C0[x]−θC1[x], where C0[x] := (γx2+1)(γx3+
1)(2x1γ + γx2 + γx3 + 2)
and
C1[x] := x
2
1γ
2(γx2 + γx3 + 2) + (γx2 + 1)(γx3 + 1)(γR(γx2 + γx3 + 2) + 2(γx2 + γx3 + 1)) +
x1γ
(
2γR(γx2 + 1)(γx3 + 1) + γ
2x22 + γx2(4γx3 + 5) + γ
2x23 + 5γx3 + 4
)
. The θ coeﬃcient
is negative, and so f [x] > 0 iﬀ θ < θmax[x] := −C0[x]C1[x] . We now let x2,3 := x2+x3,
and x123 := x1 + x2 + x3. Holding x1, x2,3 and x3+constant we ﬁnd the choice
of x3 that minimises f [x]. Diﬀerentiation gives that,
dθmax[x1,x2,3−x3,x3,x3+]
dx3
=
(x2,3 − 2x3) g[x]h2[x] , where
g[x] := γ3x1(γx2,3 + 2) (2γ2x21 + γx1(3γx2,3 + 4) + γ2x2,3 + 3γx2,3 + 2) > 0
73As in Section 1.6 above, this is supermodularity of the module worth function V with
respect to embedded coalitions; rather than of welfare W with respect to partitions. See
Appendix L for an explanation.
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and
h[x] := γx3+(γx3+1)(2γx1+γx2,3+2)(γx2+1)+γx1
(
γ2x22,3 + γx2,3(2γx3 + 5)− 2γ2x23 + 4
)
+
γ2x21(γx2,3 + 2) + 2(γx2,3 + 1)(γx3 + 1)(γx2,3 − γx3 + 1). So minima occur with x3 = 1
and with x3 = x2,3 − 1.74 So without loss of generality x3 = x2,3 − 1 and hence
x2 = 1. Similarly
dθmax[x1,1,x1,2,3−x1,x3+]
dx1
= − l[x]
m2[x]
where:
l[x] := γ(γ+1)
(
γ2(x1,2,3 − 1)x1,2,3 + γ(2x1,2,3 − 1) + 1
) (
γ2(2x1 + 1) + 2γx1,2,3 + 2 + γ
2(x1,2,3 − x1 − 1)2
)
>
0 andm[x] := γ(γ+1)R
(
γ2
(
x21 + x1 − x21,2,3 + x1,2,3
)
+ γ(x1 − 3x1,2,3 + 2)− 2
)−
(γx1,2,3 + 1) (γ
2 (− (x21 + 2x1 + 2)) + γx1,2,3(γ(x1 + 2) + 2) + 2). So we want to
maximise x1 bearing in mind the constraint that x3 ≥ 1. So x1 = x123 − 2,
x2 = 1 and x3 = 1. Hence θmax[x] = θmax[x1,2,3, 1, 1, x3+] = γ+1(γ+1)γR+γx1,2,3+1 .
So we want to maximise R: this requires x3+ = {1, 1, 1..1} and hence gives
R = (n− x1,2,3) ∗ P [1, γ]. Hence θmax[x] = θmax[x1,2,3, 1, 1, {1, 1...1}] = γ+1(γn+1) .
Deﬁnition 31. An anonymous symmetric PFG being bilaterally subadditive
requires that, if x = (xi)ki=1 is any partition then V
g
1 [x
′
] ≤ V g1 [x] + V g2 [x], where
x′ =
(
x1 + x2, (xi)
k
i=3
)
.
Theorem 32. The atomic partition is strictly eﬃcient for any symmetric bilat-
erally subadditive PFG with negative externalities.
Proof. Suppose x = (xi)ki=1 is a partition and module k is non-singleton. Then
let x′ := ((xi)k−1i=1 , xk − 1, 1). Due to negative externalities the worth of each of
the ﬁrst k − 1 modules is no lower; and due to subadditivity the members from
xk are better oﬀ as well. So by induction the atomic partition is eﬃcient.
Theorem 33. The standard model is bilaterally subadditive if and only if θP [0.5n] ≥
P [n].
74By symmetry both x3 = 1 and x3 = x2,3 − 1 give the same value for f [x].
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Proof. Consider any partition (xi)ki=1. Then let e[x] := V1[x1 + x2, x2+] −
(V1[x1, x2, x2+] + V1[x2, x1, x2+]). Trivially e[x] = 0 if either x2 = 0 or x3 = 0.
So we assume x1 ≥ 1 and x2 ≥ 1. Let f [x] := e[x]/(x1P [x1]x2P [x2]P [x1 + x2]).
Then f [x] ≡ −2(θ + γθR− 1)− γx1,2(θ(γR + 2)− 1), where R :=
∑k
i=3 xiP [xi]
and x1,2 := x1 + x2 ≥ 2. Then,
f [x] ≡ (γx1,2 + 2) − θ (2γR + γ2Rx1,2 + 2γx1,2 + 2). The θ coeﬃcient is neg-
ative so f [x] ≤ 0 if and only if θ ≥ θmin[x] := (γx1,2+2)2γR+γ2Rx1,2+2γx1,2+2 . As
θmin[x] is maximised when R is minimised, we set R = (n − x1,2)P [n − x1,2],
and so θmin[x1,2] =
γx1,2+2
γ(n−x1,2)(γx1,2+2)
γn−γx1,2+1 +2γx1,2+2
. Hence dθmin[x1,2]
dx1,2
= γ∗g[x]
h2[x]
, where
g[x] := (−2γ2n2 − 4γn+ 2) + x1,2 (8γ + γ2(4n− x1,2)) and h[x] := γn(3γx1,2 +
4)− 3γ2x21,2 − 2γx1,2 + 2. As x1,2 ≤ n, g[x] is quasi-convex and hence θmin[x] is
maximised either with x1,2 = 2 or with x1,2 = n. θmin[x1,2 = n] − θmin[x1,2 =
2] =
γ(n−2)(4γ+γ2n+1)
2(γn+1)(3γ2(n−2)+2γ(n−1)+1) ≥ 0, where n ≥ 2, as x12 ≥ 2. As θmin[x1,2 =
n] = P [n]
P [0.5n]
, the result now follows.
1.8 Stability
This section assesses the stability of the standard model using the EEBA (Ex-
tended Equilibrium Binding Agreement), building on the ideas, techniques and
deﬁnitions which were introduced in Section 1.6. It does this by ﬁrst describ-
ing the hedonic approach before reviewing the distinction between characteristic
form games and partition form games. It then introduces the modelling of ex-
pectations within partition form games.
In a general non-hedonic co-operative game, there are two stages: agents ﬁrstly
form modules, and then secondly play a strategic form game. Contrastingly, in
a hedonic game there is no second stage: the partition is suﬃcient to deﬁne the
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payoﬀs each agent gets. Bogomolnaia, and Jackson (2002) introduced the idea
of hedonic coalition games where, each agent’s preferences over partitions are
completely characterized by his preferences over the coalitions that he belongs
to in each partition. Mathematically, π j π′ ⇐⇒ Cπ(j) j Cπ′(j), where Cπ(j)
is the coalition in π that j belongs to.75 Diamantoudi and Xue (2007) extend
the concept to form hedonic partition games, where for every agent there exists
a complete, reﬂexive, and transitive binary relation on partitions. The banking
models used in this thesis are all hedonic, and having a hedonic game simpliﬁes
some of the deﬁnitions used below, which show how partition form games diﬀer
from characteristic form games.
Typically in co-operative game theory there are no externalities: how outside
agents organise themselves does not aﬀect you. Your utility in such a char-
acteristic form game is determined by the members of your coalition, but is
independent of how the other outside agents are grouped. Formally, if N is the
set of all agents then, for each nonempty coalition S ⊆ N , a characteristic func-
tion U cf determines an |S| dimensional vector, U cf [S] =
(
ucfi [S]
)
i∈S. In such
characteristic form games, a central equilibrium notion is the core: the set of all
unblocked coalitions. And we say that D blocks S if a coalition D of agents can
deviate away from S, and make themselves all better oﬀ. Formally, Ø = D ⊆ S
and
(
ucfi [D] > u
cf
i [S]
)
i∈D.
In contrast, with partition form games, there are externalities: how outside
agents are grouped does aﬀect you. So, in partition form games, utility is de-
termined not only by the members of your module, but also by the modules
formed by agents not in your module. Formally, there is a partition function Upf ,
that for every partition π assigns a payoﬀ to every agent, Upf [π] =
(
upfi [π]
)
i∈N
.76
75This description is adapted from Burani and Zwicker (2003).
76Recall from Deﬁnition 4 that a partition π = (πi)
k
i=1 of a set N is a pairwise disjoint
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With such games it is not trivial to deﬁne what the core is. Why? Suppose we
start with partition π, from which a coalition S is considering deviating to form
a new partition π∗, at which S gets higher payoﬀs: assuming the other modules
do not react.77 However, at π∗ there may be a new coalition S∗ that does want
to react to form π∗∗; and at π∗∗ it may be that S is worse oﬀ than they were
at π. Further, this process is iterative: coalitions like S∗ that might want to
deviate in response to the S deviation, need to think how their deviation may
provoke further deviations in turn. Hence, with partition form games, we need
to include expectations in our solution concept.78
The EEBA (Extended Equilibrium Binding Agreement) concept, is a farsighted
solution concept: “when contemplating a deviation, a coalition takes into con-
sideration that further deviations may occur and that other deviating coalitions
also apply similar reasoning. For farsighted agents, it is the ﬁnal agreement
their deviations lead to that matters.”, Diamantoudi and Xue (2007). Note that
farsightedness is a two part concept: such agents have not just farsighted expect-
ations (the knowledge and ability to work out the end state of the system), but
also farsighted preferences (it is only the end state they care about and not any of
the intermediate states). In contrast, section 2.3.3 considers a number of solution
concepts that are myopic in expectations or preferences: The Simultaneous-Move
Open Membership Game, The Unanimity Game and Bilateral Stability.79
Now, I will deﬁne the preference relation. Then I will explain how the EEBA
extends the original Equilibrium Binding Agreement (EBA), of Ray and Vohra
(1997), through increasing the feasible set of allowable deviations. Then I will
covering so,
⋃
πi
i
= N and (πi
⋂
πj = Ø)i =j .
77Later in this section it is formally deﬁned what new partition(s) a deviating coalition can
form.
78For a detailed description of partition form games, including expectations, see Ray (2007);
for a brief summary of a number of diﬀerent extensions of the core to PFGs see section 1.6.
79 Section 2.3.3 also considers the Equilibrium Binding Agreement (EBA) which like the
EEBA is farsighted in both expectations and preferences.
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deﬁne the indirect dominance relation. Then I will deﬁne a stable set, and then
ﬁnally show that generically the unique EEBA solution of the standard model
is the eﬃcient partition.
We deﬁne a coalition preference, by requiring the individual preference to hold
for all members of the coalition. Formally:
Deﬁnition 34. Let N be the set of agents, and let P and Q be partitions of N .
Coalition S strictly prefers P to Q (notation P pfS Q), if each member of coali-
tion S strictly prefers partition P to Q. Speciﬁcally, require that
(
P pfi Q
)
i∈S
,
or in utility formation, upfi [P ] > u
pf
i [Q] for all i ∈ S. Note, that S can be
any subset of N : there is no requirement that S be a member of either of the
partitions.
The idea of a coalitional deviation is as follows. Initially, there is a partition P
consisting of modules {S1, S2....Sk}. A coalition T then deviates from partition
P to form new modules {T1, ..., Tl}. Each Sj module simply loses the members
that have joined T . Formally:
Deﬁnition 35. We write P T→P ′ to denote a coalitional deviation where the
following conditions on P , T and P ′ hold. P = {S1, ..., Sk} is a partition of N .
A coalition T can partition itself to form new modules, (Tl)
L
l=1. The resulting
partition structure of N , before any further regrouping and restructuring, is P´
such that:
1.
(
Tl ∈ P ′
)L
l=1
; that is the partitioning of T is itself included in the new
partition structure.
2. ∀j = 1, ..., k, Sj
⋂
T = Ø ⇒ Sj \ T ∈ P´; that is, the residuals of all
modules aﬀected by the deviation of T are modules in the new partition
structure.
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3. ∀j = 1, ..., k, Sj
⋂
T = Ø ⇒ Sj ∈ P´; that is, all those modules that
were unaﬀected by the deviation of T remain modules in the new partition
structure.
The EEBA allows any sequence of coalitional deviations, so deviating banks can
re-deviate: speciﬁcally, this allows Pi
Ti→ Pi+1, Pj Tj→ Pj+1, b ∈ Ti ∩ Tj, and i = j.
In contrast, the EBA only allows internal deviations (splits within a module), and
each agent can only deviate once. The beneﬁt of EEBA is the added ﬂexibility
in allowing these more general deviations to take place; but the cost is that the
solution set may not exist, or that there may be multiple solutions. However
for a partition model with anonymity, negative externalities, and strict quasi-
convexity, the solution always exists, and is unique except for a set of measure
zero (when both the trivial partitions are eﬃcient). So in this section the EEBA
is used; section 2.3.3.4 shows the robustness of these results to using the EBA.
These general partition model results apply directly to generic parametrisations
of the standard model; except in the case where there is indiﬀerence between
the two boundary partitions. In this special case of the standard model, there is
only weak quasi-convexity and there are extra EEBA.
As explained above, with partition form games we need to consider expecta-
tions. Under the EEBA, this is done using the indirect domination relation:
P´ indirectly dominates P if there exists a sequence of partitions P = P1, P2,
..., Pk = P
′, and a sequence of coalitions T1, T2, ..., Tk−1 such that, at each stage
there is both feasibility (the deviators Tj deﬁne a coalitional deviation Pj
Tj→Pj+1),
and farsighted individual rationality (each deviator Tj strictly prefers the end
state P ′ to the current state Pj). More formally:
Deﬁnition 36. P´ indirectly dominates P (denoted by P ′ pf P ), if there
exists a sequence of partitions P1, P2, ..., Pk , where P1 = P and Pk = P ′ and a
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sequence of coalitions T1, T2, ..., Tk−1 such that
(
Pj
Tj→ Pj+1 and Pj ≺pfTj P´
)k−1
j=1
.
For its solution concept, the EEBA uses the stable set of von Neumann and
Morgenstein (1944), applied to partitions under the indirect domination relation.
Intuitively, the stable set requires that; ﬁrstly, no solution can be preferred to
any other solution, and secondly, every non-solution must be inferior to some
solution. Formally:
Deﬁnition 37. Consider a set X and some binary partial ordering > on X.
Then R where, Ø = R ⊆ X, is a vN–M stable set for (X,>), if it is both
internally and externally stable:
• R is vN–M internally stable for (X,>), if there do not exist P, P´ ∈ R
such that P´ > P
• R is vN–M externally stable for (X,>), if for any P ∈ X \ R, there exists
some P´ ∈ R such that P´ > P
Finally, we have the deﬁnition of an EEBA:
Deﬁnition 38. P is an EEBA (extended EBA), if there exists R s.t. P ∈ R
and R is a vN–M stable set of (P, pf ), where P is the set of partitions.
We are now ready to apply the EEBA concept, ﬁrst to the general model, and
then to the standard model.
Proposition 39. In the general model, if there is anonymity, negative external-
ities, vg1,1[x1] is strictly quasi-convex, and if {n} is the unique strictly eﬃcient
partition then P ′ = {n} ⇒ {n} g P ′.
Proof. We need to ﬁnd a path from P ′ to {n}, that is both feasible (possible
via a sequence of coalition deviations), and individually rational on a farsighted
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basis (for the deviators at every stage). Here that transition can occur directly
in one stage. Firstly, P ′
{n}→ {n} is feasible. Secondly, by Proposition 14.2,
({n} gi P ′)ni=1 . Hence {n} g P ′ as required.
Theorem 40. In the general model, if there is anonymity, negative externalities,
vg1,1[x1] is strictly quasi-convex, and if {n} is the unique strictly eﬃcient partition,
then {n} is the unique EEBA.
Proof. Existence. Consider R = {{n}}, the set containing the grand coalition
partition. The set R only has one member, and so trivially it is internally
stable. Suppose it is not externally stable and so there exists partition P ′ s.t.
{n} g P ′ . However, by Proposition 39 {n} g P ′. This is a contradiction.
Hence R is stable, and so {n} is an EEBA.
Uniqueness. Suppose R′ = {{n}} is stable. If {n} /∈ R′ then it will not be
externally stable. So {n} ∈ R′. Suppose also that P ′ ∈ R′ and P ′ = {n}. But
then it will not be internally stable as {n} g P ′. Hence no such R′ exists.
There are similar results in the reverse case where P [n] < θP [1], and hence the
atomistic partition {1, 1, 1...1} is the unique eﬃcient partition:
Proposition 41. In the general model, if there is anonymity, negative exter-
nalities, vg1,1[x1] is strictly quasi-convex, and if {1, 1, 1...1} is the unique strictly
eﬃcient partition then P ′ = {1, 1, 1...1} ⇒{1, 1, 1....1} g P ′
Proof. We need to show a path from P ′ to {1, 1, 1...1} that is both feasible
(possible via a sequence of coalition deviations), and individually rational on
a farsighted basis (for the deviators at every stage). Here that transition can
occur directly in one stage. Firstly, P ′
{n}→ {1, 1, 1...1} is feasible. Secondly, by
Proposition 14.1, ({1, 1, 1..1} gi P ′)ni=1 . Hence {1, 1, 1....1} g P ′ as required.
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Theorem 42. In the general model, if there is anonymity, negative externalities,
vg1,1[x1] is strictly quasi-convex, and if {1, 1, 1...1} is the unique strictly eﬃcient
partition then {1, 1, 1....1} is the unique EEBA.
Proof. Existence. Let R := {{1, 1, 1...1}}, be the set containing the atomistic
partition of singletons. R only has one member, so trivially it is internally
stable. Suppose it is not externally stable and so there exists partition P ′ s.t.
{1, 1, 1..1} g P ′ . However, by Proposition 41, {1, 1, 1..1} g P ′, so this is a
contradiction. Hence R is stable, and so {1, 1, 1..1} is an EEBA.
Uniqueness. Suppose R′ = {{1, 1, 1...1}} is stable. If {1, 1, 1...1} /∈ R′ then it
will not be externally stable. So {1, 1, 1...1} ∈ R′. Suppose also that P ′ ∈ R′
and P ′ = {1, 1, 1...1}. However, then it will not be internally stable as {1,
1, 1...1} g P ′. Hence R′ = {{1, 1, 1...1}} and so {1, 1, ....1} is the unique
EEBA.
Proposition 43. In the general model, if there is anonymity, negative exter-
nalities, vg1,1[x1] is strictly quasi-convex, and if {1, 1, 1...1} and {n} are the
only strictly eﬃcient partitions then P ′ = {1, 1, 1...1} and P ′ = {n} ⇒{1, 1,
1....1} g P ′ and {n} g P ′
Proof. We need to show a path from P ′ to {1, 1, 1...1} that is both feasible
(possible via a sequence of coalition deviations), and individually rational on
a farsighted basis (for the deviators at every stage). Here that transition can
occur directly in one stage. Firstly, P ′
{n}→ {1, 1, 1...1} is feasible. Secondly, by
Proposition 14.3, ({1, 1, 1..1} gi P ′)ni=1 . Hence {1, 1, 1....1} g P ′ as required.
Similarly, we need to ﬁnd a path from P ′ to {n}, that is both feasible (possible
via a sequence of coalition deviations), and individually rational on a farsighted
basis (for the deviators at every stage). Here that transition can occur directly
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in one stage. Firstly, P ′
{n}→ {n} is feasible. Secondly, by Proposition 14.3,
({n} gi P ′)ni=1 . Hence {n} g P ′ as required.
Theorem 44. In the general model, if there is anonymity, negative externali-
ties, vg1,1[x1] is strictly quasi-convex, and if {1, 1, ....1} and {n} are both strictly
eﬃcient, then {1, 1, ....1} and {n} are both EEBA.
Proof. Let R = {{1, 1, 1...1}, {n}}, be the set containing both the trivial parti-
tions.
Internal Stability. Consider a path that starts at one of the trivial partitions and
ends at the other. All banks are indiﬀerent between {1, 1, 1....1} and {n}. So
no initial group of deviators can be strictly better oﬀ at the end state compared
with the start state. Hence R is internally stable.
External Stability. Suppose it is not externally stable so there exists some par-
tition P ′ s.t. {1, 1, 1...1} g P ′ and {n} g P ′. However, by Proposition 43
{1, 1, 1..1} g P ′ and {n} g P ′ . This is a contradiction. Hence R is stable,
and so both {1, 1, ....1} and {n} are EEBA.
Now, with the standard model, we in turn consider the three cases, P [n] > θP [1],
P [n] < θP [1] and P [n] = θP [1].
Theorem 45. In the standard model, if P [n] > θP [1] then {n} is the unique
EEBA.
Proof. The result follows from a direct application of Theorem 40: the model is
strictly quasi-convex by Proposition 25; has anonymity by Proposition 23; has
negative externalities by Proposition 24; and the partition {n} is the unique
eﬃcient partition by Corollary 26.
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Theorem 46. In the standard model, if P [n] < θP [1] then {1, 1, ....1} is the
unique EEBA.
Proof. The result follows from a direct application of Theorem 42: the model is
strictly quasi-convex by Proposition 25; has anonymity by Proposition 23; has
negative externalities by Proposition 24; and the partition {n} is the unique
eﬃcient partition by Corollary 26.
With the critical parameter case, P [n] = θP [1], we have weak, but not strict,
quasi-convexity in v1[x1]; and hence we cannot use Theorem 44. Hence it is
necessary to use an intermediate proposition, which for the special case of P [n] =
θP [1], generalises Proposition 13 to the ith module:
Proposition 47. If P [n] = θP [1] then argmax vi[x]={{(1)i−1j=1, xi, (1)n+1−xij=i+1 } :
xi ∈ An+1−i}
Proof. Let us start by considering the partition(s) x that maximise v1[x], the
utility of a bank in the ﬁrst module. As there are negative externalities all the
modules after the ﬁrst one must be singletons. So x = {x1, 1, 1, 1....1}: there
must be one module of size x1 and n−x1 modules of size 1. So v1[x] = x1n2P [x1]+
θ (n−x1)
n2
P [x1]P [1]. Hence ∂v1[x]∂x1 = (γ−θ−γθn+1)P [1]P [x1]. So as P [n] = θP [1],
∂v1[x]
∂x1
≡ 0. This proves the result for the ﬁrst module. The same argument
applies for the ith module as appropriate, (with the caveat that we need there
to be an ith module, and so we require the ﬁrst i − 1 modules to be singleton
modules).
Theorem 48. In the standard model, if P [n] = θP [1], then {1, 1, ....1} and {n}
are both EEBA. Further all other partitions with precisely one non-singleton
module are also EEBA.
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Proof. Let R be the set containing all partitions with either 0 or 1 non-singleton
modules. So it contains all elements such as {1, 1....1}, {x1, 1, 1..1}, {1, x2, 1,
1..1},{1, 1, x3, 1, 1..1}, {1, 1, 1, ...., xi, 1, 1, 1, 1}, and {n}.
Internal Stability. We need to prove that there do not exist P, P´ ∈ R such
that P´  P . Proof is by contradiction: suppose such a path from P1 := P
to Pt := P ′ exists, and that the length t is the minimal length. Then there is
a set T1 of deviators from P1 to some P2. Without loss of generality, assume
that the potential non-singleton module within P , is module 1. Suppose T1
contains no members of module 1 of P. Then we must have P2 = P, or that P2
is a permutation of P ; however, in either case the path is now not of minimal
length. Instead suppose T1 contains some, or all, the members of module 1 of P .
However by Proposition 47, P ∈ argmax v1[x]. And so such members of module
1 of P that are deviating, cannot be strictly better oﬀ at the end partition P ′ .
So there is a contradiction in this case as well. Hence R is internally stable.
External Stability. Suppose P ′ /∈ R. And so that P ′ must have at least 2 non-
singleton modules, so P /∈ argmax vi[x], by Proposition 47. I will now show
that there is a path from P ′ to {n}, that is both feasible (possible via a sequence
of coalition deviations), and individually rational on a farsighted basis (for the
deviators at every stage). The transition can occur directly in one stage. Firstly,
P ′
{n}→ {n} is feasible. Secondly, the argmax of v1[x] includes {n}. So {n} i P ′
for all i. Hence {n}  P ′ as required.
The internal examiner, Professor Peter Hammond, notes that in these proofs the
transitions take place in one stage, and asked what this meant for the requirement
of farsightedness. In general the EEBA deﬁnition includes multiple deviations
because it allows situation such as P = P1, P2, P3 = P ′ where the deviators are
T1 and T2 such that T1 prefers P ′ to P and T2 prefers P ′ to P2 but does not prefer
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P ′ to P : with each EEBA sequence, deviating agents prefer the end partition to
the current partition at the point they deviate, but there is no requirement that
they prefer the end partition to other partitions in the sequence.
However, here following Proposition 14 as the partition model has anonymity,
negative externalities and vg1,1[x1] is strictly quasi-convex, there is generically a
unique eﬃcient partition such that at other partitions everyone is worse, and so
the transition can be completed in one stage. One interpretation of this would
be that the issues of farsightedness are non-critical. However, if we want to
imagine that in practice that at each stage simple deviations are possible (a
single module splitting; or 2 modules merging) but compound deviations are not
feasible (multiple modules splitting or more than 2 modules merging), then the
farsightedness requirement would again be non-trivial.
1.9 Parameterisations
So far we have considered the model in terms of three parameters: n, the number
of banks; θ, the value of outside matches; and γ, the shock parameter. This
section considers some sensible ranges of these parameters: the number of banks,
n, is one of {10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100, 1000}; the value of outside matches, θ, has
a minimum of 0, a maximum of 1.0 and has an increment of 0.1; the shock
parameter, γ, is one of {0} ∪ 0.01N9∪0.1N30, where Nn := {1, 2...n}.80 So, the
n parameter is one of 7 values, the θ parameter is one of 11 values, and the γ
parameter is one of 40 values. This gives a total of 7 ∗ 11 ∗ 40 = 3080 diﬀerent
parametrisations. For each of these cases we consider which out of the atomistic
partition of singletons, Atom, and the grand coalition, GC, is preferred.
80Firstly, the net eﬀect is that the γ range is {0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08,
0.09, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 2.0, 2.1, 2.2,
2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 3.0}. Secondly, Appendix E, shows that 3 is a reasonable upper
limit for γ.
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For each parametrisation, the welfare of the atomistic partition is given by W[1];
the welfare of the grand coalition is given by W[n]; and g, the percentage gain
from choosing the atomistic partition over the grand coalition, is given by 100 ∗
(W [1]−W [n])/W [n].81 In 2444 cases the atomistic partition is strictly preferred;
in 11 cases there is indiﬀerence; and in 625 cases the grand coalition is strictly
preferred. This argues that for realistic parameter values the atomistic partition
should be chosen.
How the distribution of the gain varies can be displayed for each parameter in
a separate table. Each line of a table ﬁxes one parameter value, but lets the
other parameters vary. So, for example, the top line of the n table includes the
parametrisations where, n is ﬁxed at 10, θ varies between 0 and 1, and γ varies
between 0 and 3. These 11 ∗ 40 = 440 cases are considered to see what the
distribution of the gains is.
The grand coalition is the unique solution, if and only if P [n] > θP [1]. So
the n table and the θ table show that as either n or θ increases, there is an
increase, both in the number of cases with gain from atomisation, and in the
gains in those cases. Re-arrangement gives that GC  Atom if and only if
(γ < (1− θ)/(θn− 1) or θn ≤ 1). The γ table shows that an increase in the
shock parameter, γ, generally leads to a switch from the grand coalition to the
Atomistic partition of singletons: however, this does not occur if θn ≤ 1, for
example when θ ∈ {0, 0.1} and n = 10.
81Here we are allowing modules to have fractional sizes. So the feasible set of partition is
{(xi)ki=1 : xi ∈ R, xi ≥ 1, k ∈ N and
∑k
i=1 xi = n}
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Table 1.5: Standard Model n Table
percentage gain from atomisation broken down by n
n (-100,0) [0,100) [100,200) [200,300) [300,400) [400,500) [500,600) [600,700) [700,800) [800,900) [900,1000) [1000,25000)
10 151 169 115 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 106 116 75 66 58 19 0 0 0 0 0 0
30 91 87 63 45 50 40 37 26 1 0 0 0
40 83 68 51 47 34 32 33 33 30 19 10 0
50 78 63 44 37 31 27 30 26 23 25 25 31
100 67 23 39 21 22 26 15 22 13 11 18 163
1000 49 2 3 2 3 3 3 4 4 2 3 362
All 625 528 390 223 198 147 118 111 71 57 56 556
Table 1.6: Standard Model θ Table
percentage gain from atomisation broken down by θ
θ (-100,0) [0,100) [100,200) [200,300) [300,400) [400,500) [500,600) [600,700) [700,800) [800,900) [900,1000) [1000,25000)
0.0 280 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.1 108 106 25 6 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 29
0.2 66 82 60 7 12 17 0 1 0 1 1 33
0.3 49 64 46 41 14 1 9 17 3 0 0 36
0.4 37 54 37 39 30 17 0 1 9 9 10 37
0.5 30 55 31 25 29 25 18 1 0 1 8 57
0.6 22 46 26 30 29 18 24 16 3 0 0 66
0.7 15 33 39 30 16 24 15 22 12 7 1 66
0.8 10 30 43 19 20 16 22 13 21 9 10 67
0.9 8 27 44 10 29 10 17 18 12 19 7 79
1.0 0 31 39 16 18 18 12 20 10 11 19 86
All 625 528 390 223 198 147 118 111 71 57 56 556
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Table 1.7: Standard Model γ Table
percentage gain from atomisation broken down by γ
γ (-100,0) [0,100) [100,200) [200,300) [300,400) [400,500) [500,600) [600,700) [700,800) [800,900) [900,1000) [1000,25000)
0.00 70 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.01 49 19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0.02 41 22 5 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 5
0.03 35 24 6 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 7
0.04 31 24 8 3 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 8
0.05 28 23 10 3 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 8
0.06 26 22 10 5 1 3 1 0 0 0 1 8
0.07 25 19 12 6 2 1 3 0 0 0 0 9
0.08 25 17 12 7 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 9
0.09 21 21 10 7 3 2 1 2 1 0 0 9
0.1 21 17 13 7 4 1 1 1 2 1 0 9
0.2 15 14 9 10 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 13
0.3 12 12 9 9 6 5 2 4 1 2 0 15
0.4 11 11 11 5 7 3 5 3 3 1 2 15
0.5 10 10 10 7 6 4 3 4 2 3 1 17
0.6 10 10 10 6 4 5 4 4 3 3 0 18
0.7 10 10 10 4 6 5 3 5 2 1 3 18
0.8 9 10 10 5 6 5 3 5 1 2 3 18
0.9 8 10 10 5 6 6 3 5 1 2 3 18
1.0 8 9 9 7 5 7 3 2 4 2 3 18
1.1 8 9 9 7 5 7 3 3 3 2 3 18
1.2 8 9 9 7 7 5 3 5 1 2 3 18
1.3 8 9 10 7 6 5 3 5 1 2 3 18
1.4 8 9 11 6 6 5 3 5 1 2 3 18
1.5 8 9 13 4 6 5 3 5 2 1 3 18
1.6 8 9 13 4 6 5 4 4 2 1 3 18
1.7 8 9 13 4 6 5 4 4 3 3 0 18
1.8 8 10 12 4 6 5 4 5 2 3 1 17
1.9 8 11 11 4 6 5 5 4 2 3 1 17
2.0 8 12 10 6 4 7 3 4 2 3 1 17
2.1 8 12 10 6 6 5 3 4 2 3 1 17
2.2 8 12 10 6 8 3 3 4 2 3 1 17
2.3 8 12 10 7 7 4 4 2 2 3 1 17
2.4 8 12 10 8 7 3 5 2 4 1 1 16
2.5 8 12 10 8 7 3 5 3 3 1 2 15
2.6 8 12 10 8 7 3 5 3 3 1 2 15
2.7 8 12 10 8 7 4 5 2 3 1 2 15
2.8 8 12 10 8 7 4 5 2 3 1 2 15
2.9 8 12 12 6 7 4 5 2 3 1 2 15
3.0 8 13 12 5 7 5 4 2 3 1 2 15
All 625 528 390 223 198 147 118 111 71 57 56 556
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1.10 Interpretation
This chapter has constructed and considered the eﬃciency of a standard model,
and concluded that, depending on the parametrisation, we should either: choose
the grand coalition and accept boom and bust; or choose the atomistic partition
and accept low income. This section considers the regulatory implications of
this module rejection result: ﬁrstly, at what level of government should bank
regulation take place; secondly, do inter-bank relationships need regulating, and
thirdly, what are the implications of the 2007–2009 ﬁnancial crisis.
The eﬃciency of the boundary partitions advocates the homogenous regulation of
inter-bank relationships, as in both cases regulation of the inter-bank relationship
is the same for every pair of banks (i, j): with the grand coalition it is low for
all (i, j); whilst with the atomistic partition it is high for all (i, j). This is unlike
a partition with real modularisation where regulation is low between banks in
the same module, but high between banks in diﬀerent modules. So, the grand
coalition solution implies that banking regulation should be international; whilst
the atomistic partition implies it should be local. Neither suggests it should be
at an intermediate or regional level (for example by the EU).
The EEBA solution concept has farsighted agents, and Section 1.8 has showed
that for the standard model, with this concept only the eﬃcient modularisation
is stable. This result argues against the need for regulation of banking networks.
However, in contrast, chapter 2 will show that in formulations with myopic
agents: the atomistic partition may be unstable, even when it is eﬃcient; and
the grand coalition stable, even when it is ineﬃcient. So with myopic banks the
conclusion is that there is a pro grand coalition bias.
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Finally, it provides this two-part conﬂicting interpretation of the policy of highly
interconnected banks that allowed the 2007–2009 ﬁnancial crisis to become global.
If the shock parameter is low enough, or the cost of high regulation large enough,
then low regulation is optimal despite boom and bust. So, the occurrence of a
single crisis is not suﬃcient to argue for a policy change. Conversely, however, as
the number of banks increases, there is a tipping point at which the eﬃcient solu-
tion jumps from the grand coalition to the atomistic partition, and indeed the
parameterisations considered in section 1.9 suggest that separation into minimal
sized banks is likely to be the optimal policy.
My model does not allow for growth in the banking sector, but it does suggest
that in such an environment the eﬃcient policy is to switch from low to high
regulation once the number of banks reaches a certain critical level. And it is
possible that the banking sector has grown past that critical level, and thus the
pre crisis structure was sub-optimal.
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Chapter 2
Criticality and Robustness
2.1 Summary
This chapter considers the criticality and robustness of the standard model in
four aspects: the business sector, the ﬁnancial sector, the social planner’s pref-
erences and partition formation. There is criticality with respect to an aspect
of the standard model, if altering that aspect can result in the optimality of
proper partitions, (where there are multiple modules, and each module will have
multiple member banks). A method often used to demonstrate criticality is to
computationally evaluate the altered model’s welfare function for interior sym-
metric partitions. The method is valid as it leads to a lower bound for the
welfare gain when interior non-symmetric partitions are additionally allowed.
Conversely, there is robustness with respect to an aspect of the standard model,
if on altering that aspect the standard model’s rejection of proper partitions still
remains. A method often used to demonstrate this is to computationally ﬁnd the
interior partition that maximises the utility of bank 1. As Appendix A shows,
this leads to an upper bound for the welfare gain from interior partitions.
The business sector demonstrates criticality in aspects such as circular matching,
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(businesses are arranged in a circle, and matches are always between immediate
neighbours); hypercube models, (either 4 businesses arranged in a square, or
8 businesses arranged in a cube); and non-uniform matching (with 3 or 4 busi-
nesses). Contrastingly, the ﬁnancial sector demonstrates both robustness (where
the probability of a bank receiving an initial shock increases with module size),
and criticality (if banks receive biased incentives, for example in terms of their
time horizons). The standard model is robust to altering the preferences of the
social planner (either in terms of risk aversion or including intertemporal utility).
Further, this chapter applies diﬀerent partition formation concepts to the stand-
ard model. The eﬃcient partition is again always formed under either the Equi-
librium Binding Agreement (EBA), of Ray and Vohra (1997), or the Unanimity
Game of Bloch (1996). However, ineﬃcient partitions can be formed under bi-
lateral stability from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), or the Open Membership
game from Yi and Shin (2000).
2.2 Business
2.2.1 Circular Business Networks
2.2.1.1 Circular Matching
The standard model has uniform matching: this represents a ‘global’ world where
business matches are as likely to be between businesses that are on opposite sides
of the world, as they are to be between businesses that are close neighbours of
each other. In contrast, here with the circular model we consider an environment
where all matches are between business that are local to each other. The use
of a circle of agents, rather than a line segment, is done partly to represent the
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circular (spherical) nature of the earth and partly to avoid introducing special
matching behaviour at the end points.
This section considers a variant model where there is a circle of banks and will
show that the eﬃcient partition generally has proper modules: multiple modules
each with multiple member banks.1 We are attempting to show the ineﬃciency of
the boundary partitions, so it is suﬃcient to check only the symmetric partitions:
if there is a symmetric partition that beats both the trivial partitions, then there
must be a partition in the bigger set of all partitions that beats both the trivial
partitions. Hence, for simplicity, in this section we will consider only symmetric
partitions, which partition the circle into k modules of length d, {[id, (i+1)d)}k−1i=0 ,
where kd = n and d ≥ 1. We assume inﬁnite divisibility of banks, and so the
matching process is represented by a probability density function (pdf), rather
than a probability function.2 All matches are between neighbouring banks one
unit distance apart: so the matching process has probability density function
p(i, i+ 1) = 1/n where i ∈ [0, n].3
As in the standard model, matches are either inside (banks in same module), or
outside (banks in diﬀerent modules), however, the probability of an inside match
is diﬀerent:
Theorem 49. The inside match probability is given by: P (Inside) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
d−1
d
d < n
1 d = n
.
Proof. Outside matching occurs when matches ‘stretch’ over a module bound-
ary, so as matches are of length one, P (inside) is the number of inter-module
1The next two sections 2.2.1.2 and 2.2.1.3 consider respectively circular models where the
minimum module size is parametrised and where the match size is variable.
2Inﬁnite divisibility is assumed to ensure that symmetric partitions are valid even when
they have modules which contain a fractional number of banks.
3Where in a slight abuse of notation, addition is modulus n and so n+1 = 1. Hence, more
generally, p(z, z + 1− n) = 1n when z ∈ [n− 1, n]
107
boundaries divided by n. With k modules the number of boundaries is, 0 if
k = 1 and k if k > 1. This discontinuity generates the two-part formula: when
there are multiple modules, (d < n), the match is inside one module, unless the
ﬁrst bank in the match is within one unit of its module’s upper bound, so as
each module is of length d, this gives the d−1
d
term; when there is only a single
module (d = n), the match is always inside.
For symmetric sized modules the welfare function is given by:
Wc[d]= P (inside)P [d]+θP (outside)P 2[d], where P [d] = 11+γd is the standard
module enablement probability. As with the matching probability, the wel-
fare function has two parts: Wc[1 ≤ d ≤ 0.5n]=
(
1− 1
d
)
P [d]+θ
(
1
d
)
P 2[d] and
Wc[d = n]=P [n] .4 This gives:
∂Wc[d]
∂d
|d<n= −
(6γθ − 2γ + θ − 1) + (d− 2) (4γ2 + 3γθ + γ)+ (4γ2 + γ) (d− 2)2 + γ2(d− 2)3
d2(γd+ 1)3
The (d− 2), (d− 2)2 and (d− 2)3 coeﬃcients are all negative (note the leading
minus sign). So, in the region where d > 2 the function is quasi-concave not
quasi-convex : once the slope is negative it stays negative. So in general, with
circular matching the eﬃcient partition is non-trivial: it has real modules. So
when the matching is circular this is a pro-module argument.
Next, for a range of diﬀerent parametrisations we compute the partition that
maximisesWc[d]. The number of banks, n, is one of {10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100, 1000}.
The value of outside matches, θ, has a minimum of 0.1, a maximum of 0.9 and
has an increment of 0.1. The shock parameter, γ, is one of {0}∪0.01N9∪0.1N30,
where Nn := {1, 2...n}.5 So, the n parameter is one of 7 values, the θ parameter
4For general asymmetric partitions, the welfare function is Wc[(xi)ki=1] ={∑k
i=1
(
(xi−1)
n P [xi] +
θ
nP [xi]P [xi+1]
)
k > 1
P [n] k = 1
5Firstly, the net eﬀect is that the γ range is {0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08,
0.09, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 2.0, 2.1, 2.2,
2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 3.0}. Secondly, Appendix E, shows that 3 is a reasonable upper
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is one of 9 values, and the γ parameter is one of 40 values. This gives a total
of 7 ∗ 9 ∗ 40 = 2520 parametrisations. For each of these cases we consider which
out of the atomistic partition of singletons, Atom, and the grand coalition, GC,
is preferred.
For each parametrisation, the welfare of the best trivial partition is given by
Wb := Max{Wc[1],Wc[n]}; the welfare of the best symmetric interior partition
is given by Wi := Max{Wc[n/k]}n−1k=2 ; and g, the percentage gain from choosing
an interior partition, is given by 100 ∗ (W i −W b)/W b.6 The large gains from
interior partitions, represented in Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 below, mean that the
standard model rejection of interior partitions is critical to replacing a uniform
distribution of business opportunities with a circular distribution. If the gain
had been calculated over all partitions rather than just symmetric partitions
then each gain would have been weakly higher and so this criticality would only
be stronger.
How the distribution of the gain varies can be displayed for each parameter in a
separate table. The n table shows, ﬁrstly that there are nearly always gains from
interior partitions, and secondly, as n increases that there are occasionally very
high percentage gains from interior partitions. The θ table shows that there is a
clear correlation between low θ and high gains from the interior partitions: this
suggests the best boundary solution is the atomistic partition, and that when θ
gets big that the atomistic partition becomes an increasingly valued option. The
γ table shows that as γ increases, the gains from including interior partitions go
up: there is an increased co-ordination value of getting both banks enabled at
the same time.
limit for γ.
6Here we are allowing modules to have fractional sizes. So the feasible set of partition is
{(xi)ki=1 : xi ∈ R, xi ≥ 1, k ∈ N and
∑k
i=1 xi = n}
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Table 2.1: Circular Matching n table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by n
n (-100,0) [0,100) [100,200) [200,300) [300,400) [400,500) [500,600) [600,700) [700,800) [800,900) [900,1000) [1000,1100)
10 36 236 88 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 14 229 51 33 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
30 13 222 53 28 13 16 15 0 0 0 0 0
40 13 214 61 27 10 10 4 7 14 0 0 0
50 13 209 62 30 10 9 6 5 5 4 7 0
100 13 201 60 35 11 10 9 5 5 4 4 3
1000 13 197 58 34 11 8 12 10 6 4 4 3
All 115 1508 433 187 88 53 46 27 30 12 15 6
Table 2.2: Circular Matching θ table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by θ
θ (-100,0) [0,100) [100,200) [200,300) [300,400) [400,500) [500,600) [600,700) [700,800) [800,900) [900,1000) [1000,1100)
0.1 13 42 35 17 24 13 46 27 30 12 15 6
0.2 12 41 37 86 64 40 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.3 11 39 152 78 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.4 10 139 125 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.5 9 201 70 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.6 9 257 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.7 8 272 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.8 8 272 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.9 35 245 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All 115 1508 433 187 88 53 46 27 30 12 15 6
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Table 2.3: Circular Matching γ table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by γ
γ (-100,0) [0,100) [100,200) [200,300) [300,400) [400,500) [500,600) [600,700) [700,800) [800,900) [900,1000) [1000,1100)
0 63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.01 9 50 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0.02 6 49 6 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0.03 4 51 6 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0.04 3 51 5 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0.05 2 51 6 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0.06 0 51 8 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0.07 0 51 8 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0.08 0 49 10 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0.09 0 48 9 4 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0.1 0 48 9 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
0.2 7 38 8 7 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
0.3 7 38 8 6 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0
0.4 7 38 8 5 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0
0.5 7 38 6 7 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0
0.6 0 45 6 7 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 0
0.7 0 45 6 7 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 0
0.8 0 45 6 7 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0
0.9 0 45 6 7 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0
1.0 0 44 7 7 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 0
1.1 0 44 7 7 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 0
1.2 0 43 8 7 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 0
1.3 0 35 16 7 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 0
1.4 0 35 16 1 6 1 0 4 0 0 0 0
1.5 0 35 16 0 7 1 0 1 3 0 0 0
1.6 0 35 16 0 7 0 1 1 3 0 0 0
1.7 0 35 16 0 7 0 1 0 4 0 0 0
1.8 0 35 10 6 7 0 1 0 4 0 0 0
1.9 0 35 10 6 7 0 1 0 4 0 0 0
2.0 0 35 10 6 7 0 1 0 1 3 0 0
2.1 0 28 17 6 7 0 1 0 1 3 0 0
2.2 0 28 17 6 7 0 1 0 1 3 0 0
2.3 0 28 17 6 2 5 1 0 1 3 0 0
2.4 0 28 17 6 2 5 1 0 1 0 3 0
2.5 0 28 17 6 2 5 1 0 1 0 3 0
2.6 0 28 17 6 2 5 1 0 1 0 3 0
2.7 0 28 17 6 2 5 1 0 1 0 3 0
2.8 0 28 17 6 2 5 1 0 1 0 1 2
2.9 0 21 24 6 2 5 1 0 1 0 1 2
3.0 0 21 18 12 2 5 1 0 1 0 1 2
All 115 1508 433 187 88 53 46 27 30 12 15 6
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2.2.1.2 Circular Matching: variable minimum module size
In the previous section there are two normalisations of size 1: ﬁrstly, the min-
imum banks module size is 1, and secondly the match length is of size 1. And we
cannot, in a mathematical model, make two such normalisation without losing
generality.7 This section tests the robustness of the circular model where the
minimum module size is no longer 1: previously the maximum number of mod-
ules was n; now it is n ∗ s. If s = 1 then the maximum number of modules is n,
and the minimum module size is 1, as in the original circular model. If s < 1
then the maximum number of modules is less than n, and the minimum module
size is greater than 1. If s > 1 then the maximum number of modules is greater
than n, and the minimum module size is less than 1.
In this section the rest of the model stays the same. Again, we will consider
only symmetric partitions, which partition the circle into k modules of length
d, {[id, (i + 1)d)}k−1i=0 , where kd = n, 1 ≤ k ≤ ns and k ∈ N. We continue to
assume inﬁnite divisibility of banks, and so the matching process is represented
by a probability density function (pdf), rather than a probability function. All
matches are still between neighbouring banks one unit distance apart: so the
matching process has the same probability density function p(i, i + 1) = 1/n
where i ∈ [0, n]. And hence the same welfare function, Wc[d], still applies.
Next, for a range of diﬀerent parametrisations we compute the partition that
maximises Wc[d]. The s parameter has a minimum of 0.1, a maximum of 2 and
an increment of 0.1. The other parameters have the same ranges as before: the
number of banks, n, is one of {10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100, 1000}; the value of outside
matches, θ, has a minimum of 0.1, a maximum of 0.9 and has an increment of
7Although we might justify on practical terms why the normalisations could be the same.
For example suppose there a number of small towns existing on a circle and each match is
between business in neighbouring towns, and it is excluded on eﬃciency grounds for there to
be multiple banks per town.
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0.1; the shock parameter, γ, has a minimum of 0.1, a maximum of 3.0 and an
increment of 0.1.8 So, the s parameter is one of 20 values, the n parameter is
one of 7 values, the θ parameter is one of 9 values, and the γ parameter is one
of 30 values. This gives a total of 20 ∗ 7 ∗ 9 ∗ 30 = 37800 parametrisations.
For each parametrisation, the welfare of the best trivial partition is given by
Wb := Max{Wc[1/ns],Wc[n]}; the welfare of the best symmetric interior par-
tition is given by Wi := Max{Wc[n/k]}ns−1k=2 ; and g, the percentage gain from
choosing an interior partition, is given by 100 ∗ (W i−W b)/W b. The large gains
from interior partitions, represented in Tables 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 below, mean
that the standard model rejection of interior partitions is critical to replacing a
uniform distribution of business opportunities with a circular distribution with
variable minimum module size. If the gain had been calculated over all partitions
rather than just symmetric partitions then each gain would have been weakly
higher and so this criticality would only be stronger.
How the gain varies can be displayed for each parameter in a separate table. The
s table shows the signiﬁcant diﬀerences between this model and the previous
model. If s is small (0.1 to 0.4) then modules in the atomistic partition are
much bigger than the size of the matches: so we want smaller modules not
bigger modules; hence the interior partitions are further from the ideal module
size and there are very few gains from interior partitions. As s increases, there
are more cases with gains from interior partitions, and once s is above 0.5 then
in the majority of cases there are gain from interior partitions. With s = 1, we
get the original circle model as a special case: minimum module size and match
length are both 1, and this case represents a high point both for the frequency of
gains from interior partitions, and for the size of gains from interior partitions.
Once s > 1, the atomistic partition has modules of size less than 1, and hence
8This choice of n and s ensures that ns is an integer.
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the atomistic partition always has outside matches. As s increases further, the
atomistic partition has increasingly small modules, and hence the enablement
probability of each atomic module increases, but the probability of an inside
match is always 0 and so does not decrease further. Hence, once s > 1, the
welfare of the atomistic partition is strictly increasing as s increases further, and
hence the opportunities for gains from interior partitions are reduced.
Table 2.4: Circular Matching: variable minimum module size s table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by s
s (-100,0) [0,100) [100,200) [200,300) [300,400) [400,500) [500,600) [600,700) [700,800) [800,900) [900,1000) [1000,1100)
0.1 1890 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.2 1890 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.3 1872 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.4 1796 94 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.5 1276 614 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.6 434 1456 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.7 147 1743 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.8 65 1814 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.9 40 1455 387 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.0 28 1057 373 170 84 51 43 22 29 12 15 6
1.1 168 1001 343 146 84 37 43 24 26 15 3 0
1.2 301 974 301 112 64 41 49 24 24 0 0 0
1.3 462 882 267 113 28 61 47 30 0 0 0 0
1.4 604 795 242 89 22 81 49 8 0 0 0 0
1.5 715 719 237 59 63 65 32 0 0 0 0 0
1.6 770 706 231 23 88 65 7 0 0 0 0 0
1.7 875 615 223 17 116 42 2 0 0 0 0 0
1.8 934 556 223 17 141 17 2 0 0 0 0 0
1.9 987 503 223 17 156 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 1001 491 221 59 114 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
All 16255 15493 3282 830 960 464 278 108 79 27 18 6
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Table 2.5: Circular Matching: variable minimum module size n table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by n
n (-100,0) [0,100) [100,200) [200,300) [300,400) [400,500) [500,600) [600,700) [700,800) [800,900) [900,1000) [1000,1100)
10 2423 2373 604 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 2345 2177 461 206 211 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
30 2321 2165 457 131 159 89 78 0 0 0 0 0
40 2307 2179 458 119 150 86 42 28 31 0 0 0
50 2297 2189 434 132 154 91 44 26 16 9 8 0
100 2284 2202 434 121 143 99 57 27 16 9 5 3
1000 2278 2208 434 121 143 99 57 27 16 9 5 3
All 16255 15493 3282 830 960 464 278 108 79 27 18 6
Table 2.6: Circular Matching: variable minimum module size θ table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by θ
θ (-100,0) [0,100) [100,200) [200,300) [300,400) [400,500) [500,600) [600,700) [700,800) [800,900) [900,1000) [1000,1100)
0.1 817 1008 453 204 788 414 278 108 79 27 18 6
0.2 840 986 1658 494 172 50 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.3 891 2412 771 126 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.4 979 2927 288 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.5 1540 2562 98 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.6 2124 2062 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.7 2618 1582 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.8 3039 1161 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.9 3407 793 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All 16255 15493 3282 830 960 464 278 108 79 27 18 6
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Table 2.7: Circular Matching: variable minimum module size γ table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by γ
γ (-100,0) [0,100) [100,200) [200,300) [300,400) [400,500) [500,600) [600,700) [700,800) [800,900) [900,1000) [1000,1100)
0.1 351 729 111 47 0 0 22 0 0 0 0 0
0.2 479 607 99 42 11 18 4 0 0 0 0 0
0.3 545 559 92 20 23 19 2 0 0 0 0 0
0.4 576 528 96 5 35 17 3 0 0 0 0 0
0.5 601 503 84 17 35 17 3 0 0 0 0 0
0.6 610 494 78 23 35 16 4 0 0 0 0 0
0.7 611 493 78 23 35 16 4 0 0 0 0 0
0.8 614 490 78 23 30 17 8 0 0 0 0 0
0.9 611 487 84 28 25 17 8 0 0 0 0 0
1.0 597 498 81 34 25 17 4 4 0 0 0 0
1.1 589 506 81 34 25 13 8 4 0 0 0 0
1.2 582 502 92 34 25 13 8 4 0 0 0 0
1.3 581 477 118 34 20 18 8 4 0 0 0 0
1.4 576 481 113 34 26 18 4 8 0 0 0 0
1.5 574 483 113 24 36 18 4 5 3 0 0 0
1.6 560 497 113 24 36 10 12 5 3 0 0 0
1.7 545 505 120 18 42 10 12 4 4 0 0 0
1.8 545 498 121 24 37 15 12 4 4 0 0 0
1.9 536 507 115 24 43 15 8 8 4 0 0 0
2.0 536 507 115 24 43 10 13 4 5 3 0 0
2.1 535 501 122 24 43 10 13 4 5 3 0 0
2.2 531 505 122 24 43 10 13 4 5 3 0 0
2.3 514 508 136 24 33 20 11 6 5 3 0 0
2.4 507 515 124 30 39 20 9 8 5 0 3 0
2.5 499 523 124 30 39 15 14 4 6 3 3 0
2.6 498 524 124 30 39 15 14 4 6 3 3 0
2.7 496 519 131 30 39 15 14 4 6 3 3 0
2.8 495 520 131 30 34 20 14 4 6 3 1 2
2.9 481 513 152 30 29 25 10 8 6 3 1 2
3.0 480 514 134 42 35 20 15 8 6 0 4 2
All 16255 15493 3282 830 960 464 278 108 79 27 18 6
2.2.1.3 Circular Matching: variable match lengths
Consider an extension of the circle model where the gap z between matched
banks is not ﬁxed at 1, but instead is uniformly distributed between 0 and M .
Speciﬁcally, consider a circle of circumference n, so that matched banks (x1,
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x2) ∈ [0, n)2 and z :=| x2 − x1 |∼ U [0,M ]. The gap has probability density
function, f(z) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1
M
z ≤ M
0 z > M
. We can now formulate the welfare function for
the symmetric case of k modules of length d:
Theorem 50. The Circular Model with variable match lengths has this welfare
function for symmetric partitions:
Wgc[d] =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
d
2M
P [d] + θ (2M−d)
2M
P [d]2 d ≤ M
(
1− M
2d
)
P [d] + θM
2d
P [d]2 M ≤ d ≤ 0.5n
P [n] d = n
Proof. If the gap is z then in order for the match to be inside (both banks are in
the same module), we require the ﬁrst bank to be in the ﬁrst d− z units of the
module. If the gap, z, is bigger than the size of the module, d, then the match
is always outside (banks are in diﬀerent modules). Also in the special case of 1
module, the match is always inside. Hence:
P (Inside : z) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 k = 1 ≡ d = n
d−z
d
z ≤ d
0 z ≥ d
So by integrating over z, we can calculate the inside match probability for the
case of k > 1 symmetric modules: P (Inside : k ∈ N2) =
´M
z=0
P (Inside :
z)f(z)dz =
´Min{d,M}
z=0
d−z
d
1
M
dz = 1
dM
´Min{d,M}
z=0
(d − z)dz. This splits naturally
into 2 cases: P (Inside : d < M) = d
2M
and P (Inside : d < M) = 1 − M
2d
.
The welfare function is given by Wgc[d] = P (Inside)P [d] + θP (Outside)P [d]2,
where P [d] = 1
1+γd
is the module enablement probability from the standard
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model. Including in the special case of 1 module, gives us the full 3-piece welfare
function:
Wgc[d] =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
d
2M
P [d] + θ (2M−d)
2M
P [d]2 d ≤ M
(
1− M
2d
)
P [d] + θM
2d
P [d]2 M ≤ d ≤ 0.5n
P [n] d = n
We now consider the argmax in each of the ﬁrst two pieces, d∗1 and d∗2 respectively,
and d∗ the argmax of the whole function.
Theorem 51. The ﬁrst piece of Wgc[d], where d ≤ M , is quasi-convex and
hence d∗1 = 1 or d∗1 = M .
Proof. The ﬁrst piece is the standard model with parametrisation (n = 2M, θ, γ).
That model is quasi-convex and hence d∗1 = 1 or d∗1 = M .
Corollary 52. Hence if M = 0.5n then the whole function consists of just the
ﬁrst piece and d∗ = 1 or d∗ = M .
Theorem 53. The 2nd piece of Wgc[d] is quasi-concave and hence
d∗2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
M θ ≥ 1+γM
1+3γM
FOC
(γn+2)(2M(γn+1)−γn2)
2M(3γn+2)
< θ < 1+γM
1+3γM
0.5n θ ≤ (γn+2)(2M(γn+1)−γn
2)
2M(3γn+2)
Proof. With piece two, W ′gc[d : M ≤ d ≤ 0.5n] =
M(2γ2d2−3γd(θ−1)−θ+1)−2γd2(γd+1)
2d2(γd+1)3
and so 2d
2W
′
gc[d]
P [d]3
= M (2γ2d2 − 3γd(θ − 1)− θ + 1) − 2γd2(γd + 1). Considering
this as a cubic expansion around d = M, gives that W ′gc[d : M ≤ d ≤ 0.5n] > 0
if and only if:
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(−3γθM2 + γM2 − θM +M)−(2γ2M2 + 3γθM + γM) (d−M)−(2γ + 4γ2M) (d−M)2−2γ2(d−M)3 > 0
The (d −M), (d −M)2, and (d −M)3 coeﬃcients are all negative, so the 2nd
piece of Wgc[d] is quasi-concave and hence:
d∗2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
M W
′
gc[d = M ] ≤ 0
FOC W
′
gc[d = M ] > 0 andW
′
gc[d = 0.5n] < 0
0.5n W
′
gc[d = 0.5n] ≥ 0
Algebraic re-arrangement gives:
W
′
gc[d = M ]
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
≤ 0 3θ > 1 andM ≥ 1−θ
γ(3θ−1) < 0
> 0 3θ ≤ 1 orM < 1−θ
γ(3θ−1)
W
′
gc[d = 0.5n] ≥ 0 if and only if M ≥ γn
2(γn+2)
(2γ2n2+6γ(1−θ)n+4(1−θ)) .
The result then follows.
Corollary 54. If M = 1 then the whole function is the middle piece.
We can do further analysis by considering speciﬁc parametrisations: the number
of banks, n, is from {10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100, 1000}; θ, the value of outside
matches, has a minimum of 0.1, a maximum of 0.9 and an increment of 0.1; the
shock parameter, γ, has a minimum of 0.1, a maximum of 3.0 and an increment
of 0.1; M , the maximum match distance is set to be M = m ∗ n, where m has a
minimum of 0.01, a maximum of 0.5 and an increment of 0.01.9
We can consider the potential gains from interior partitions by using a separate
table for each parameter. For each parametrisation, the welfare of the best
9Forming M from m in this way ensures that M ≤ 0.5n for all choices of n.
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trivial partition is given by Wb := Max{Wgc[1],Wgc[n]}; the welfare of the best
symmetric interior partition is given by Wi := Max{Wgc[n/k]}n−1k=2 ; and g, the
percentage gain from choosing an interior partition, is given by 100 ∗ (W i −
W b)/W b. The low frequency of large gains from interior partitions, represented
in Tables 2.8, 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11 below, suggests that the standard model rejection
of interior partitions is robust to replacing a uniform distribution of business
opportunities with a circular distribution with variable match length. However,
if the gain had been calculated over all partitions rather than just symmetric
partitions then each gain would have been weakly higher and so this may not
then hold.
The quasi-concave region occurs with mn ≤ d ≤ 0.5n. As m increases this region
gets smaller, and hence the potential for interior solutions is less. So in the m
table, for larger m, both the frequency of interior solutions and the gains from
interior solutions are lower. In the θ table, increases in θ results in, a reduction
in the frequency of, and gains from, interior partitions: the atomistic partition
has more outside matches than any interior partition; so as θ increases, there are
greater beneﬁts to the atomistic partition than to interior partitions. Similarly,
increases in either n or γ, result in the same shift away from interior solutions.
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Table 2.8: Circular Matching: variable match lengths m table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by m
m (-100,0) [0,10) [10,20) [20,30) [30,40) [40,50) [50,60) [60,70) [70,80) [80,90) [90,100) [100,140)
0.01 1724 149 9 3 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0.02 1612 221 34 11 5 2 2 2 0 1 0 0
0.03 1511 282 55 20 10 6 1 2 1 1 0 1
0.04 1504 255 76 24 13 6 5 2 2 2 0 1
0.05 1461 285 77 29 16 9 2 6 1 2 0 2
0.06 1505 234 77 33 15 10 5 3 2 3 0 3
0.07 1552 188 76 31 13 11 6 5 1 3 1 3
0.08 1575 164 78 28 14 11 6 3 5 2 0 4
0.09 1578 171 69 28 15 9 5 7 2 2 1 3
0.10 1557 198 64 26 17 8 4 7 2 3 1 3
0.11 1553 207 59 29 14 8 5 5 3 4 0 3
0.12 1574 183 64 30 11 8 7 4 3 3 1 2
0.13 1602 165 57 26 13 8 6 4 3 3 1 2
0.14 1618 150 58 26 11 9 5 5 1 5 1 1
0.15 1641 128 58 26 12 8 5 5 3 2 2 0
0.16 1659 115 55 24 12 10 4 4 3 4 0 0
0.17 1675 107 50 23 13 8 5 4 1 4 0 0
0.18 1685 101 48 22 14 6 5 5 3 1 0 0
0.19 1694 94 50 18 14 8 5 4 3 0 0 0
0.20 1710 84 46 19 12 8 5 4 2 0 0 0
0.21 1720 81 41 16 13 9 6 3 1 0 0 0
0.22 1728 75 40 19 12 8 4 4 0 0 0 0
0.23 1737 67 40 21 11 6 7 1 0 0 0 0
0.24 1739 70 40 17 11 7 5 1 0 0 0 0
0.25 1745 69 37 17 13 8 1 0 0 0 0 0
0.26 1756 66 33 16 10 8 1 0 0 0 0 0
0.27 1765 60 31 15 12 7 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.28 1771 56 32 16 11 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.29 1778 51 32 17 9 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.30 1784 48 31 17 9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.31 1788 46 32 17 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.32 1795 46 27 17 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.33 1800 46 28 15 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.34 1803 46 29 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.35 1812 41 28 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.36 1816 41 30 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.37 1820 44 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.38 1828 38 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.39 1829 42 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.40 1835 42 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.41 1837 46 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.42 1842 46 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.43 1848 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.44 1851 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.45 1854 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.46 1863 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.47 1870 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.48 1879 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.49 1890 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.50 1890 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All 86263 4823 1782 720 371 214 112 91 42 45 8 29
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Table 2.9: Circular Matching: variable match lengths θ table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by θ
θ (-100,0) [0,10) [10,20) [20,30) [30,40) [40,50) [50,60) [60,70) [70,80) [80,90) [90,100) [100,140)
0.1 6236 1958 1181 461 251 144 88 71 28 45 8 29
0.2 8420 1387 342 154 88 51 24 20 14 0 0 0
0.3 9439 795 145 70 32 19 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.4 10033 359 73 35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.5 10286 173 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.6 10402 98 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.7 10458 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.8 10489 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.9 10500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All 86263 4823 1782 720 371 214 112 91 42 45 8 29
Table 2.10: Circular Matching: variable match lengths n table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by n
n (-100,0) [0,10) [10,20) [20,30) [30,40) [40,50) [50,60) [60,70) [70,80) [80,90) [90,100) [100,140)
10 10958 1690 572 194 68 18 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 11652 1075 405 165 92 57 31 16 6 1 0 0
30 12144 742 292 128 73 49 24 22 11 11 3 1
40 12444 549 229 103 58 39 24 21 12 13 2 6
50 12589 487 185 85 49 34 21 19 8 12 1 10
100 12990 276 96 44 28 17 12 11 5 8 2 11
103 13486 4 3 1 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 1
All 86263 4823 1782 720 371 214 112 91 42 45 8 29
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Table 2.11: Circular Matching: variable match lengths γ table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by γ
γ (-100,0) [0,10) [10,20) [20,30) [30,40) [40,50) [50,60) [60,70) [70,80) [80,90) [90,100) [100,140)
0.1 2249 342 175 113 74 54 39 34 23 10 8 29
0.2 2484 245 126 93 58 55 17 18 19 35 0 0
0.3 2614 211 116 58 57 29 26 39 0 0 0 0
0.4 2702 180 88 79 32 39 30 0 0 0 0 0
0.5 2759 172 89 46 47 37 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.6 2797 159 92 40 62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.7 2826 156 81 46 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.8 2848 154 74 74 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.9 2873 143 71 63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.0 2889 146 61 54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.1 2906 148 55 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.2 2916 145 76 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.3 2923 144 83 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.4 2931 139 80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.5 2938 134 78 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.6 2947 130 73 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.7 2954 130 66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.8 2961 127 62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.9 2964 131 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 2965 137 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.1 2967 140 43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.2 2973 139 38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.3 2975 146 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.4 2976 157 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.5 2982 162 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.6 2983 167 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.7 2986 164 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.8 2991 159 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.9 2992 158 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.0 2992 158 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All 86263 4823 1782 720 371 214 112 91 42 45 8 7
2.2.2 Other Business Networks
2.2.2.1 Increased probability of self matching
The standard model assumes that the probability of a self match (b1, b1), a match
where both businesses have the same bank, is 1/n2; the same probability as when
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the banks are diﬀerent: P [(b1, b2)] = 1/n2 for all (b1, b2). This section shows the
robustness of the results of the standard model to varying that assumption.
In this section there are 2 classes of matches: self-match matches (class 1) and
standard matches (class 2). If the class is 1 then the match is certain to be
between businesses with the same bank. So P [(b1, b1)| class1] = 1/n. If the class
is 2 then the match is distributed in the same way as in the standard model:
self-matches can occur but are no more probable than any other match, so P [(b1,
b2)| class2] = 1/n2. The match is class 1 with probability s and is class 2 with
probability 1 − s. This means that: when s = 0, we have the standard model;
when s = −1/(n−1), we have a model where the probability of a self match is 0;
and if s = 1 then the probability of a self match is 1.
This generates for a (generally asymmetric) partition, x = (xj)kj=1:
• Bank Payoﬀ vsi[x] := s 1nP [xi] + (1− s)
(
xi
n2
P [xi] +
∑
j =i
θ
xj
n2
P [xi]P [xj]
)
• Module Worth Vsi[x] := sxin P [xi] + (1− s)
(
x2i
n2
P [xi] +
∑
j =i
θ
xixj
n2
P [xi]P [xj]
)
• Welfare Ws[x] := s
n∑
i=1
xi
n
P [xi] + (1− s)
n∑
i=1
(
x2i
n2
P [xi] +
∑
j =i
θ
xixj
n2
P [xi]P [xj]
)
Theorem 55. This model has boundary solutions
Proof. The optimality of the trivial partitions can be shown using the same
methodology as with the standard model. There are again negative extern-
alities, and so the argmax for vs1[x] will be of the form {x1, 1, 1, , , , 1} for
some x1. The optimal x1 can be found as follows. The derivative v
′
s1[x1] :=
∂vs1[{x1,1,1,,,,1}]
∂x1
=− θ+γ(θn−1)+s(γ−θ+1)(γn+1)−1
(γ+1)(γnx1+n)2 and so v
′
s1[x1] > 0 if and only if s <
γ−θ+γθ(−n)+1
γ−θ+γ2n−γθn+γn+1 ; but this condition is independent of x1, and so vs1[x1] is mono-
tonic. So the best partition for bank 1 is always either the grand coalition {n},
or the atomistic partition {1, 1, 1...1}. Hence, as in the standard model, only the
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trivial partitions can be strictly eﬃcient. The preference between the two trivial
partitions is given by the condition that, the grand coalition is weakly preferred
to the atomistic partition if and only if P [n] ≥ (1− s)θP [1] + s.
2.2.2.2 Multiple Businesses per Bank
We get similar results when we have multiple (f) businesses per bank, and
matches are always between distinct businesses. This gives that:
vf1[x1]:=
1
fn
(fx1 − 1)
fn− 1 P [x1] + θ
1
fn
f(n− x1)
fn− 1 P [x1]P [1]
Hence v′f1[x1] =
γ(γ+1)+f(γ−θ+γθ(−n)+1)
(γ+1)(γx1+1)2
, and so the eﬃcient solution is always a
trivial partition.
2.2.2.3 Star Business Network
Consider a setup where there is 1 big ﬁrm and n small ﬁrms. Suppose the
business match is always between the big ﬁrm and one of the small ﬁrms. This
can be visualised as a star network: the big ﬁrm is the hub; each small ﬁrm
is a spoke. Each ﬁrm is the single client of a bank. So there is 1 big bank
and n small banks. Formulating ﬁnancial shocks in discrete time, each small
bank is hit independently by a disabling shock with probability q, whilst the big
bank is hit by a disabling shock with probability Q. As in the standard model,
P [d] = 1
1+γd
, is the enablement probability for a module with d small banks (but
not the big bank). Similar analysis to that used for the standard model gives
that the enablement probability for a module containing d small banks plus the
1 big bank is Pb[d] = 11+Γ+γd , where γ =
Log[1−q]
Log[1−ρ] and Γ =
Log[1−Q]
Log[1−ρ] .
Due to the negative externalities we know that the eﬃcient partition will be of
the form, {(1 big, d small), 1small, 1small, ......1small}: it is ineﬃcient for a
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module to contain multiple small ﬁrms, unless that module also contains the
big ﬁrm. So we only need to consider the welfare function for partitions of that
format, Wstar[d] = dnPb[d] + θ
(n−d)
n
Pb[d]P [1]. This represents that the matched
small bank is in the same module as the big bank with probability d
n
and in a
diﬀerent module with probability n−d
n
. When the banks are in diﬀerent modules
we have standard θ parameter to represent transaction costs.
Diﬀerentiation with respect to d gives that W ′star[d] =
(1+Γ)(γ−θ+1)−γθn
(γ+1)(γd+1+Γ)2
. So
W
′
star[d]
P [1]Pb[d]2
= (1 + Γ)(γ − θ + 1) − γθn. Hence Wstar[d], is monotonic and so
the maximisation program has boundary solutions.
2.2.2.4 Trilateral Business Matches
In the standard model, business opportunities always involve two businesses.
Here we consider the variant model where matches involve three businesses.10
We ﬁrst form vtri,i[x] the return for a sample member of module i. These are
then aggregated to form the welfare function W tri[x].
Each match can be put into one of four diﬀerent categories, from the perspect-
ive of module i. The ﬁrst is when all three businesses are in module i. The
second is when two businesses are in module i, but the third is in a distinct
module j. The third is when one business is in module i, but the other two
are in a distinct module j. The fourth is when the ﬁrst business is in mod-
ule i, and the other two businesses are in distinct modules j and k. In cases
two and three where the businesses are split over two modules, the value of
a productive match is θ1. In case four where the businesses are split over
three modules, the value of a productive match is θ2. As there are increas-
ing transaction costs from matches involving multiple modules, 0 < θ2 < θ1 <
1. Keeping the same behaviour of ﬁnancial shocks as in the standard model,
10Thanks to Professor Herakles Polemarchakis for suggesting the investigation of this aspect.
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gives us: vtri,i[x] =
x2i
n3
P [xi] +
2xi
n2
P [xi]θ1
∑
j =i
xj
n
P [xj] +
1
n
θ1P [xi]
∑
j =i
x2j
n2
P [xj] +
1
n
θ2P [xi]
∑
j =i, k =i, j =k
(xjxk
n2
)
P [xj]P [xk].
As Vtri,i[x] = xi∗vtri,i[x] andWtri[x] =
∑k
i=1 Vtri,i[x], aggregation gives: Wtri[x] =∑k
i=1
[
x2i
n3
Ei + 2
xi
n2
Eiθ1
∑
j =i
1
n
Ej +
1
n
Eiθ1
∑
j =i
x2j
n2
P [xj] +
1
n
θ2Ei
∑
j =i, k =i, j =k
1
n2
EjEk
]
,
where El := xlP [xl] is the expected number of enabled banks in module l.
and for the symmetric case this simpliﬁes to:
Wtri[d] =
1
n2
(d2P [d] + 3d(n− d)P 2[d]θ1 + θ2((n− d)((n− 2d)P 3[d])
Proposition 56. If γ ≥ 0.5 then the trilateral model has negative externalities.
Proof. We now consider vtri,1[x], to see when it has negative externalities. Con-
sider x = (x1, T − x3, x3, x4, x5.....xk). This gives: dvtri,1[(x1,T−x3,x3,x4,x5.....xk)]dx3 =
P [x1]P [x3]
2P [T−x3]2(T−2x3) {θ2 [γR(γT + 2) + 2γT + 2] + θ1(2γx1 − 1)(γT + 2)},
where R :=
∑
j>3 xjP [xj]. So, if x3 < 0.5T then
dvtri,1[(x1,T−x3,x3,x4,x5.....xk)]
dx3
> 0 if
and only if θ2(γR(γT + 2)+ 2γT + 2)+ θ1(2γx1 − 1)(γT + 2) > 0. So γ ≥ 0.5 is
suﬃcient for negative externalities.
Proposition 57. If γ < 0.5, then there exist values of the other parameters
(θ1, θ2, n) such that the trilateral model does not have negative externalities.
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 56, in order for the model that to have
negative externalities we need that θ2 [γR(γT + 2) + 2γT + 2]+θ1(2γx1−1)(γT+
2) > 0 for all partitions and resulting values of R, T, and x1. It is hardest for
this condition to be positive when: R is minimised, which happens when all
the members not in the ﬁrst three modules are in one big module, resulting in
R = P [n − T − x1]; when T is maximised, which requires T = n − x1; and
that x1 is minimised which requires x1 = 1.11 This combines to give R = 0,
11The result R = P [n−T−x1] only applies in the case where n−T−x1 > 0. If n−T−x1 = 0
then R = 0
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T = n − 1 and x1 = 1. Hence the model has negative externalities if and only
if (2γ − 1) [γ(n− 1) + 2] + 2r [γ(n− 1) + 1] > 0. where r := θ2/θ1. The second
term is positive, but as γ < 0.5, the ﬁrst term is negative. Hence for suﬃciently
small values of r, the whole expression is negative.
Theorem 58. The vtri program, where outside modules are restricted to being
singletons, has boundary solutions.
Proof. Consider the partitions of form
(
x1, (1)
n+1−x1
j=2
)
where modules apart from
module 1 are singletons. Then:
vtri,1[
(
x1, (1)
n+1−x1
j=2
)
] = 2x1(n−1)P [1]P [x1]θ1+x21P [x1]+θ1(n−1)P [1]P [x1]+θ2(n−1)(n−2)P [1]2P [x1]
This gives:
1
P [1]2P [x1]2
dvtri,1[(x1, (1)
n+1−x1
j=2 ]
dx1
= −(n−1) [(γ2 − γ − 2)θ1 + γθ2(n− 2)]+(2γ2 + 4γ + 2)x1+(γ3 + 2γ2 + γ)x21
The x1 and x21 coeﬃcients are both positive. So once the slope is positive it stays
positive. Hence for partitions of this form vtri,1 is quasi-convex.
Corollary 59. So if non-singleton outside modules can be rejected, for example
due to γ > 0.5, then the eﬃcient partition is a boundary solution.
This corollary motivates why no cases were found with interior solutions to the
welfare maximisation program. This rejection of interior partitions for every
parametrisation argues that the standard model rejection of interior partitions
is robust to replacing a bilateral distribution of business opportunities with a
trilateral distribution.
For each parametrisation, the welfare of the best trivial partition is given by
Wb := Max{Wtri[1],Wtri[n]}; the welfare of the best symmetric interior partition
is given by Wi := Max{Wtri[n/k]}n−1k=2 ; and g, the percentage gain from choosing
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an interior partition, is given by 100 ∗ (W i−W b)/W b. The number of banks, n,
is one of {10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100, 1000}. The value of outside matches spread over
2 modules, θ1, has a minimum of 0.1, a maximum of 0.9 and has an increment of
0.1. The value of outside matches spread over 3 modules, θ2, is θ1∗r, and r has a
minimum of 0, a maximum of 1 and has an increment of 0.1. We know there are
no interior solutions, with γ ≥ 0.5: so the shock parameter, γ, has a minimum
of 0.1, a maximum of 0.4 and an increment of 0.1. So, the n parameter is one of
7 values, the θ1 parameter is one of 9 values, the r parameter one of 11 values,
and the γ parameter is one of 4 values. This gives a total of 7 ∗ 9 ∗ 11 ∗ 4 = 2772
parametrisations.
In every case considering symmetric partitions, the best boundary partition has
a higher welfare than the best interior partition. This leads to the following
conjecture:
Conjecture 60. The trilateral program has boundary solutions for a large range
of parameter values.
The θ1, r2, n and γ tables, each show that when their parameter is increased
then, whilst the best interior partition is still worse than the best boundary
partition, the scale of the loss from choosing an interior partition is reduced:
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Table 2.12: Trilateral Matching θ1 Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by θ1
θ1 [-60,-50) [-50,-40) [-40,-30) [-30,-20) [-20,-10) [-10,0)
0.1 225 11 10 8 3 51
0.2 53 119 21 10 11 94
0.3 0 131 14 12 16 135
0.4 0 67 45 19 11 166
0.5 0 24 60 17 16 191
0.6 0 14 36 30 14 214
0.7 0 10 16 33 17 232
0.8 0 0 17 22 24 245
0.9 0 0 8 15 24 261
All 278 376 227 166 136 1589
Table 2.13: Trilateral Matching r2 Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by r2
r2 [-60,-50) [-50,-40) [-40,-30) [-30,-20) [-20,-10) [-10,0)
0.0 33 117 60 33 8 1
0.1 29 67 40 29 26 61
0.2 29 48 28 22 22 103
0.3 29 37 19 19 17 131
0.4 26 30 16 14 14 152
0.5 26 20 17 10 12 167
0.6 25 16 11 11 9 180
0.7 23 13 11 8 8 189
0.8 21 11 10 7 6 197
0.9 19 10 7 6 10 200
1.0 18 7 8 7 4 208
All 278 376 227 166 136 1589
Table 2.14: Trilateral Matching n Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by n
n [-60,-50) [-50,-40) [-40,-30) [-30,-20) [-20,-10) [-10,0)
10 77 68 62 52 44 93
20 55 70 48 35 31 157
30 53 58 36 29 20 200
40 38 62 28 21 19 228
50 33 55 28 18 13 249
100 18 39 17 10 9 303
103 4 24 8 1 0 359
All 278 376 227 166 136 1589
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Table 2.15: Trilateral Matching γ Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by γ
γ [-60,-50) [-50,-40) [-40,-30) [-30,-20) [-20,-10) [-10,0)
0.1 93 85 75 55 46 339
0.2 67 96 56 43 36 395
0.3 65 93 51 35 27 422
0.4 53 102 45 33 27 433
All 278 376 227 166 136 1589
2.2.2.5 Temporal distribution of business opportunities
We now show the resilience of the standard model to diﬀerent temporal dis-
tributions of the business opportunities, when: the initial module enablement
probabilities are given by the stationary distribution of ﬁnancial shocks, and
business opportunities remain independent of ﬁnancial shocks. Let s = (st)t∈R+
be a generic realisation of business opportunities, with st ∈ R opportunities at
time t. Let f(s) be the probability density function (pdf) of s and let ft(st) be
the induced pdf of st. LetWbis[x] be the aggregate expected welfare given our dis-
tribution of s. Then by the law of total expectation Wbis[x] =
´
s
Wbis[x|s]f(s)ds.
The conditional expectation is given by Wbis[x|s] =
´∞
t=0
δtstW [x]dt, where δ is
the intertemporal discount factor and W [x] is the welfare function of the stan-
dard model. Hence, Wbis[x] =
´
s
´∞
t=0
δtstW [x]dt f(s)ds. As W [x] is independent
of both s and t, this gives: Wbis[x] = W [x]
´
s
´∞
t=0
δtstdt f(s)ds. So the optimal
choice of x is the same as in the standard model.
2.2.3 Small number of banks
2.2.3.1 Regional trade
Mundell (1961) considers optimal currency areas and how they vary depending
on the distribution of industry. He considers the example of a world consisting
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of just the USA and Canada, where eastern region of each country makes cars,
and the western region makes wood products. He then argues in face of sectoral
shocks that it may be better to have an eastern currency and a western currency;
than a Canadian currency and an American currency. We can consider a similar
simple example to consider ﬁnancial stability.12
Imagine a world with 2 countries (North and South) and that each has a man-
ufacturing sector in the west and a service sector in the east. So this gives 4
regions: {NW,NE, SW, SE}. Business opportunities are national (NW to NE
or SW to SE) with probability 1 − φ, or sectoral (NW to SW or NE to SE)
with probability φ. The question is what partition of modules best enables busi-
ness to operate. There are 4 symmetric partitions to choose from: 1) the grand
coalition G := {{NW,NE, SW, SE}}; 2) the national partition N := {{NW,
NE}, {SW, SE}}; 3) the sectoral partition S := {{NW,SW}, {NE, SE}}; and
4) the atomistic partition A := {{NW}, {NE}, {SW}, {SE}}.13 Using the
same shock dynamics as in the standard model, where θ is the value of inter-
module matches and P [d] = 1
1+γd
is the module enablement probability, gives
the following welfare function: WM [G] := P [4], WM [N ] := (1−φ)P [2]+φθP 2[2],
WM [S] := φP [2] + (1− φ)θP 2[2], and WM [A] := θP 2[1].
The choice between the national and sectoral partitions is determined by whether
national or sectoral matches is more likely: S  N ⇐⇒ φ > 1
2
. Given the
symmetry of the example, without loss of generality we assume φ > 1
2
. The pref-
erence conditions comparing the sectoral partition with the boundary partitions
are as follows: S  A ⇐⇒ φ > θ(P 2[1]−P 2[2])
P [2]−θP 2[2] and S  G ⇐⇒ φ > (P [4]−θP
2[2])
P [2]−θP 2[1] .
Re-arrangement gives that S is the sole argmax partition if and only if, φ >
12Guillaume Sublet suggested investigating such an example.
13Allowing asymmetric partitions like {{NW,NE, SW}, {SE}} makes the maths intract-
able. However, when only symmetric partition are allowed with most parametrisations there is
an interior solution, and increasing the feasible set of interior solutions can only make interior
solutions occur more often.
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0.5 and θ > θmin and (θ < θmax or γ ≥ ϕ) where, ϕ := 1+
√
5
2
(the golden ratio),
θmin :=
(2γ+1)(2γ−φ4γ+1−φ)
(1−φ)(4γ+1) , and θmax :=
(γ+1)2(2γ+1)φ
γ2(φ+3)+2γ(φ+1)+φ
.
The following graphs plot this region in purple in a series of graphs with φ on
the x-axis and θ on the y-axis. There is one graph for each value of γ, the shock
parameter, starting at 0, incrementing by 0.1 and ending at 1:
Figure 2.1: Regional Trade Model Interior Sectoral Solution Plot
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We can see that this region is large for all non-zero values of γ used. To the top
left of the purple region is the region where the atomistic partition is strictly pre-
ferred to the sectoral partition: once γ reaches the golden ratio (approximately
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1.61803), this region is empty. To the bottom left is the region where the grand
coalition is strictly preferred to the sectoral partition. Each of the graphs plots
φ between 0.5 and 1: If we consider what happens with φ between 0 and 0.5,
then there is a symmetric relation for the preference of the national partition
over the atomistic partition and the grand coalition.
For each parametrisation, the welfare of the best trivial partition is given by
Wb := Max[WM [A],WM [G]]; the welfare of the best interior partition (regional
or sectoral partition) is given by Wi := Max[WM [N ],WM [S]]; and g, the per-
centage gain from choosing an interior partition, is given by 100∗(W i−W b)/W b.
This gain was found for a range of diﬀerent parametrisations: the shock para-
meter, γ had a minimum of 0.1, a maximum of 3 and an increment of 0.1; the
sectoral match probability, φ had a minimum of 0.1, a maximum of 1 and an
increment of 0.1 and outside match parameter, θ similarly had a minimum of
0.1, a maximum of 1 and an increment of 0.1. In general, the large gains from in-
terior partitions, represented in Tables 2.16, 2.17 and 2.18 below, mean that the
standard model rejection of interior partitions is critical to replacing a uniform
distribution of business opportunities with a four country orthogonal distribu-
tion. However, in the special case of uniform matching, where φ = 0.5, there is
both a low frequency of parametrisations (35%) where there are gains from an
interior partition and small gains in those parametrisations (below 10% in all
cases). In this case the robustness appears to remain.
The distribution of the gain percentages can be displayed for each of the 3
choice parameters. The γ table shows, as expected from the indiﬀerence graphs
above, that for all values of γ, the frequency of interior solutions is low and that
frequency decreases as γ decreases. The φ table has vertical symmetry given
the symmetric choice between the sectoral partition in response to φ and the
national partition the sectoral partition in response to 1 − φ. Only when the
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matching parameter, φ, is close to 0.5 are there no gains, or only small gains,
from the interior partitions. In the θ table, there is not much of a correspondence
between θ and the gain, except to observe that there are especially few cases of
boundary solutions when θ is 0.6, 0.7 or 0.8.
Table 2.16: Regional Trade γ Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by γ
γ [-100,0) [0,10) [10,20) [20,30) [30,40) [40,50) [50,60) [60,70) [70,80) [80,90)
0.1 50 36 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.2 37 25 24 24 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.3 30 22 22 20 16 0 0 0 0 0
0.4 25 23 16 16 16 14 0 0 0 0
0.5 21 19 18 18 16 4 14 0 0 0
0.6 19 15 20 18 10 14 14 0 0 0
0.7 14 16 18 16 14 16 16 0 0 0
0.8 12 16 16 16 18 16 2 14 0 0
0.9 10 14 16 18 18 10 8 16 0 0
1.0 10 14 14 16 16 8 16 16 0 0
1.1 9 15 12 16 14 10 18 16 0 0
1.2 6 12 14 18 12 14 18 0 16 0
1.3 6 12 14 16 12 14 18 2 16 0
1.4 6 12 14 16 6 18 20 2 16 0
1.5 6 10 14 12 10 20 12 8 18 0
1.6 6 8 14 14 10 20 6 14 18 0
1.7 5 9 14 12 10 20 4 18 18 0
1.8 5 7 16 10 12 20 2 18 20 0
1.9 5 7 16 10 12 18 2 20 20 0
2.0 5 7 14 10 14 16 4 20 0 20
2.1 5 7 14 10 14 14 6 20 0 20
2.2 5 5 16 8 16 14 6 20 0 20
2.3 5 5 16 8 16 12 8 20 0 20
2.4 5 5 16 8 16 12 8 20 0 20
2.5 5 5 16 6 18 10 10 20 0 20
2.6 5 5 16 6 18 8 12 20 0 20
2.7 5 5 16 6 18 8 12 20 0 20
2.8 5 5 16 4 20 6 14 20 0 20
2.9 5 5 16 4 20 6 14 20 0 20
3.0 5 5 16 4 20 4 16 20 0 20
All 337 351 488 360 412 346 280 364 142 220
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Table 2.17: Regional Trade φ Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by φ
φ [-100,0) [0,10) [10,20) [20,30) [30,40) [40,50) [50,60) [60,70) [70,80) [80,90)
0.0 0 4 13 14 13 13 27 35 71 110
0.1 2 9 14 19 20 32 57 147 0 0
0.2 7 16 19 28 46 128 56 0 0 0
0.3 17 26 37 93 127 0 0 0 0 0
0.4 45 68 161 26 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.5 195 105 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.6 45 68 161 26 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.7 17 26 37 93 127 0 0 0 0 0
0.8 7 16 19 28 46 128 56 0 0 0
0.9 2 9 14 19 20 32 57 147 0 0
1.0 0 4 13 14 13 13 27 35 71 110
All 337 351 488 360 412 346 280 364 142 220
Table 2.18: Regional Trade θ Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by θ
θ [-100,0) [0,10) [10,20) [20,30) [30,40) [40,50) [50,60) [60,70) [70,80) [80,90)
0.1 54 34 38 42 28 40 22 34 16 22
0.2 48 32 42 40 30 44 20 36 16 22
0.3 46 26 46 36 36 44 22 36 16 22
0.4 40 22 54 34 38 40 26 38 16 22
0.5 38 18 56 30 44 38 30 38 16 22
0.6 16 32 60 30 46 38 30 40 16 22
0.7 5 39 62 26 50 36 34 40 16 22
0.8 5 41 66 20 56 32 34 38 16 22
0.9 21 55 34 56 46 18 32 36 10 22
1.0 64 52 30 46 38 16 30 28 4 22
All 337 351 488 360 412 346 280 364 142 220
2.2.3.2 Orthogonal
The results in the previous section consider a world with 4 banks arranged in a
square. This section generalises the setup to consider a D dimension orthogonal
model: there are n = 2D banks and they are arranged at the vertices of a D
dimensional hypercube. Bank positions can be represented in co-ordinate form
as being the members of the set Y := {(yi)Di=1 : (yi ∈ {0, 1})Di=1}.
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The business matches are distributed such that informally, each business trades
with a business a ’distance’ of 1 unit away. More precisely, matched businesses
have the same co-ordinates in D − 1 dimensions and diﬀerent co-ordinates in
exactly 1 dimension. So a match (y, y′) between the banks in positions y and
y′ means that there exists dimension j s.t. (yi = y
′
i)i =j and yj = y′j. The
probabilistic distribution of matches is as follows. Each bank has a probability
2−D of being the ﬁrst bank picked. Without loss of generality, we order the
dimensions such that the probability, φi ∈ (0, 1), of the second bank in the
match being in dimension i is weakly decreasing as i increases: so (φi ≥ φi+1)D−1i=1 .
There are no self matches and normalisation requires
∑D
i=1 φi = 1. For future
use, we deﬁne the accumulative probability that the match is in one of the ﬁrst
j dimensions, Φj :=
∑j
i=1 φi. This implies that, ΦD = 1, and we further deﬁne
Φ0 := 0 . Financial shocks operate as in the standard model: shocks are fully
transmitted between banks in same module and there is no transmission between
banks in diﬀerent modules.
We now deﬁne a set of feasible partitions. Informally, partition Xj has ’breaks’
in j dimensions and ’joins’ in D − j dimensions. So it has kj := 2j modules
each containing dj := 2D−j banks. The gain from extra joins is that there
are more high value inside matches, and fewer low value outside matches. The
cost from extra joins is that each initial ﬁnancial shock spreads further, and
does more damage. So optimally, the D − j join dimensions will be the ﬁrst
D − j dimensions, as these have the highest matching probabilities, and the
breaks will be in the last j dimensions, as these have the lowest matching
probabilities. Formally,
(
Xj := {{y ∈ Y : (yi = mi)Di=D+1−j}m∈Mj}
)D
j=0
where
Mj := {((0)D−ji=1 , (yi)Di=D+1−j) : (yi ∈ {0, 1})Di=D+1−j}. As special cases we have
the boundary partitions, X0 is the grand coalition and XD is the atomistic par-
tition.
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The welfare function is
Worth[Xi] = ΦD−iP [2D−i] + θ(1− ΦD−i)P 2[2D−i]
This can be interpreted in the usual way: the ﬁrst term comes from inside
matches; the second term from outside matches. From the standard model
we use: θ, the value of outside matches; P [d] = 1
1+γd
, the module enablement
probability for a module of size d; and γ the shock parameter. The grand
coalition and the atomistic partition have the expected welfares:
Worth[X0] = P [2
D]
and
Worth[XD] = θP
2[1]
We now now consider when Xj+1 is preferred to Xj.
Worth[Xj] = ΦD−jP [2D−j] + θ(1− ΦD−j)P 2[2D−j]
and
Worth[Xj+1] = ΦD−j−1P [2D−j−1] + θ(1− ΦD−j−1)P 2[2D−j−1]
The trade oﬀ is formed as follows. Recall that Φi is an increasing function, so
that partition Xj has the higher probability of an inside match: ΦD−j compared
with ΦD−j−1. However, it also has the lower module enablement probability:
P [2D−j] compared with P [2D−j−1]. Re-arrangement gives that Xj+1  Xj if and
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only if
ΦD−j <
γθnkj (3γn+ 2kj+1) + 2ΦD−j−1 (γn+ 4)
2 (γn+ (1− θ)kj+1)
(γn+ kj+1)
2 (γn+ (1− θ)kj)
In order for there to be an interior solution we need a partition Xj such that
Xj  X0 and Xj  XDim. The conditions for this are as follows:
Table 2.19: Hypercube Preference Conditions
Xj  X0 Xj  XDim
θ terms
(γdj+1)
(
(1+γdj)
(γn+1)2
−ΦDim−j
)
(1−ΦDim−j) < θ θ <
(γ+1)2 ΦDim−j(γdj+1)
(γdj+1)2−((1+γ)2(1−ΦDim−j))
ΦDim−j
(γdj+1)
2−θ(γn+1)2
(γn+1)2((1−θ)+γdj) < ΦDim−j
γθ(dj−1)((γ+2)+γdj)
(γ+1)2((1−θ)+γdj) < ΦDim−j
Here, n = 2D is the total number of banks, kj = 2j, is the number of modules
in partition Xj, and dj = nkj = 2
D−j is the number of banks in each of those
modules.
2.2.3.3 3-Dimension case
We now focus on the three-dimensional case, where there are 23 = 8 banks, and
four symmetric partitions: 1) X0, the grand coalition, 1 module of 8 banks; 2)
X1, 2 squares, 2 modules of 4 banks; 3) X2 4 lines, 4 modules of 2 banks; and
4) X3 atomistic partition, 8 modules of 1 banks.14 The welfare valuations are
Worth[X0] =
1
8γ + 1
Worth[X1] =
θ(1− Φ2)
(4γ + 1)2
+
Φ2
4γ + 1
14As in section 2.2.3.1, allowing asymmetric partitions makes the maths intractable. How-
ever, when only symmetric partition are allowed with most parametrisations there is an interior
solution, and increasing the feasible set of interior solutions can only make interior solutions
occur more often.
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Worth[X2] =
θ(1− Φ1)
(2γ + 1)2
+
Φ1
2γ + 1
Worth[X3] =
θ
(γ + 1)2
The parameters from the standard model have their standard ranges: θ ∈ (0,
1) and γ ∈ (0,∞). The parameters speciﬁc to this orthogonal model satisfy,
1/3 ≤ Φ1 < Φ2 < 1 andΦ2 ≤ 2∗Φ1 andΦ2−Φ1 ≥ 1−Φ2. In the case of uniform
matching (no bias towards any dimension) then Φ1 = 13 and Φ2 =
2
3
. In the
case of non-uniform matching, the inequalities are all strict: 1/3 < Φ1 < Φ2 <
1 andΦ2 < 2 ∗Φ1 andΦ2−Φ1 > 1−Φ2. The following conditions can be derived
for when the interior partitions are strictly preferred to the boundary partitions:
Table 2.20: 3D Hypercube Preferences General Matching
strict preference conditions for an interior partition over a boundary partition
X0 (Grand Coalition) X3 (Singletons)
X1 (2 Squares) c10 :=
(4γ+1)(64γ2Φ2+4γ(4Φ2−1)+Φ2−1)
(8γ+1)2(Φ2−1) < θ θ <
(γ+1)2(4γ+1)Φ2
γ2(Φ2+15)+2γ(Φ2+3)+Φ2
=: c13
X2 (4 lines) c20 :=
(2γ+1)(64γ2Φ1+2γ(8Φ1−1)+Φ1−1)
(8γ+1)2(Φ1−1) < θ θ <
(γ+1)2(2γ+1)Φ1
γ2(Φ1+3)+2γ(Φ1+1)+Φ1
=: c23
With Uniform Matching, this becomes:
Table 2.21: 3D Hypercube Preferences Uniform Matching
strict preference conditions for an interior partition over a boundary partition
X0 (Grand Coalition) X3 (Singletons)
X1 (2 Squares) − (4γ+1)(128γ
2+20γ−1)
(8γ+1)2
< θ θ < 2(γ+1)
2(4γ+1)
47γ2+22γ+2
X2 (4 lines) − (2γ+1)(32γ
2+5γ−1)
(8γ+1)2
< θ θ < (γ+1)
2(2γ+1)
10γ2+8γ+1
To get an interior solution requires either, (X1  X0 andX1  X3) or
(X2  X0 andX2  X3). With uniform matching this simpliﬁes toX1  X0andX2 
X3. Graphically this becomes:
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Figure 2.2: 3D Uniform Matching Model Interior Solution Plot
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The large green region shows that for most values of γ and θ, that there is an
interior solution. Above this region there is an area where the atomistic partition
is preferred: Once γ ≥ 1
4
(√
57 + 5
)
= 3.14 (3S.F.), this region becomes empty.
On the far left there is a very small region where the grand coalition is preferred:
Once γ ≥ 1
64
(√
57− 5) = 0.0398 (3S.F.), this region also becomes empty.
For each parametrisation, the welfare of the best trivial partition is given by
Wb := Max[(Worth[Xj : Φ1 = 1/3,Φ2 = 2/3])j=0,3]; the welfare of the best interior
partition (regional or sectoral partition) is given by
Wi := Max[(Worth[Xj : Φ1 = 1/3,Φ2 = 2/3])
2
j=1]; and g, the percentage gain from
choosing an interior partition, is given by 100 ∗ (W i−W b)/W b. The large gains
from interior partitions, represented in Tables 2.22 and 2.23 below, mean that the
standard model rejection of interior partitions is critical to replacing a uniform
distribution of business opportunities with a 3D Orthogonal Uniform Matching
distribution.
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This gain was found for a table of parametrisations: the shock parameter, γ
had a minimum of 0.1, a maximum of 3 and an increment of 0.1; and θ had
a minimum of 0.1, a maximum of 0.9 and an increment of 0.1. As expected
from the graph above: as θ increases there are both fewer parametrisations with
interior solutions and less gains from the parametrisations that do have interior
solutions; the γ table shows fewest interior partitions with γ = 0.6.
Table 2.22: 3D Uniform Matching θ Table
3D Uniform Matching: percentage gain distribution broken down by θ
θ (-100,0) [0,100) [100,200) [200,300) [300,400) [400,500) [500,600) [600,700) [700,800)
0.1 0 1 1 1 1 11 6 7 2
0.2 0 1 13 14 2 0 0 0 0
0.3 0 14 16 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.4 0 26 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.5 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.6 1 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.7 13 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.8 20 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.9 26 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 60 132 34 15 3 11 6 7 2
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Table 2.23: 3D Uniform Matching γ Table
3D Uniform Matching: percentage gain distribution broken down by γ
γ (-100,0) [0,100) [100,200) [200,300) [300,400) [400,500) [500,600) [600,700) [700,800)
0.1 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.2 3 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.3 3 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0.4 3 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0.5 3 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0.6 4 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0.7 3 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0.8 3 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0.9 3 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1.0 3 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1.1 3 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1.2 3 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1.3 3 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1.4 3 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1.5 2 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
1.6 2 4 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
1.7 2 4 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
1.8 2 4 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
1.9 2 4 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
2.0 2 4 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
2.1 1 5 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
2.2 1 5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
2.3 1 5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
2.4 1 5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
2.5 1 5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
2.6 1 5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
2.7 0 5 2 1 0 0 0 1 0
2.8 0 5 2 1 0 0 0 1 0
2.9 0 5 2 0 1 0 0 0 1
3.0 0 5 2 0 1 0 0 0 1
Total 60 132 34 15 3 11 6 7 2
Considering the case of non-uniform matching in 3 dimensions, it is the case for
all (γ,Φ1,Φ2) parametrisations that c10 < c20 < c13 < c23. Hence there is an
interior solution if and only if c10 < θ < c23. The interior solution is plotted
below for a range of values of Φ1:
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Figure 2.3: 3D Non-Uniform Matching Model Interior Solution Plot
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In each case Φ2 has the minimal value (Φ1+12 ): if it is increased further then
the region on the far left, which is barely visible, where the grand coalition is
preferred becomes yet smaller ; whilst the region at the top where the atomistic
partition is preferred stays the same size. As Φ1 increases across the plots, we
see that the interior solution region becomes bigger.
Further, as with other models, we can consider a range of diﬀerent parametrisa-
tions, and see what the percentage gain is from choosing the best interior parti-
tion compared with the best boundary partition: the welfare of the best trivial
partition is given by Wb := max[(Worth[Xj])j=0,3]; the welfare of the best sym-
metric interior partition is given by Wi := max [(Worth[Xj])
2
j=1]; and g, the per-
centage gain from choosing an interior partition, is given by 100∗(W i−W b)/W b.
The large gains from interior partitions, represented in Tables 2.24, 2.25, 2.26
and 2.27 below, mean that the standard model rejection of interior partitions is
critical to replacing a uniform distribution of business opportunities with a 3D
Orthogonal Non-Uniform Matching distribution.
The θ and γ parameters have their usual ranges: θ has a minimum of 0.1, a
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maximum of 0.9 and an increment of 0.1; γ has a minimum of 0.1, a maximum
of 3.0 and an increment of 0.1. Next we calculate appropriate choices for the
Φ1 and Φ2 ranges. The three required conditions are as follows: 1) 1/3 < Φ1 <
Φ2 < 1, (as Φj is an increasing function, and one of the dimensions must be
chosen with a probability of at least 1/3); 2) Φ2 < 2Φ1, (as φ2 < φ1); and
3) Φ2 − Φ1 > 1 − Φ2, (as φ2 > φ3). These requirements combine to give the
following conditional range for Φ2 given Φ1 : (1 + Φ1)/2 < Φ2|Φ1 < min[2Φ1, 1].
The implementation for Φ1 and Φ2 is as follows: Φ1 has a minimum of 1/3, an
increment of 0.1, and a maximum of 0.6 + 1
3
; Φ2 is one of 11 equally spaced
out values, with a minimum of (1 + Φ1)/2, a maximum of min[2Φ1, 1], and an
increment of 0.1 (min[2Φ1, 1]− (1 + Φ1)/2). The choice of Φ2 is achieved using
an intermediate variable f , so Φ2 = Φ1 + f*0.1 (min[2Φ1, 1]− (1 + Φ1)/2).
The results are presented below in separate tables for f , Φ1, θ and γ. In the f
table the choice of f has very little eﬀect: this is simply because given Φ1, the
choice of Φ2 has very little eﬀect. The top line of the Φ1 table equates to the
uniform case, and as Φ1 increases, the welfare from X2 increases, but the welfare
from both the boundary partitions is unaltered. Hence there is a shift towards
interior partitions, and higher gains are achieved. In the θ table, as θ increases,
the welfare of the atomistic partition increases, and hence the gains from interior
partitions are less. In the γ table, as γ increases somewhat surprisingly we see a
shift towards interior solutions; however, this can be explained as follows. Recall
that in this model there are no self matches: so, with the atomistic partition,
we need two independent modules to be enabled in order for a match to be
productive, an unlikely event when γ is large; however, with X2 which has 1
dimensional modules, with probability Φ1 a match is contained inside a single
module.
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Table 2.24: 3D Non-Uniform Matching: f Table
3D Non-Uniform Matching: percentage gain distribution broken down by f
f (-100,0) [0,100) [100,200) [200,300) [300,400) [400,500) [500,600) [600,700) [700,800) [800,2100)
0.0 100 768 398 188 110 76 54 39 31 126
0.1 100 767 397 190 109 77 54 39 31 126
0.2 100 765 399 190 109 77 54 39 31 126
0.3 100 763 400 190 110 76 55 39 31 126
0.4 100 760 401 192 110 75 56 39 31 126
0.5 100 757 399 197 110 72 58 40 31 126
0.6 100 756 400 197 110 71 57 42 31 126
0.7 100 756 400 197 110 71 54 44 32 126
0.8 100 755 401 196 109 73 52 45 32 127
0.9 100 754 402 195 109 74 52 44 32 128
1.0 100 750 405 193 110 76 51 42 33 130
Total 1100 8351 4402 2125 1206 818 597 452 346 1393
Table 2.25: 3D Non-Uniform Matching:Φ1 Table
3D Non-Uniform Matching: percentage gain distribution broken down by Φ1
Φ1 (-100,0) [0,100) [100,200) [200,300) [300,400) [400,500) [500,600) [600,700) [700,800) [800,2100)
10/30 660 1452 374 165 33 121 66 77 22 0
13/30 286 1528 465 250 120 58 79 55 57 72
16/30 110 1467 548 302 132 97 56 56 47 155
19/30 44 1286 661 308 195 80 77 66 44 209
22/30 0 1067 759 319 220 143 66 77 66 253
25/30 0 869 781 374 253 143 110 55 66 319
28/30 0 682 814 407 253 176 143 66 44 385
Total 1100 8351 4402 2125 1206 818 597 452 346 1393
Table 2.26: 3D Non-Uniform Matching: θ Table
3D Non-Uniform Matching: percentage gain distribution broken down by θ
θ (-100,0) [0,100) [100,200) [200,300) [300,400) [400,500) [500,600) [600,700) [700,800) [800,2100)
0.1 0 28 66 52 58 176 212 232 214 1272
0.2 0 26 226 499 455 367 275 209 132 121
0.3 0 182 763 606 407 231 110 11 0 0
0.4 0 613 927 484 242 44 0 0 0 0
0.5 0 1100 836 330 44 0 0 0 0 0
0.6 11 1496 671 132 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.7 143 1661 484 22 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.8 330 1683 297 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.9 616 1562 132 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1100 8351 4402 2125 1206 818 597 452 346 1393
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Table 2.27: 3D Non-Uniform Matching: γ Table
3D Non-Uniform Matching: percentage gain distribution broken down by γ
γ (-100,0) [0,100) [100,200) [200,300) [300,400) [400,500) [500,600) [600,700) [700,800) [800,2100)
0.1 44 451 198 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.2 77 361 123 88 44 0 0 0 0 0
0.3 77 354 100 66 57 17 22 0 0 0
0.4 77 356 100 50 34 26 17 11 11 11
0.5 77 357 99 50 22 28 13 14 11 22
0.6 77 335 121 50 22 27 13 15 11 22
0.7 66 341 115 61 11 38 13 15 11 22
0.8 66 341 114 51 22 37 13 5 11 33
0.9 66 319 121 55 33 25 19 11 11 33
1.0 66 318 122 54 23 33 22 10 12 33
1.1 55 319 121 65 23 33 21 11 12 33
1.2 44 319 121 64 35 22 30 12 2 44
1.3 44 308 132 55 44 22 29 4 11 44
1.4 44 297 143 55 44 22 17 16 11 44
1.5 33 286 154 66 33 33 16 17 11 44
1.6 33 286 121 88 33 22 33 22 10 45
1.7 22 275 143 87 34 22 33 21 1 55
1.8 22 264 154 74 47 22 22 30 3 55
1.9 22 253 165 66 55 22 22 18 15 55
2.0 22 242 165 77 43 34 22 11 22 55
2.1 11 242 165 77 44 44 22 11 22 55
2.2 11 231 175 67 55 33 11 33 21 56
2.3 11 220 165 88 55 22 22 22 20 68
2.4 11 220 154 99 55 22 22 22 19 69
2.5 11 220 154 99 44 33 22 22 11 77
2.6 11 176 198 99 44 33 22 22 11 77
2.7 0 165 198 99 54 45 22 22 11 77
2.8 0 165 198 88 64 35 22 22 11 88
2.9 0 165 187 88 66 33 33 11 22 88
3.0 0 165 176 99 66 33 22 22 22 88
Total 1100 8351 4402 2125 1206 818 597 452 346 1393
2.2.3.4 3-node case
Consider a 3-node model where, unlike in the standard model, there is non-
uniform matching: the nodes are numbered {0, 1, 2}, and the matching probab-
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ility between nodes i and j is qij.15 There is no self matching and so there are 3
matching probabilities, which sum to one: q01 + q02 + q12 = 1. The 3 nodes have
5 possible partitions:
Table 2.28: 3 Nodes Model Partitioning Table
Partition Modules W3
GC: Grand Coalition {{0, 1, 2}} W3[GC] = P [3]
S0: Separate node 0 {{0}, {1, 2}} W3[S0] = θ(q01 + q02)P [1]P [2] + q12P [2]
S1: Separate node 1 {{1}, {0, 2}} W3[S1] = θ(q01 + q12)P [1]P [2] + q02P [2]
S2: Separate node 2 {{2}, {0, 1}} W3[S2] = θ(q02 + q12)P [1]P [2] + q01P [2]
Atom: Atomistic {{0}, {1}, {2}} W3[Atom] = θP 2[1]
The best of the three S partitions comes from when the highest probability
match is inside the 2 node module. Without loss of generality, we assume that
q := q01 ≥ q02 ≥ q12, (this also means that q ≥ 1/3), and thus that W3[S] =
W3[S2] ≥ W3[S1] ≥ W3[S0], where S := S2. Hence the strict interior solutions are
given when W3[S] > W3[GC] and W3[S] > W3[Atom]. The preference conditions
are S  GC ⇔ q > qGC [γ, θ] := 1− γ(γ+1)(3γ+1)(γ−θ+1) and S  Atom ⇔ q > qAtom[γ,
θ] := γθ
(γ+1) (γ−θ+1) . The green region shows the interior solution, where q >
max[1− γ(γ+1)
(3γ+1)(γ−θ+1) ,
γθ
(γ+1) (γ−θ+1) ]:
15One particular application of the 3 node model is to have 3 geographic blocks: Asia, USA,
and EU. Each business opportunity comes from a product made in Asia and sold in either
the USA or the EU; so each match is between Asia and one of the US and EU. Letting Asia
be node 0, USA be node 1 and the EU node 2; the match distribution is P [0, 1] = q01 and
P [0, 2] = 1− q01.
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Figure 2.4: 3 Node Model Interior Solution Plot
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This leads to the following result:
Proposition 61. In the 3-node model with no self matching a necessary condi-
tion for an interior solution is that q > 0.5.
Proof. Recall for an interior solution we need both q > qGC [γ, θ] := 1− γ(γ+1)(3γ+1)(γ−θ+1)
and q > qAtom[γ, θ] := γθ(γ+1) (γ−θ+1) . Fix an arbitrary value of γ, and note that,
∂qGC
∂θ
= − γ(γ+1)
(3γ+1)(γ−θ+1)2 < 0 ,
∂qAtom
∂θ
= γ
(γ−θ+1)2 > 0, qGC [γ, 0] = 1 − γ(3γ+1) > 2/3
and qAtom[γ, 0] = 0. For θ = 0, the qGC condition is binding, but as θ increases,
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the qGC condition becomes weaker, and the qAtom condition becomes stronger,
so for some values of γ, the qAtom condition becomes binding. If we have such a
γ then at the crossing point, qGC [γ, θ] = qAtom[γ, θ] and θ = θ∗[γ] := (γ+1)
2
3γ+1
. This
gives that qGC [γ, θ∗[γ]] = qAtom[γ, θ∗[γ]] = 12 . If θ < θ
∗ then the qGC condition
is binding and θ < θ∗ ⇒ qGC [γ, θ] > 12 . Conversely, if θ > θ∗ then the qAtom
condition is binding and θ > θ∗ ⇒ qAtom[γ, θ] > 12 . If γ is such that there is no
crossing point, then the qGC [γ, θ] is binding for all θ and 1 < θ∗[γ] := (γ+1)
2
3γ+1
. So
qGC [γ, θ] >
1
2
.
We can further analyse this model with our usual table approach. For each
parametrisation, the welfare of the best trivial partition is given by Wb :=
Max{W3[Atom],W3[GC]}; the welfare of the best interior partition is given by
Wi := W3[S]; and g, the percentage gain from choosing an interior partition,
is given by 100 ∗ (W i −W b)/W b. The high frequency (69%) of positive gains
from interior partitions, represented in Tables 2.29, 2.30 and 2.31 below, suggests
that the standard model rejection of interior partitions is critical to replacing a
uniform distribution of business opportunities with a 3 Node distribution.
For an interior solution we need q > 0.5, so q has a minimum of 0.55, a maximum
of 0.95 and an increment of 0.05. The θ and γ parameters have their usual ranges:
θ has a minimum of 0.1, a maximum of 0.9 and an increment of 0.1; γ has a
minimum of 0.1, a maximum of 3.0 and an increment of 0.1. The q table has
the clearest pattern: as expected, increasing q leads to greater gains from the
interior partition. There are also increase in the gains from the interior partition
when the θ and γ parameters increase, however, these are less dramatic.
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Table 2.29: 3 Node Model q Table
3 Node Model: percentage gain distribution broken down by q
q (-100,0) [0,5) [5,10) [10,15) [15,20) [20,25) [25,30) [30,35) [35,40)
0.55 261 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.60 234 34 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.65 161 81 28 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.70 65 89 94 22 0 0 0 0 0
0.75 25 33 90 101 21 0 0 0 0
0.80 13 16 27 75 123 16 0 0 0
0.85 6 9 15 27 57 134 22 0 0
0.90 2 7 10 15 24 50 126 36 0
0.95 0 4 7 11 16 24 41 97 70
Total 767 282 273 251 241 224 189 133 70
Table 2.30: 3 Node Model θ Table
3 Node Model: percentage gain distribution broken down by θ
θ (-100,0) [0,5) [5,10) [10,15) [15,20) [20,25) [25,30) [30,35) [35,40)
0.1 127 22 24 24 17 20 19 12 5
0.2 117 26 27 22 19 22 20 12 5
0.3 108 29 30 18 23 23 21 12 6
0.4 103 32 21 24 25 25 21 12 7
0.5 98 22 26 29 27 27 19 14 8
0.6 72 34 33 31 31 27 18 15 9
0.7 65 35 34 33 31 26 20 17 9
0.8 49 39 43 34 31 21 24 19 10
0.9 28 43 35 36 37 33 27 20 11
Total 767 282 273 251 241 224 189 133 70
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Table 2.31: 3 Node Model γ Table
3 Node Model: percentage gain distribution broken down by γ
γ (-100,0) [0,5) [5,10) [10,15) [15,20) [20,25) [25,30) [30,35) [35,40)
0.1 53 20 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.2 39 18 14 10 0 0 0 0 0
0.3 34 13 15 14 5 0 0 0 0
0.4 30 13 11 14 13 0 0 0 0
0.5 27 11 11 12 12 8 0 0 0
0.6 27 8 13 10 11 12 0 0 0
0.7 26 10 9 11 10 12 3 0 0
0.8 24 10 10 11 10 9 7 0 0
0.9 23 10 11 9 9 9 10 0 0
1.0 23 9 10 9 9 10 11 0 0
1.1 24 8 9 8 11 9 10 2 0
1.2 23 9 9 8 10 9 8 5 0
1.3 23 8 9 9 9 9 7 7 0
1.4 23 9 8 8 10 8 6 9 0
1.5 23 9 7 9 9 8 7 9 0
1.6 24 8 7 9 8 8 8 9 0
1.7 23 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 0
1.8 23 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 0
1.9 23 8 8 8 7 8 10 9 0
2.0 23 7 9 8 7 8 9 9 1
2.1 23 7 9 7 7 9 9 8 2
2.2 23 7 9 7 7 9 8 7 4
2.3 22 8 8 8 7 8 9 6 5
2.4 23 8 7 8 7 8 8 6 6
2.5 23 8 7 8 7 8 8 5 7
2.6 23 8 7 7 8 8 7 4 9
2.7 23 8 8 6 8 8 7 4 9
2.8 23 8 8 6 8 8 6 5 9
2.9 23 8 8 6 8 7 7 5 9
3.0 23 8 8 5 8 8 6 6 9
Total 767 282 273 251 241 224 189 133 70
2.2.3.5 2 rich 2 poor
Imagine that there are 4 countries: 2 rich countries (R1, R2) and 2 poor countries
(P1, P2). Each business opportunity is between a random rich country and a
random poor country. So the distribution of matches is P [R1, P1] = 0.25, P [R1,
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P2] = 0.25, P [R2, P1] = 0.25 and P [R2, P2] = 0.25. Countries are partitioned into
modules and, as in the standard model, ﬁnancial shocks are fully transmitted
within modules; ﬁnancial shocks are never transmitted between modules; and
the module enablement probability is P [d] = 1
1+γd
.
The possible partitions can be classiﬁed into ﬁve diﬀerent types: ﬁrstly there is
the grand coalition {{RRPP}}; secondly there is the one singleton partition that
separates oﬀ one poor or rich country into a singleton module, {{P}, {RRP}} or
{{R}, {RPP}}; thirdly there is the heterogenous pairs partition that has each
module consisting of one rich country and one poor country, {{RP}, {RP}};
fourthly there is the split partition that has 3 modules, one rich-poor module and
two singletons {{RP}, {R}, {P}}; and ﬁfthly there is the atomistic partition of
singletons, {{R}, {R}, {P}, {P}}.16 The welfares of the partitions are as follows:
Table 2.32: 2 Rich 2 Poor Model Welfare Table
Partition X Description Welfare Wrrpp[X]
{{RRPP}} Grand Coalition P [4]
{{P}, {RRP}} or {{R}, {RPP}} One Singleton (1/2)P [3] + (1/2)θP [3]P [1]
{{RP}, {RP}} Pairs (1/2)P [2] + (1/2)θP [2]2
{{RP}, {R}, {P}} Split (1/4)P [2] + (1/4)θP [1]2 + (1/2)θP [2]P [1]
{{R}, {R}, {P}, {P}} Atomistic Partition θP [1]2
Proposition 62. If there is a strict interior solution then it is the pairs partition,
I := {{RP}, {RP}}
Proof. There are 3 interior partitions: i) One Singleton, ii) Pairs and iii) Split.
First, the pairs partition strictly dominates the one singleton partition: Wrrpp[{{RP},
{RP}}] −Wrrpp[{{R}, {RPP}}] = γ(2γ
2+γ(3−θ)+1)
2(γ+1)(2γ+1)2(3γ+1)
> 0. Second, if there is a
solution at the split partition, then we need the split partition to be weakly pre-
ferred to the pairs partition, and strongly preferred to the atomistic partition:
16Firstly due to the symmetry we do not need to specify the speciﬁc rich or poor country
in order to calculate the welfare. Secondly we have excluded the partitions {{RR},{PP}},
{{RR},{P},{P}}, {{R},{R},{PP}} as they have homogenous modules which increases conta-
gion but have no business value.
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Wrrpp[{{R}, {RPP}}] ≥ Wrrpp[{{RP}, {RP}}] and, Wrrpp[{{R}, {RPP}}] >
Wrrpp[{{R}, {R}, {P}, {P}}]. This requires (γ+1)2(2γ+1)6γ2+6γ+1 ≤ θ < (γ+1)
2
4γ+1
and hence
8γ2 + 6γ + 1 < 6γ2 + 6γ + 1, a contradiction.
This leads to the condition for an interior solution:
Theorem 63. There is a strict interior solution if and only if 2γ+1
4γ+1
< θ <
(γ+1)2(2γ+1)
7γ2+6γ+1
.
Proof. From Proposition 62 the pairs partition I := {{RP}, {RP} is the only
candidate interior maximum. The result then comes from comparing the pairs
partition with the grand coalition GC := {RRPP} and the atomistic partition
Atom := {{R}, {R}, {P}, {P}}: I  Atom ⇔ θ < θAtom[γ]:= (γ+1)2(2γ+1)7γ2+6γ+1 and
I  GC ⇔ θ > 2γ+1
4γ+1
.
Corollary 64. A necessary condition for an interior solution is that θ > 0.5
Proof. An interior solution requires I  GC ⇔ θ > 2γ+1
4γ+1
⇔ θ > 2γ+0.5+0.5
4γ+1
⇔
θ > 1
2
+ 0.5
4γ+1
> 0.5
Corollary 65. A suﬃcient condition for the grand coalition to be optimal is that
θ ≤ 0.5
Proof. Follows from Corollary 64.
Corollary 66. A necessary condition for a strict atomistic solution is that θ is
greater than the only real root of f [θ] := 49θ3−43θ2+5θ−1. The root is given by
θ∗ :=
(
16+
3
√
379−21√105+ 3
√
379+21
√
105
)2(
11+2
3
√
379−21√105+2 3
√
379+21
√
105
)
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(
90+8
3
√
379−21√105+(379−21
√
105)
2/3
+8
3
√
379+21
√
105+(379+21
√
105)
2/3
) = 0.780(3d.p.).
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Proof. ∂θAtom[γ]
∂γ
=
2(7γ4+12γ3+4γ2−2γ−1)
(7γ2+6γ+1)2
. This has only one ﬁrst order point, a
local minimum where γ∗ = 1
21
(
−5 + (379− 21√105)1/3 + (379 + 21√105)1/3).
Evaluating θAtom[γ∗] gives the required result.
The interior region is plotted in green below:
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Figure 2.5: 2 Rich 2 Poor Model Interior Solution Plot
The percentage gain from welfare is shown in table 2.33 as a function of θ and
γ, and the distribution of the gain is given in single variate θ and γ tables.
For each parametrisation, the welfare of the best trivial partition is given by
Wb := Max{Wrrpp[Atom],Wrrpp[GC]}; the welfare of the best symmetric interior
partition is given by Wi := Wrrpp[I]; and g, the percentage gain from choosing
an interior partition, is given by 100 ∗ (W i − W b)/W b. The following tables,
2.33, 2.34 and 2.35 show that the percentage gain is small (always below 10%),
for each of the considered parametrisations. This argues for that the standard
model rejection of interior partitions is robust to replacing a uniform distribution
of business opportunities with a four country 2 Rich 2 Poor distribution.
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The tables show that there can still be interior solutions when θ = 1 and outside
matches have the same value as inside matches. This occurs for large values of
γ, speciﬁcally when γ > 1
2
(
1 +
√
5
)
= 1.62 (2d.p.). Remember, that with the
atomistic partition it is necessary for 2 independent modules to be enabled in
order for the match to be productive; whilst with the pairs partition half the time
we only need one module to be enabled in order for the match to be productive:
for big enough γ the probability of 2 separate singleton modules being enabled is
small enough that the pairs partition is preferred. The θ table shows ﬁrstly, that
with intermediate values of θ there are most likely to be interior solutions, (this
is consistent with the above graph), and secondly that to get the highest gains
requires a large θ. The γ table shows that the highest gains occur with γ = 2;
whilst the frequency of interior solutions increases as γ increases: speciﬁcally,
once γ > 2.2 all solutions are interior.
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Table 2.33: 2 Rich 2 Poor Percentage Gain Table
Percentage Welfare Gain from the interior partition
γ\θ 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1.0
0.0 -23.0 -20.0 -18.0 -15.0 -13.0 -10.0 -7.5 -5.0 -2.5 0.0
0.1 -15.0 -12.0 -10.0 -7.6 -5.2 -2.8 -0.3 -2.0 -4.9 -7.6
0.2 -10.0 -8.2 -5.9 -3.6 -1.3 1.0 -2.8 -6.1 -9.1 -12.0
0.3 -7.6 -5.5 -3.3 -1.2 1.0 -1.0 -4.9 -8.3 -11.0 -14.0
0.4 -5.7 -3.7 -1.7 0.3 2.3 -1.7 -5.7 -9.3 -12.0 -15.0
0.5 -4.4 -2.5 -0.6 1.3 3.1 -1.6 -5.7 -9.4 -13.0 -16.0
0.6 -3.4 -1.7 0.1 1.9 3.6 -0.8 -5.1 -8.9 -12.0 -15.0
0.7 -2.7 -1.0 0.6 2.3 3.9 0.3 -4.1 -8.0 -12.0 -15.0
0.8 -2.1 -0.6 1.0 2.5 4.1 1.8 -2.7 -6.8 -10.0 -14.0
0.9 -1.7 -0.3 1.2 2.7 4.1 3.6 -1.1 -5.4 -9.1 -13.0
1.0 -1.4 0.0 1.4 2.8 4.2 5.6 0.7 -3.7 -7.6 -11.0
1.1 -1.1 0.2 1.5 2.8 4.2 5.5 2.6 -1.9 -5.9 -9.6
1.2 -0.9 0.3 1.6 2.9 4.1 5.4 4.7 0.0 -4.1 -7.9
1.3 -0.7 0.5 1.7 2.9 4.1 5.2 6.4 2.0 -2.3 -6.1
1.4 -0.6 0.6 1.7 2.8 4.0 5.1 6.3 4.2 -0.3 -4.3
1.5 -0.5 0.6 1.7 2.8 3.9 5.0 6.1 6.3 1.8 -2.3
1.6 -0.4 0.7 1.7 2.8 3.8 4.9 5.9 7.0 3.9 -0.4
1.7 -0.3 0.7 1.7 2.7 3.7 4.8 5.8 6.8 6.0 1.7
1.8 -0.2 0.8 1.7 2.7 3.7 4.6 5.6 6.6 7.5 3.7
1.9 -0.2 0.8 1.7 2.6 3.6 4.5 5.4 6.4 7.3 5.9
2.0 -0.1 0.8 1.7 2.6 3.5 4.4 5.3 6.2 7.1 8.0
2.1 -0.1 0.8 1.7 2.6 3.4 4.3 5.2 6.0 6.9 7.8
2.2 -0.0 0.8 1.7 2.5 3.3 4.2 5.0 5.9 6.7 7.5
2.3 0.0 0.8 1.6 2.5 3.3 4.1 4.9 5.7 6.5 7.3
2.4 0.0 0.8 1.6 2.4 3.2 4.0 4.8 5.6 6.3 7.1
2.5 0.1 0.8 1.6 2.4 3.1 3.9 4.7 5.4 6.2 6.9
2.6 0.1 0.8 1.6 2.3 3.1 3.8 4.5 5.3 6.0 6.8
2.7 0.1 0.8 1.6 2.3 3.0 3.7 4.4 5.2 5.9 6.6
2.8 0.1 0.8 1.5 2.2 2.9 3.6 4.3 5.0 5.7 6.4
2.9 0.1 0.8 1.5 2.2 2.9 3.5 4.2 4.9 5.6 6.3
3.0 0.2 0.8 1.5 2.1 2.8 3.5 4.1 4.8 5.5 6.1
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Table 2.34: 2 Rich 2 Poor θ Table
Percentage gain broken down by θ
θ (-100,0) [0,1) [1,2) [2,3) [3,4) [4,5) [5,6) [6,7) [7,8) [8,9)
0.55 23 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.60 10 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.65 6 3 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.70 4 1 2 24 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.75 3 1 0 5 16 6 0 0 0 0
0.80 6 1 2 0 8 8 6 0 0 0
0.85 10 1 0 1 0 9 7 3 0 0
0.90 12 1 0 1 0 3 7 7 0 0
0.95 15 0 1 0 1 0 4 7 3 0
1.00 16 1 1 0 1 0 1 6 4 1
All 105 38 28 31 26 26 25 23 7 1
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Table 2.35: 2 Rich 2 Poor γ Table
Percentage gain broken down by γ
γ (-100,0) [0,1) [1,2) [2,3) [3,4) [4,5) [5,6) [6,7) [7,8) [8,9)
0.0 9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.1 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.2 9 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.3 9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.4 8 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.5 8 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0.6 7 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0.7 6 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0.8 6 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0.9 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1.0 4 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
1.1 4 1 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 0
1.2 3 2 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 0
1.3 3 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 0 0
1.4 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
1.5 2 1 2 1 1 0 1 2 0 0
1.6 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0
1.7 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 0 0
1.8 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0
1.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0
2.0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 0
2.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0
2.3 0 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0
2.4 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0
2.5 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 0 0
2.6 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 0 0
2.7 0 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 0 0
2.8 0 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 0 0
2.9 0 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 0 0
3.0 0 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 0 0
All 105 38 28 31 26 26 25 23 7 1
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2.3 Financial
2.3.1 Variable Shock Initialisation Probability
In the standard model, the module enablement probability is P [d] = 1
1+γd
, where
d is the module size variable and γ is the shock parameter. The shock parameter
does not vary with module size variable. In this section we consider the variant
α model where the module enablement probability is given by Pα[d] = 11+γdα ,
and α is an extra parameter. This can be interpreted as follows: consider a
module enablement probability PΓ[d] = 11+Γ(d)d , where Γ(d) is some completely
general shock parameter function Γ : R → R+; then the α model equates to the
case where 
, the elasticity of Γ with respect to d, is constant and equals α− 1.
In the standard model independent of the module size d, banks in enabled mod-
ules receive disabling shocks at rate Log[1 − q], and disabled modules receive
enabling shocks at rate Log[1 − ρ]. Let us now consider the α model. If α < 1
then an increase in d decreases the module enablement probability by less than
it would in the standard model: this equates to the case where banks in bigger
modules receive fewer shocks and/or recover faster. If α = 1 then we have the
standard model. If α > 1 then an increase in d decreases the module enablement
probability by more than it would in the standard model: this equates to the
case where banks in bigger modules receive more shocks and/or recover slower.
We now follow the solution methodology as followed with the standard model.
This consists of ﬁnding the Pareto optimal allocations for bank 1. The welfare
function for a general allocation x = (xi)ki=1 is:
Wα[(xi)
k
i=1] =
k∑
i=1
(
xi
n
)2Pα[xi] +
k∑
i=1
∑
j =i
θ(
xi
n
)(
xj
n
)Pα[xi]Pα[xj]
160
Similarly the expected return for bank 1, assumed without loss of generality to
be in module 1, is:
v1α[(xi)
k
i=1] = (
1
n
)(
x1
n
)Pα[x1] +
k∑
i=2
θ(
1
n
)(
xi
n
)Pα[x1]Pα[xi]
Lemma 67. If α > 0 then v1α[(xi)ki=1] has negative externalities. If α < 0 then
v1α[(xi)
k
i=1] has positive externalities.
Proof. Consider Δv1α the change in utility to bank 1 from merging two outside
modules 2 and 3. So Δv1α := v1α[x1, x2 + x3, (xi)ki=4] − v1α[x1, x2, x3, (xi)ki=4].
Hence n
2Δv1α
θPα[x1]
= x2+3Pα[x2+3]− x2Pα[x2]− x3Pα[x3]. Re-arrangement gives that
Δv1α > 0 if and only if
x3
(x3
α − (x2 + x3)α)
Pα[x2]
+ x2
(xα2 − (x2 + x3)α)
Pα[x3]
> 0
When α > 0, each of the terms is always negative and so Δv1α ≤ 0. Hence,
v1α[(xi)
k
i=1] when α > 0 has negative externalities.
Conversely, when α < 0, each of the terms is always positive and so Δv1α > 0.
Hence, v1α[(xi)ki=1] when α > 0 has positive externalities.
Lemma 68. If α < 0 then the grand coalition is the solution to the α model.
Proof. If α < 0 then from Lemma 67 the partition that maximises the utility of
bank 1 in module 1 will be of the format (x1, n− x1) due to the presence of the
positive externalities. Hence, let v1αp[x1] := v1α[(x1, n− x1)].
Further, let Δv[x1] :=
v1αp[n]−v1αp[x1]
γPα[n]Pα[x1]Pα[n−x1] , which is positive if and only if there is
a gain to bank 1 from being in the grand coalition (n) compared with being in
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the partition (x1, n− x1). Letting a = −α and re-arranging gives:
Δv[x1] = γn
−ax−a1 (n
1+a − x1+a1 )(n− x1)−a + n1−ax−a1 (na − xa1) + (n− x1)1−a
So Δv[x1] > 0 for all x1 and hence the grand coalition is the unique Pareto
optimal partition.
Lemma 69. If α = 0 then the grand coalition is the solution to the α model.
Proof. If α = 0 and x1 > 0 then Pα[x1] = P [1]. Deﬁne the normalised welfare
function:
Wn[(xi)
k
i=1] :=
n2Wα=0[(xi)
k
i=1]
P [1]
So:
Wn[(xi)
k
i=1] =
k∑
i=1
x2i +
k∑
i=1
∑
j =i
θxixjP [1]
whilst:
Wn[x1+x2, (xi)
k
i=3] = (x1+x2)
2+
k∑
i=3
x2i+(x1+x2)
k∑
j=3
θxjP [1]+
k∑
i=3
θxi
∑
j =i
xjP [1]
So
Wn[x1+x2, (xi)
k
i=3]−Wn[(xi)ki=1] = 2x1x2+θP [1]
(
(x1 + x2)
k∑
j=3
xj +
k∑
i=3
xi
∑
j =i
xj −
k∑
i=1
∑
j =i
xixj
)
Hence
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Wn[x1 + x2, (xi)
k
i=3]−Wn[(xi)ki=1] = 2x1x2(1− θP [1])
So merging modules always increases welfare and hence the grand coalition max-
imises welfare.
We now consider only partitions of the form {x1, 1, 1, .....1}, where all modules
apart from the ﬁrst module are singletons and deﬁne
v1α[x1] := (
1
n
)(
x1
n
)Pα[x1] + θ(
1
n
)(
n− x1
n
)Pα[x1]Pα[1]
Then v′1α[x1] = v′1αn[x1](γ − θ + 1)n−2P 2α[x1]Pα[1]x−11 where
v′1αn[x1] := −Nxα−11 − (α− 1)γxα1 + 1
and N := nαγθ
γ−θ+1 > 0.
So v′1α[x1] > 0 if and only if the normalised function v′1αn[x1] > 0. We can now
characterise v1α[x1]:
Theorem 70. If 0 < α ≤ 1 then v1α[x1] is quasi-convex. Conversely if α ≥ 1
then v1α[x1] is quasi-concave.
Proof. If α = 1 then this comes from the standard model results, as
v′1α[x1 : α = 1] =
γ−θ+γθ(−n)+1
(γ+1)(γx1+1)2
For α = 1 then this will proved using v′1αn[x1]. If α < 1 then α−1 < 0. Suppose
y1 > x1 then −Nyα−11 > −Nxα−11 and γ(1 − α)yα1 > γ(1 − α)xα1 . Hence if
v′1α[x1] > 0 and y1 > x1 then v′1α[y1] > 0. Hence if 0 < α ≤ 1 then v1α[x1] is
quasi-convex.
If α > 1 then α − 1 > 0. A similar argument as in the above case then shows
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that if v′1α[x1] < 0 and y1 > x1 then v′1α[y1] < 0. Hence if α ≥ 1 then v1α[x1] is
quasi-concave.
Corollary 71. If 0 < α < 1 then the model has boundary solutions.
Proof. This follows from applying Theorem 15: the α model clearly possesses
anonymity; Lemma 67 shows that the model has negative externalities; and
Theorem 70 shows that there is quasi-convexity.
So the standard model, where α = 1, is at a tipping point between the quasi-
convex and quasi-concave regions. However, when α > 1 despite v1α[x1] being
quasi-concave it may be monotonic and hence not have interior solutions. Con-
sidering v′1αn[1] and v′1αn[n] leads to 9 diﬀerent cases:
Table 2.36: α Model Characterisation Table
Characterisation of Argmax v1α[x1] when α > 1
v′1αn[1] v′1αn[n] x∗1
< 0 < 0 1
< 0 = 0 impossible due to quasi-concavity
< 0 > 0 impossible due to quasi-concavity
= 0 < 0 1
= 0 = 0 impossible due to quasi-concavity
= 0 > 0 impossible due to quasi-concavity
> 0 < 0 interior
> 0 = 0 n
> 0 > 0 n
This leads to the following characterisation theorem:
Theorem 72. When α > 1: if v′1αn[1] ≤ 0 then the atomistic partition is the
only Pareto optimal partition; if v′1αn[n] ≥ 0 then the grand coalition is the only
Pareto optimal partition; if v′1αn[1] > 0 and v′1αn[n] < 0 then there is an interior
Pareto optimal partition.
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Proof. The results follow directly from the table above.
Corollary 73. If the atomistic partition is the solution of the standard model
then it is also the sole solution to the α model when α > 1.
Proof. Re-arrangement gives ﬁrstly that
v′1αn[1]
P 3[1]
= −(α − 1)γ2 − θ − γ(−αθ + α + θ + αθn − 2) + 1, and secondly that
v′1αn[1] ≤ 0 if and only if α ≥ γ2−γθ+2γ−θ+1γ2−γθ+γ+γθn . If the standard model has the
atomistic solution then P [n] < θP [1] and hence γ
2−γθ+2γ−θ+1
γ2−γθ+γ+γθn < 1 < α.
A second argument is as follows. Diﬀerentiation gives that
∂v1α[x1]
∂α
= −γxα1 log(x1)(θn+ x1(γ − θ+ 1))P [1]P 2α[x1]. As log[1] = 0, ∂v1α[1]∂α = 0.
The ∂v1α[x1]
∂α
expression has a leading negative and so when x1 > 0 the other
factors are always positive. So x1 > 0 ⇒ ∂v1α[x1]∂α < 0. Hence v1α[1] = v1[1] and
(v1α[x1] < v1[x1])x1>0 . So if 1 = argmax1≤x1≤n v1[x1], then 1 = argmax1≤x1≤n v1α[x1].
Corollary 74. In order for the α model to have an interior solution we require
that α > 1 and that the grand coalition be the solution of the standard model.
Proof. When α ≤ 0 then by Lemmas 68 and 69 there is no interior solution.
When 0 < α ≤ 1 the non-existence of interior solutions follows from the quasi-
convexity shown in Theorem 70 and the negative externalities shown in Lemma
67. When α > 1 the result follows from Corollary 73
Corollary 75. If α > 1 and the grand coalition is the solution of the α model
then the grand coalition is also the solution of the corresponding standard model.
Proof. This again follows from Corollary 73. But also directly: v′1αn[n] ≥ 0 if
and only if nα ≤ γ−θ+1
αγ2+αγ−γ2+γθ−γ if and only if α ≤ 1+ γ−θ−γθn
α+1
γ2nα+γnα
. This requires
γ − θ − γθnα + 1 > 0 and hence that P [nα] > θP [1]. As α > 1 it follows that
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n < nα, and so P [n] > θP [1] and hence that the grand coalition is the solution
to the standard model.
Corollary 76. The α model has an interior Pareto Optimal partition if and
only if Max{1, γ−θ+γ2nα−γθnα+γnα+1
γ2nα+γnα
} < α < γ2−γθ+2γ−θ+1
γ2−γθ+γ+γθn .
Proof. The need for α > 1 follows from Lemmas 68, 69 and Corollary 71. The-
orem 72 gives that if α > 1 then there is a interior PO partition if and only
if both v′1αn[1] > 0 and v′1αn[n] < 0. The deﬁnitions of v′1αn[1] and v′1αn[n],
gives that v′1αn[n] < 0 iﬀ α > αlower[n, θ, γ, α] := γ−θ+γ
2nα−γθnα+γnα+1
γ2nα+γnα
and that
v′1αn[1] > 0 iﬀ α < αupper[n, θ, γ] := γ
2−γθ+2γ−θ+1
γ2−γθ+γ+γθn .
This is a graphical representation of the interior solution region:
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Figure 2.6: α Model Interior Solution Plot
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Theorem 77. If the standard model has the grand coalition as a solution then
there is a value of α > 1 with an interior Pareto Optimum of the α model.
Proof. From Corollary 76 the αmodel has an interior P.O. if both
γ−θ+1
nα
+γ2−γθ+γ
γ2+γ
<
α < γ
2−γθ+2γ−θ+1
γ2−γθ+γ+γθn and α > 1. The two conditions will be checked in turn.
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As nα > n, a suﬃcient condition for condition 1 is
γ−θ+1
n
+γ2−γθ+γ
γ2+γ
< α <
γ2−γθ+2γ−θ+1
γ2−γθ+γ+γθn , which equates to
(γ−θ+1)(γn+1)
γ(γ+1)n
< α < (γ+1)(γ−θ+1)
γ(γ+θ(n−1)+1) . The interval is
non-empty if and only if θP[1] < P [n]: the condition for the grand coalition to
be the solution of the standard model.
We now need to check that the intersection of this range with (1,∞) is non-
empty. This requires (γ+1)(γ−θ+1)
γ(γ+θ(n−1)+1) > 1, which occurs when θP[1] < P [n]: the
condition for the grand coalition to be the solution of the standard model.
We now consider a range of diﬀerent parametrisations to investigate the potential
that v1α[x1] has for interior solutions. The number of banks, n, is one of {10,
20, 30, 40, 50, 100, 1000}. The value of outside matches, θ, has a minimum of
0.1, a maximum of 0.9, and has an increment of 0.1. The shock parameter γ
has a minimum of 0.1, a maximum of 3.0, and an increment of 0.1. The α
parameter, has a minimum of 1.0, a maximum of 3.0 and an increment of 0.1.
The n parameter is one of 7 values, the θ parameter is one of 9 values, the γ
parameter is one of 30 values and the α parameter is one of 21 values. This gives
a total of 7 ∗ 9 ∗ 21 ∗ 30 = 39690 parameterisations.
In each of these cases, assuming x1 to be integer, it is ﬁrstly assessed whether
there is a boundary solution or an interior solution. Secondly, the percentage
gain from the best interior solution over the best boundary solution is com-
puted. For each parametrisation, the bank 1 utility of the best trivial partition
is given by vb := Max{v1α[1], v1α[n]}; the bank 1 utility of the best symmetric
interior partition is given by vi := Max{v1α[n/k]}n−1k=2 ; and g, the percentage gain
from choosing an interior partition, is given by 100 ∗ (vi − vb)/vb. In 99.65% of
these cases the v1α program has a boundary solution. In cases where it does
not, the gain has a maximum of 35%. The high frequency of parametrisations
with boundary solutions, and the absence of large gains when there are interior
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solutions, leads to the conclusion that the standard model rejection of interior
partitions is robust to replacing a distribution of ﬁnancial shocks which is in-
dependent of module size, with a distribution where the incidence of ﬁnancial
shocks is higher in bigger modules.
The gain percentage results can be presented in a summary table for each of the
diﬀerent dimensions (n, θ, γ, α) of the parameters. In the α table, for every value
of α, the number of cases with interior solutions is low: the highest proportion
(1.59%) occurs with α = 1.10, whilst with α > 2.7 there are no cases with
interior solutions. When α = 1, we have the standard model and so there are
no gains from interior partitions. With α slightly bigger than 1, there are a few
examples where, in the standard model the grand coalition is optimal, but in
the α model, due to the decreased enablement probability of large modules, an
interior partition with smaller modules is now optimal. Once α becomes large,
the solution is always the atomistic partition. The n table shows that, when n
is small, interior solutions are more frequent, and are of greater beneﬁt. Once
n becomes large then, in the standard model, the atomistic partition is always
preferred, and so this is also the case in the α model. Speciﬁcally, if n is chosen
to be 100 or 1000 then there are no gains from interior partitions for all choices
of the other parameters. Similarly, in the standard model, if θ or γ increases
then generically the solution converges to the atomistic partition, and so the θ
table and the γ tables show the same result for the α model.17
17As θ tends to 1 the result holds for all parametrisations. As γ tends to ∞ the result holds
unless θn ≤ 1.
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Table 2.37: α Model α Table
Overall gain percentage broken down by α
α (-100,0) [0,5) [5,10) [10,15) [15,20) [20,25) [25,30) [30,35)
1.0 1890 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.1 1860 28 2 0 0 0 0 0
1.2 1866 14 9 0 1 0 0 0
1.3 1871 9 6 3 0 1 0 0
1.4 1876 5 5 3 0 1 0 0
1.5 1877 7 3 0 1 2 0 0
1.6 1881 3 2 2 2 0 0 0
1.7 1883 3 1 2 0 0 0 1
1.8 1885 1 3 0 0 0 1 0
1.9 1885 3 1 0 0 1 0 0
2.0 1886 3 0 0 1 0 0 0
2.1 1887 2 0 0 1 0 0 0
2.2 1888 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
2.3 1889 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
2.4 1889 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
2.5 1889 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
2.6 1889 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.7 1889 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.8 1890 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.9 1890 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.0 1890 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All 39550 81 34 12 6 5 1 1
Table 2.38: α Model n Table
Overall gain percentage broken down by n
n (-100,0) [0,5) [5,10) [10,15) [15,20) [20,25) [25,30) [30,35)
10 5585 51 17 9 4 2 1 1
20 5641 15 9 2 1 2 0 0
30 5656 7 5 1 0 1 0 0
40 5663 4 2 0 1 0 0 0
50 5665 4 1 0 0 0 0 0
100 5670 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1000 5670 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All 39550 81 34 12 6 5 1 1
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Table 2.39: α Model θ Table
Overall gain percentage broken down by θ
θ (-100,0) [0,5) [5,10) [10,15) [15,20) [20,25) [25,30) [30,35)
0.1 4308 54 25 11 5 5 1 1
0.2 4384 17 7 1 1 0 0 0
0.3 4401 7 2 0 0 0 0 0
0.4 4408 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.5 4409 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.6 4410 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.7 4410 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.8 4410 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.9 4410 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All 39550 81 34 12 6 5 1 1
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Table 2.40: α Model γ Table
Overall gain percentage broken down by γ
γ (-100,0) [0,5) [5,10) [10,15) [15,20) [20,25) [25,30) [30,35)
0.1 1254 32 20 5 6 4 1 1
0.2 1298 15 5 4 0 1 0 0
0.3 1310 8 3 2 0 0 0 0
0.4 1315 5 2 1 0 0 0 0
0.5 1317 4 2 0 0 0 0 0
0.6 1320 2 1 0 0 0 0 0
0.7 1320 2 1 0 0 0 0 0
0.8 1321 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.9 1321 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.0 1321 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.1 1322 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.2 1322 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.3 1322 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.4 1322 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.5 1322 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.6 1322 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.7 1322 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.8 1323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.9 1323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 1323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.1 1323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.2 1323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.3 1323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.4 1323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.5 1323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.6 1323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.7 1323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.8 1323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.9 1323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.0 1323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All 39550 81 34 12 6 5 1 1
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2.3.2 Biased Incentives
2.3.2.1 Zero Lifetime Bankers
This section considers bankers who are short lived. In particular it will assume
the limiting case of them having zero lifetime.18 Imagine bankers who ﬁrstly,
know that there is a last round of business opportunities before they retire, and
secondly, are able to reorganise the modules before the business opportunities
come through. For the sake of simplicity assume that initially all the modules
are enabled.19
The per bank utility function has the same format as in the standard model, but
with an altered module enablement probability:
vi0[(xj)
n
j=1] :=
xi
n2
P0[xi] +
∑
j =i
θ
xj
n2
P0[xi]P0[xj]
where P0[d] is the enablement probability of a module of size d. There is no
time for a shock to hit in zero time, so every module stays enabled, and hence
P0[d] = 1 for all d. Therefore:
vi0[(xj)
n
j=1] =
xi
n2
+
∑
j =i
θ
xj
n2
=
xi + θ(n− xi)
n2
=
θn+ (1− θ)xi
n2
However, recall from the standard model that P [d] = 1
1+γd
with γ = −Log[1−q]−Log[1−ρ]
where γ is the shock parameter and so P0[d] = P [d : γ = 0]. So the EEBA
analysis above for the standard model still applies: just that the bankers have
the wrong γ. P [n : γ = 0] = 1 and θP [1 : γ = 0] = θ. So as θ < 1 the grand
coalition is the only stable partition. Hence when P [n] < θP [1] the market
18An extension in the next section shows that the results extend to the case of short lived
bankers with non-zero life times.
19If some modules are initially disabled then the result is that all enabled modules merge
and the disabled modules remain separate.
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outcome is ineﬃcient.
2.3.2.2 Short Run Bankers
Section 2.3.2.1 considers the case of zero lifetime bankers and concludes that such
bankers will, for all parameterisations, choose the grand coalition. This section
extends the results to the case where the business opportunity is at time t > 0
in the future, after which the bankers retire. Assuming that initially all banks
are enabled, then as the Markov process converges exponentially fast, we get the
time t module enablement probability, Pt[d] = P [d]+((1−q)d(1−ρ))t(1−P [d]),
where the terms have their standard meanings: P [d] is the module enablement
probability of the standard model, d is the module size, q is the probability that
a bank is hit by a disabling shock, and ρ is the re-enablement probability. In
this section I will consider for what size of t the short run bankers ineﬃciently
prefer the grand coalition over the atomistic partition of singletons.
The welfare function for short run bankers with symmetric partitions is given by,
Wt[d]:=d/nPt[d] + θ(n−d)/nPt[d]2. We calculate the percentage gain, g, the social
planner has from his preferred choice, compared with the choice of the period
t short run banker. This is done on the basis that: ﬁrstly, the social planner
remains concerned solely about welfare in the limiting state; and secondly, that
the banker has to choose a boundary partition. Precisely: Wsp = max{W [1],
W [n]}; dbank = argmaxd∈{1,n} Wt[d]; and g = 100 ∗ (Wsp −W [dbank])/W [dbank].
Using a similar approach as with other variant models, we include the time t
as one dimension of the parametrisations: the time, t, has a minimum of 0, a
maximum of 20 and an increment of 1; the number of banks, n, is one of 10, 20,
30, 40, 50, 100, 1000; the value of outside matches, θ, has a minimum of 0.1,
a maximum of 0.9 and an increment of 0.1; the disabling shock probability, q,
comes from the range, 0.001N9∪0.01N9∪{0.1}; and the enabling probability, ρ,
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comes from the range 0.001N9 ∪ 0.01N9 ∪ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}, where N9 := {1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 8, 9}. So, the t parameter is one of 21 values, the n parameter is one of 7
values, the θ parameter is one of 9 values, the q parameter is one of 19 values, and
the ρ parameter is one of 21 values. This gives a total of 21∗7∗9∗19∗21 = 527877
parametrisations.
The next ﬁve tables record the percentage gain to a social planner from deciding
the partition themselves, rather than leaving it to the market: they assess how
biased a market of period t bankers is; and the ﬁnal sixth, bias length table,
records directly the number of biased cases at each period. The t table shows that
as time increases, the banker’s choice converges to the social planner’s choice.
The n table shows that if there are lots of banks, then it is less likely that
bankers want the grand coalition even in the short run; but when they do choose
the wrong partition, the social costs are very high. As θ increases, there are lower
costs from outside matches; less gains to the bankers from moving away from
the atomistic partition; and hence less social costs from the market solution.
As the enablement probability q increases, the time before a disabling shock
arrive reduces, and hence the banker’s choice is less biased. The re-enablement
probability, ρ, does not have much eﬀect on the banker’s choice: they are short
run and there is unlikely to be enough time for the system to both be disabled
and then re-enabled again before time t. The bias length table shows that: ﬁrstly,
once t reaches a couple of years, that there is a large decrease in the number of
biased choices by bankers; but secondly, also that there is a substantial number
of residual cases where the banker’s choice is biased even for large t (up to 20
years).
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Table 2.41: Short Run Bankers t Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by t
t [0,0] (0,10] (10,20] (20,30] (30,40] (40,50] (50,60] (60,70] (70,80] (80,90] (90,100] (100,1000] (1000,∞]
0 2955 800 858 812 768 630 758 511 610 453 482 11293 4207
1 16045 680 626 548 504 387 483 296 355 244 270 4543 156
2 18852 523 457 403 367 287 364 222 274 183 206 2962 37
3 20188 504 396 354 316 245 313 181 227 136 153 2111 13
4 21076 479 357 324 284 204 279 137 200 103 133 1556 5
5 21715 459 343 292 247 165 240 111 172 88 118 1182 5
6 22193 443 322 268 216 140 214 91 144 72 98 934 2
7 22585 445 299 231 189 121 196 75 123 63 85 724 1
8 22883 432 272 189 171 107 176 66 101 59 71 610 0
9 23136 422 244 171 150 95 153 58 92 56 63 497 0
10 23360 404 225 154 135 86 131 54 77 50 53 408 0
11 23514 412 201 136 123 78 111 49 71 46 47 349 0
12 23649 393 186 123 111 75 96 47 63 42 40 312 0
13 23814 378 171 115 98 62 85 42 56 39 34 243 0
14 23922 367 161 100 90 58 80 40 48 35 31 205 0
15 24025 350 146 92 82 53 70 36 43 31 27 182 0
16 24096 341 136 87 70 50 68 32 34 30 25 168 0
17 24170 332 122 81 64 48 57 30 33 29 23 148 0
18 24234 317 112 78 58 43 56 27 33 27 22 130 0
19 24293 307 105 72 53 42 55 27 30 26 20 107 0
20 24359 291 97 68 51 41 50 26 25 23 18 88 0
All 455064 9079 5836 4698 4147 3017 4035 2158 2811 1835 2019 28752 4426
Table 2.42: Short Run Bankers n Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by n
n [0,0] (0,10] (10,20] (20,30] (30,40] (40,50] (50,60] (60,70] (70,80] (80,90] (90,100] (100,1000] (1000,∞]
10 58003 4434 2379 1939 1514 1024 1434 558 1144 419 488 2075 0
20 61750 2018 1439 808 663 741 1112 457 377 470 598 4978 0
30 63734 1036 893 914 903 337 327 332 371 402 436 5726 0
40 65148 686 550 488 562 496 722 239 230 231 228 5831 0
50 66091 600 376 381 367 288 359 388 599 135 182 5550 95
100 68622 296 192 163 136 124 79 179 89 175 79 4175 1102
1000 71716 9 7 5 2 7 2 5 1 3 8 417 3229
All 455064 9079 5836 4698 4147 3017 4035 2158 2811 1835 2019 28752 4426
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Table 2.43: Short Run Bankers θ Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by θ
θ [0,0] (0,10] (10,20] (20,30] (30,40] (40,50] (50,60] (60,70] (70,80] (80,90] (90,100] (100,1000] (1000,∞]
0.1 48847 3616 1451 1014 787 450 612 244 484 55 38 791 264
0.2 48618 1753 1337 538 463 637 886 214 277 349 414 2836 331
0.3 48482 811 801 1140 968 256 343 397 254 346 450 4045 360
0.4 48950 664 556 553 635 625 1018 226 175 197 197 4494 363
0.5 49722 607 509 407 417 346 453 402 918 168 133 4012 559
0.6 50635 572 466 352 331 246 272 266 280 333 404 3892 604
0.7 51820 471 321 353 256 202 195 197 215 179 211 3626 607
0.8 53236 370 261 211 192 169 149 123 131 144 101 2945 621
0.9 54754 215 134 130 98 86 107 89 77 64 71 2111 717
All 455064 9079 5836 4698 4147 3017 4035 2158 2811 1835 2019 28752 4426
Table 2.44: Short Run Bankers q Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by q
q [0,0] (0,10] (10,20] (20,30] (30,40] (40,50] (50,60] (60,70] (70,80] (80,90] (90,100] (100,1000] (1000,∞]
0.001 18936 949 694 618 460 341 411 353 268 342 209 3973 229
0.002 20027 721 612 484 446 298 384 329 316 229 314 3385 238
0.003 20988 641 561 419 451 350 370 206 306 222 179 2855 235
0.004 21826 576 443 436 373 274 427 169 315 143 174 2396 231
0.005 22470 472 447 369 389 240 344 188 238 143 166 2076 241
0.006 22955 502 396 297 331 258 331 121 199 145 147 1863 238
0.007 23425 421 341 374 200 247 311 103 211 65 174 1678 233
0.008 23695 453 337 261 262 177 299 98 195 80 122 1570 234
0.009 23901 464 301 240 267 166 267 113 172 68 110 1477 237
0.01 24193 365 312 228 256 113 273 99 148 84 84 1389 239
0.02 25229 366 233 162 130 103 118 75 88 63 74 897 245
0.03 25575 386 192 156 81 94 72 62 51 50 42 779 243
0.04 25791 388 153 115 89 67 75 48 48 36 37 699 237
0.05 25876 379 172 100 88 53 70 33 45 35 38 659 235
0.06 25972 404 130 85 77 56 52 32 44 31 33 637 230
0.07 25975 422 134 97 59 52 59 31 50 23 32 624 225
0.08 26053 402 115 93 55 49 58 31 40 27 27 611 222
0.09 26076 382 132 86 64 42 60 33 40 21 31 599 217
0.1 26101 386 131 78 69 37 54 34 37 28 26 585 217
All 455064 9079 5836 4698 4147 3017 4035 2158 2811 1835 2019 28752 4426
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Table 2.45: Short Run Bankers ρ Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by ρ
ρ [0,0] (0,10] (10,20] (20,30] (30,40] (40,50] (50,60] (60,70] (70,80] (80,90] (90,100] (100,1000] (1000,∞]
0.001 20324 576 385 367 277 251 270 135 199 131 146 1907 169
0.002 20349 355 395 278 253 176 332 113 239 94 120 2207 226
0.003 20413 345 331 208 246 183 322 103 196 135 153 2263 239
0.004 20475 373 275 204 269 136 340 97 219 112 166 2231 240
0.005 20556 358 289 172 248 142 345 138 199 87 162 2202 239
0.006 20582 423 193 287 186 236 269 106 191 155 121 2146 242
0.007 20665 444 181 224 285 158 267 123 211 117 142 2084 236
0.008 20743 406 215 291 190 213 273 105 176 129 190 1970 236
0.009 20836 367 213 295 161 275 169 216 153 169 119 1928 236
0.01 20903 378 263 208 245 190 249 124 220 111 147 1862 237
0.02 21414 408 333 225 336 105 202 181 143 88 80 1391 231
0.03 21717 498 349 263 266 110 194 122 124 89 75 1102 228
0.04 22041 450 430 219 234 120 152 100 125 46 79 923 218
0.05 22288 488 367 237 188 130 134 73 90 60 69 801 212
0.06 22460 512 338 262 158 99 118 88 65 66 37 727 207
0.07 22650 548 269 232 141 116 83 83 58 55 49 655 198
0.08 22839 462 308 196 133 91 97 68 52 57 43 596 195
0.09 22902 562 228 203 102 107 79 69 56 41 42 556 190
0.1 23025 529 230 173 116 92 71 61 48 44 45 516 187
0.2 23771 352 140 92 71 47 42 33 27 25 22 370 145
0.3 24111 245 104 62 42 40 27 20 20 24 12 315 115
All 455064 9079 5836 4698 4147 3017 4035 2158 2811 1835 2019 28752 4426
Table 2.46: Short Run Bankers Bias Table
Time t
Frequency of cases where at time t the grand coalition
is preferred by the banker but the social planner
prefers the atomistic partition.
0.0 22182
0.5 12107
1.0 9090
1.5 7375
2.0 6256
2.5 5480
3.0 4849
3.5 4374
4.0 3920
4.5 3585
5.0 3259
5.5 3018
6.0 2768
6.5 2530
7.0 2361
7.5 2230
8.0 2062
8.5 1906
9.0 1808
9.5 1676
10.0 1581
10.5 1506
11.0 1417
11.5 1359
12.0 1286
12.5 1194
13.0 1120
13.5 1063
14.0 1009
14.5 954
15.0 912
15.5 876
16.0 843
16.5 801
17.0 771
17.5 739
18.0 708
18.5 677
19.0 648
19.5 612
20.0 583
Total 527877
2.3.2.3 Banks and Businesses have diﬀerent transaction costs
We now consider how the returns from matches may be split up between banks
and businesses. The proportions may be diﬀerent for inside and outside matches,
and this can aﬀect the banks’ choice of partition. As in the standard model,
assume that inside and outside matches have total values 1 and θ respectively.
The standard model assumes that the bank and the business receive equal shares.
Now let us generalise and assume that the proportion of the return received by
the bank is α and β in the two cases:
Table 2.47: Bank-Business Distribution Table
Inside Outside
Bank α βθ
Business 1− α (1− β)θ
Total 1 θ
The social planner has the standard θ program and hence has welfare function:
WSP [(xi)
k
i=1] := W [(xi)
k
i=1 : Θ = θ] =
∑n
i=1
(
x2i
n2
P [xi] +
∑
j =i θ
xixj
n2
P [xi]P [xj]
)
.
The bank has inside and outside returns of α and βθ respectively. So the bank
welfare function is: WBank[(xi)ki=1] :=
∑n
i=1
(
α
x2i
n2
P [xi] +
∑
j =i βθ
xixj
n2
P [xi]P [xj]
)
.
This can be re-normalised to the standard welfare program with Θ = βθ
α
, as
WBank[(xi)
k
i=1] = α ∗W [(xi)ki=1 : Θ = βθα ]. However it is possible that βθα > 1,
and so the banker prefers outside matches to inside matches. We need to check
that in this case, where θ > 1, the standard model still has boundary solutions:
Proposition 78. The standard model with θ > 1, and all other parameters still
in their standard ranges, has the atomistic boundary solutions to the welfare
program.
Proof. First note the model still has negative externalities: if modules 2 and
3 merge to form a ‘super module’ then module 1 is worse oﬀ as banks in the
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super module are less likely to be enabled. So the partition that maximises the
utility of bank 1 will be of form {x1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1..1}. As in the standard model the
bank 1 utility function is given by v1[x1] = x1n2P [x1] + θ
(n−x1)
n2
P [x1]P [1]. Hence
∂v1[x1]
∂x1
= (1− θ + γ(1− θn))P [1]P [x1]2. As θn > 1 and 1 − θ < 0 we get,
∂v1[x1]
∂x1
< 0 and hence the atomistic partition of singletons is the solution to both
the v1[x1] program and the general W [x] program.
So, the bank will still want a boundary solution, but not necessarily the same
boundary as the social planner. Secondly, the form of the bias depends on
only the relative level of the 2 shares λ := β/α, but not on the absolute levels
α and β: from the standard model, {n} SP {1, 1, 1....1} ⇐⇒ P [n] > θP [1]
and {n} B {1, 1, 1....1} ⇐⇒ P [n] > λθP [1], where SP and B represent
the preferences of the social planner and the banker respectively. Similarly let
x∗SP and x∗B represent the argmax of the social planner and the bank. So if
β < α then the banker is biased towards the grand coalition, conversely if β > α
then the banker is biased towards the atomistic partition of singletons. The
condition for the banker to ineﬃciently choose the grand coalition (x∗B = {n}
and x∗SP = {1, 1, 1, 1...1}) is λθ < P [n]P [1] < θ. A necessary condition for this to
happen is λ < 1, which equates to β < α. Conversely, the condition for the
banker to ineﬃciently choose the atomistic partition (x∗B = {1, 1, 1, 1...1} and
x∗SP = {n}) is θ < P [n]P [1] < λθ. A necessary condition for this to happen is λ > 1,
which equates to α < β.
The percentage loss calculation is as follows. Firstly, the welfare of the social
planners choice is calculated using the unbiased match value θ, and is justWSP =
max[W [1 : θ],W [n : θ]. Secondly, the banker choice, dbank, is calculated using,
λθ, the biased match value: dbank = argmax1,nW [d : λθ]. The loss, l, is then
calculated as the percentage loss they experience by delegating the decision to the
banks, rather than making the decision themselves. Hence, l = 100 ∗ (W [dbank :
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θ]−WSP )/WSP .
Using the same approach as with other variant models, we consider a range of
parametrisations. The number of banks, n, is one of 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100, 1000.
The value of outside matches, θ, has a minimum of 0, a maximum of 1.0 and an
increment of 0.1. The shock parameter, γ, has a minimum of 0, a maximum of
3.0, and an increment of 0.1. The λ parameter is one of {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5,
0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}. So, the n parameter is one of 7 values,
the θ parameter is one of 11 values, the γ parameter is one of 31 values, and the
λ parameter is one of 20 values. This gives a total of 7 ∗ 11 ∗ 31 ∗ 20 = 47740
parametrisations.
The λ table below shows, that for very small values of λ, the banker is biased
towards the grand coalition: in particular when λ = 0, the banker always chooses
the grand coalition, resulting in many cases where the bankers’s outcome is
ineﬃcient. However, once λ reaches 0.2, whilst there can be large costs from
the banker’s bias, these are rare: in 77.5% (1791) of cases the banker’s choice
of boundary partition is the same as the social planner. Once λ equals 1 the
banker is unbiased, and so always makes the same choice as the social planner.
Once λ is above 1, the direct of bias now switches: the banker is biased towards
the atomistic partition. However, in 2033 of the 2310 cases the social planner
prefers the atomistic partition already; so the banker’s bias has little eﬀect. So
with λ > 1, there are few cases of losses due to the banker bias, and when they
occur they are generally small in size.
The n table shows that as n increases, ﬁrstly, there are fewer case with losses,
but secondly, when losses do occur they are larger in magnitude. This is because,
with large n, the social planner more strongly wants the atomistic partition: so
even with their λ bias the bank is likely to still want the atomistic partition;
however, when the λ bias is strong enough to make the bank choose the grand
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coalition, the loss to the social planner is large. In the θ table, when θ = 0,
both the social planner and the banker always choose the grand coalition. For
large values of θ, the same pattern emerges, and for the same reason, as in the
n table: there are fewer case with losses; but when losses occur they are large
in magnitude. In the γ table, when γ = 0: the social planner always prefers the
grand coalition (strictly if θ < 1; weakly if θ = 1); however, the bank chooses
the atomistic partition if θλ > 1. Apart from when γ is small, for example 0.1
or 0.2, there are few defections as, even with a potential λ bias, there needs to
be a low γ for the bank to select the grand coalition.
Table 2.48: Bank-Business Distribution Model λ Table
Percentage loss broken down by λ
λ (-100,-90) [-90,-80) [-80,-70) [-70,-60) [-60,-50) [-50,-40) [-40,-30) [-30,-20) [-20,-10) [-10,0) 0
0 545 473 304 230 150 115 88 61 41 25 355
0.1 0 68 164 229 150 115 88 61 41 25 1446
0.2 0 0 23 82 85 114 88 61 41 25 1868
0.3 0 0 0 14 40 54 86 61 41 25 2066
0.4 0 0 0 0 12 26 41 61 41 25 2181
0.5 0 0 0 0 0 8 21 37 41 25 2255
0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 19 41 25 2297
0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 23 25 2335
0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 19 2360
0.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 2376
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2387
2 0 0 0 0 0 1 11 14 23 28 2310
3 0 0 0 0 9 11 14 16 23 28 2286
4 0 0 0 8 9 12 14 16 23 28 2277
5 0 0 0 8 10 12 14 16 23 28 2276
6 0 0 7 9 10 12 14 16 23 28 2268
7 0 0 7 9 10 12 14 16 23 28 2268
8 0 0 7 9 10 12 14 16 23 28 2268
9 0 0 7 9 10 12 14 16 23 28 2268
10 0 0 7 9 10 12 14 16 23 28 2268
All 545 541 526 616 515 528 540 507 525 482 42415
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Table 2.49: Bank-Business Distribution Model n Table
Percentage loss broken down by n
n (-100,-90) [-90,-80) [-80,-70) [-70,-60) [-60,-50) [-50,-40) [-40,-30) [-30,-20) [-20,-10) [-10,0) 0
10 0 0 5 130 206 200 185 224 261 253 5356
20 0 25 169 145 111 90 156 46 151 127 5800
30 0 118 130 111 77 77 30 149 59 38 6031
40 9 165 105 74 70 33 112 54 18 18 6162
50 56 146 83 78 26 106 33 16 18 28 6230
100 181 85 29 71 17 14 15 9 9 9 6381
1000 299 2 5 7 8 8 9 9 9 9 6455
All 545 541 526 616 515 528 540 507 525 482 42415
Table 2.50: Bank-Business Distribution Model θ Table
Percentage loss broken down by θ
θ (-100,-90) [-90,-80) [-80,-70) [-70,-60) [-60,-50) [-50,-40) [-40,-30) [-30,-20) [-20,-10) [-10,0) 0
0.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4340
0.1 29 2 0 69 23 123 160 197 238 234 3265
0.2 30 20 51 78 94 81 125 52 139 127 3543
0.3 30 30 72 133 60 63 35 129 59 29 3700
0.4 40 41 84 65 117 11 113 37 9 10 3813
0.5 57 52 69 75 9 151 18 15 9 9 3876
0.6 58 67 65 48 36 64 76 7 0 10 3909
0.7 59 87 66 12 74 18 6 63 8 0 3947
0.8 69 85 53 23 62 6 0 7 63 0 3972
0.9 78 79 42 51 27 5 7 0 0 63 3988
1.0 95 78 24 62 13 6 0 0 0 0 4062
All 545 541 526 616 515 528 540 507 525 482 42415
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Table 2.51: Bank-Business Distribution Model γ Table
Percentage loss broken down by γ
γ (-100,-90) [-90,-80) [-80,-70) [-70,-60) [-60,-50) [-50,-40) [-40,-30) [-30,-20) [-20,-10) [-10,0) 0
0.0 0 0 35 49 56 56 63 63 63 63 1092
0.1 9 12 26 43 49 47 39 48 17 58 1192
0.2 14 19 25 31 30 30 42 23 45 9 1272
0.3 15 25 28 20 31 28 22 23 27 19 1302
0.4 17 24 28 16 24 23 18 24 26 19 1321
0.5 18 23 20 24 20 15 20 22 27 10 1341
0.6 18 27 14 27 15 19 14 20 26 9 1351
0.7 21 21 20 18 13 17 11 20 16 18 1365
0.8 21 21 20 18 12 22 18 8 15 9 1376
0.9 21 20 20 20 13 17 17 16 7 10 1379
1.0 21 20 16 23 15 8 15 23 0 20 1379
1.1 21 20 16 22 14 8 15 13 9 19 1383
1.2 21 16 18 21 12 8 15 12 9 18 1390
1.3 21 16 18 21 12 8 15 12 9 18 1390
1.4 21 16 18 18 15 8 15 12 9 18 1390
1.5 21 16 18 18 14 8 14 12 9 17 1393
1.6 20 17 17 12 19 8 13 12 9 16 1397
1.7 18 19 16 12 15 11 12 12 9 16 1400
1.8 18 19 16 12 15 10 12 11 17 8 1402
1.9 18 19 12 16 9 16 12 11 16 9 1402
2.0 18 19 8 18 9 15 12 10 16 9 1406
2.1 18 17 10 18 9 15 12 10 16 9 1406
2.2 18 15 12 18 8 15 12 10 15 9 1408
2.3 18 15 12 18 8 15 12 10 15 9 1408
2.4 17 15 12 16 10 15 12 10 14 9 1410
2.5 17 15 12 16 10 15 12 10 14 9 1410
2.6 17 15 12 14 12 15 12 10 14 9 1410
2.7 17 15 12 14 12 15 12 10 14 9 1410
2.8 17 15 12 14 12 15 12 10 14 9 1410
2.9 17 15 12 14 12 12 15 10 14 9 1410
3.0 17 15 11 15 10 14 15 10 14 9 1410
All 545 541 526 616 515 528 540 507 525 482 42415
2.3.3 Partition Formation
In section 1.8 we considered the EEBA game where agents are farsighted in
both expectations and preferences. Ideally, we want expectations and prefer-
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ences aligned in terms of their timeframe. Recall that, the preferences in the
standard model rely on the Markov process being at its limiting state; all the
stability games in this section, like the standard model, have farsighted pref-
erences. However, the ﬁrst two formations, (Bilateral Stability and the Open
Membership Game), here have agents with myopic expectations, who only con-
sider the direct eﬀect of their actions. These games for their validity rely on
the assumption that after the ﬁrst deviation, it is assumed that subsequent de-
viations are not feasible (see subsections 2.3.3.1 and 2.3.3.2).20 The ﬁnal two
games in this section, the Unanimity Game and the EBA (Equilibrium Binding
Agreements), like the EEBA game, have full farsightedness in both preferences
and expectations. The following stability table considers these four new games,
along with the earlier EEBA and the Zero Lifetime Bankers:
Table 2.52: The Stability Bias Table
Atomistic Partition Stability Level
Never Less Correct Too Always
Grand
Coalition
Stability
Level
Never
Less
Correct EEBA
Unanimity Game
EBA
Too Bilateral Stability
Always Zero Lifetime Bankers Simultaneous-Move
In table 2.52, the results from the six approaches are summarised: when is each
trivial partition stable? Is it correctly stable (stable if and only if it is eﬃcient)?
Or is it biased: either too stable (stable for some parameter values at which it
is ineﬃcient), or less stable than ideal (unstable for some parameter values at
20An alternative motivation for myopic expectations would be agents who only have short
run preferences (see sections 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.2), and for example, will be retired before any
response occurs.
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which it is eﬃcient)? Further, the pro or anti-stability bias may be extreme: the
partition may be either, always stable (stable for all parameter values), or never
stable (unstable for all parameter values).
The EEBA and Unanimity Games give us ’goldilocks’ results: each of the trivial
partitions is stable if and only if it is eﬃcient. However, in contrast three of the
other solution concepts all suggest that there is a bias towards the grand coali-
tion: with bilateral stability, the atomistic partition is correctly stable, but the
grand coalition is too stable; with the Simultaneous-Move game, the atomistic
partition is correctly stable, but the grand coalition is always stable; and with
Zero Lifetime Bankers, the atomistic partition is never stable, but the grand
coalition is always stable.21
2.3.3.1 Bilateral Stability
The concept of bilateral stability , from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), is often
used in the network literature. In network theory, with bilateral stability, the
feasible set of changes is that individual agents can unilaterally remove links but
it takes a pair of agents to bilaterally form a new link. So, if no single agent
gains from removing any of their links, and no pair of agents gains from creating
a link between them, then the network is bilaterally stable.
Extending this concept to partition form games, means considering an environ-
ment where there are random opportunities for individual modules to split, and
pairs of modules to merge. Bilateral stability requires that no module wants
to split, and no pair of modules want to merge. Bilateral stability ignores the
potential for subsequent deviations, and so requires myopic agents: either in
21With the EBA modules can split, but not merge, resulting in a structural bias towards the
atomistic partition. In particular, for all payoﬀ functions by deﬁnition the atomic partition
is always an EBA. However, the convention is to pick the coarsest EBA as the solution. And
under this convention for the standard model the solution EBA is always eﬃcient: see Corollary
96 and Proposition 97.
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expectations (agents do not believe that future deviations are possible), or in
preferences (agents have short run preferences and do not care about the long
run outcome). In the standard model, the agents’ preferences are farsighted: the
payoﬀs in the model are evaluated using asymptotic probabilities. Therefore, to
justify the use of this solution concept, we need a story that makes subsequent
deviations unfeasible. For example, imagine that, a banking commission is re-
designing the banking network, whilst structural changes (in the form of bank
mergers and bank splits), are on-going. After the commission announces their
new design for the bank network, there is time for one ﬁnal structural change in
response, before the network is ﬁnalised. So, the timing of such a story would
be:
1. The social planner assigns a partition x.
2. At random, either a single module xi or, a pair of modules (xi, xj), is given
a chance to deviate. The single module xi can split; the pair of modules xi
and xj can merge. The resulting partition x∗(xi) or x∗(xi, xj) is now ﬁxed
forever.22
Partition x is bilaterally stable if, for any possible xi or (xi, xj), there is no feasible
proﬁtable deviation, and so x∗ always equals x. For my banking model, when
are the trivial partitions bilaterally stable? Starting at the atomistic partition,
it is not feasible for a singleton module to split, but it is feasible for two modules
(without loss of generality these are assumed to be modules 1 and 2), to merge.
The initial partition gives both banks 1 and 2 an expected utility of:
v1[{1, 1, 1....1}] = 1
n2
P [1] +
1
n2
θ(n− 1)P [1]P [1]
22In June 2010 the UK government setup the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB)
to make recommendation on how to reform the banking industry. But it knew that as soon as
it issued its recommendations that it would be dissolved: this happened in September 2011.
This kind of setup motivates why the commission has to make a static choice, and why they
can not respond and make further alterations to the banking network.
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whilst merging gives them each:
v1[{2, 1, 1....1}] = 2
n2
P [2] +
1
n2
θ(n− 2)P [1]P [1]
Re-arranging gives that {1, 1, 1....1} is bilaterally stable if and only if P [n] ≤
θP [1]: the condition for the atomistic partition to be eﬃcient.
Now considering the grand coalition {n}, the alternative is to split to form {0.5n,
0.5n}.23 So the initial partition gives each bank an expected utility of v1[{n}] =
1
n
P [n]; whilst deviating gives each bank an expected utility of v1[{0.5n, 0.5n}] =
1
2n
P [0.5n]+ 1
2n
θP [0.5n]P [0.5n]. Re-arranging gives that {n} is bilaterally stable,
if and only if n ≤ n
2θ
− (1−θ)
θγ
. This is weaker than the condition for {n} to be
eﬃcient. So, there exist parameter values for which {n} is bilaterally stable, but
not eﬃcient.24
2.3.3.2 The Simultaneous-Move Open Membership Game
The simultaneous-move open membership game comes from Yi and Shin (2000).
It deﬁnes a game where there is an exogenous list of groups , and every agent
simultaneously picks one group to be in. Every agent gets to be in the group
they asked to be in; each group becomes a module, and thus a partition is
formed. This partition becomes permanent. The solution concept is that the
agents strategies need to form a Nash equilibrium of the game.
The permanency of the partition motivates the use of asymptotic payoﬀs. We
look to see when each of the trivial partitions can be formed as a Nash equilibrium
of this game. Recall vi[(xj)nj=1] =
xi
n2
P [xi] +
∑
j =i θ
xj
n2
P [xi]P [xj]. Starting with
23If there are gains to splitting, then the partition with the highest total utility over the 2
modules is the symmetric partition {0.5n, 0.5n}.
24See Appendix J for a discussion of how models of club goods diﬀer from partition form
games.
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the atomistic partition, the equilibrium strategy gives bank 1 a utility of v1[{1,
1, 1....1}] = 1
n2
P [1]+ 1
n2
θ(n−1)P [1]P [1]; whilst deviating gives v1[{2, 1, 1....1}] =
2
n2
P [2] + 1
n2
θ(n − 2)P [1]P [1].25 Re-arranging gives that {1, 1, 1....1} is a Nash
equilibrium, if and only if, P [n] ≤ θP [1]: the condition for the atomistic partition
to be eﬃcient. 26
Considering the grand coalition, the equilibrium strategy has a payoﬀ of v1[{n}] =
1
n
P [n]; whilst deviating gives v1[{1, n − 1}] = 1n2P [1] + θ(n−1)n2 P [1]P [n − 1]. Re-
arrangement shows that for all parameter values {n} is a Nash equilibrium. The
intuition behind why a single bank never wants to deviate is that {1, n−1} gives
bank 1 most of the cost of a big module (low enablement probability for partner
banks that bank 1 could be matched with), but few of the beneﬁts (low rather
than high match values as it is in a diﬀerent module).
2.3.3.3 The Unanimity Game
The Yi (1997) paper considers the Unanimity game of Bloch (1996). In the
Unanimity game a module forms if and only if all proposed members agree to
form the module. Suppose the N players are labelled {P1, P2, P3...PN}. First,
P1 makes a proposal for a module, e.g., {P1, P3, P4, P7}. Then each of the other
proposed module members, starting with the smallest index (here it is P3), ac-
cepts or rejects the proposal. If P3 accepts, then it is P4’s turn to accept or
reject the proposal, and so on. Module formation needs unanimity, so if any of
the other proposed members rejects P1’s proposal, then the current proposal is
completely thrown out: ﬁrstly, there is no module formation among the players
who agreed to the original proposal, and secondly the player who ﬁrst rejected
25Many diﬀerent strategies have an outcome which is a trivial partition. But, the simplest
for the atomistic partition is each bank i picking group i, and every bank picking group 1 for
the grand coalition.
26This is the same derivation as with bilateral stability.
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the proposal starts over by proposing another module. If, instead, all proposed
members accepted P1’s proposal, then they form a module and the remaining
players continue the module formation game, starting with the player with the
smallest index making a proposal. Notice that once a module forms, it cannot
break apart, admit new members, or merge with other modules, regardless of
how the rest of the players form modules.
Bloch (1996) shows that the Unanimity game yields the same stationary sub-
game perfect equilibrium structure as the following ‘‘Size Announcement’’ game:
player P1 ﬁrst announces the size of his module s1, and the ﬁrst s1 players form
a size s1 module, and then player Ps1+1 proposes s2, and the next s2 players
form a size s2 module, and so on until PN is reached. Intuitively, the equivalence
between the two games holds because of the identical players in the Unanimity
game: the proposer has reason to care about his module size but no reason to
care about the labels of the other player he selects; the receiver has no reason
to reject any proposal as what is best for the proposer is best for the receiver.
Under the standard model, the formation results for the Unanimity Game are
as follows:
Theorem 79. Under the standard model if P [n] > θP [1] then proposing the
grand coalition {n} is the unique SPE solution of the Unanimity game.
Proof. Firstly we know that the Unanimity game is equivalent to the size an-
nouncement game, so we can assume that if player 1 rationally proposes {n}
then it will be accepted by the other players. Secondly if P [n] > θP [1], then {n}
is the unique partition that maximises v1[x], so any other partition gives player
1 a worse payoﬀ.
Theorem 80. Under the standard model if P [n] < θP [1] then each player pro-
posing a singleton module is an SPE solution of the Unanimity game.
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Proof. As P [n] < θP [1], then {1, 1, 1...1} is the partition that maximises the
utility of each and every player. So consider the strategy where each player
proposes a singleton module. Then no deviation can lead to a higher payoﬀ.
2.3.3.4 Equilibrium Binding Agreement (EBA)
Chapter One in Section 1.8 considered the Extended Equilibrium Binding Agree-
ment (EEBA), from Diamantoudi and Xue (2007). This section will now consider
the original Equilibrium Binding Agreement (EBA), of Ray and Vohra (1997),
which has a smaller feasible set of allowable deviations but has the same coalition
preference relation, formed by requiring the individual preference to hold for all
members of the coalition. Formally:
Deﬁnition 81. Let N be the set of agents, and let P and Q be partitions of N .
Coalition S strictly prefers P to Q (notation P S Q), if each member of coali-
tion S strictly prefers partition P to Q. Speciﬁcally, require that (P i Q)i∈S, or
in utility formation, ui(P ) > ui(Q) for all i ∈ S. Note, that S can be any subset
of N : there is no requirement that S be a member of either of the partitions.
With the EEBA coalitional deviations are allowed; whilst with the EBA only
internal coalitional deviations are allowed: with the EEBA any members can
form a module and deviate; whilst with the EBA all the deviating members
need to come from the same module. Formally:
Deﬁnition 82. We write P T−→P ′ to denote an internal coalitional deviation
where the following conditions on P , T and P ′ hold:
1. P is a partition of N
2. T  S ∈ P ; that is T is a strict subset of one of the modules in P .
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3. P ′ = P \ S ∪ {S \ T, T} ; that is P ′ has one more module than P , and all
those modules that were unaﬀected by the deviation of T remain modules
in the new partition structure.
Speciﬁcally, the EEBA allows any sequence of coalitional deviations, so deviating
agents can re-deviate: this allows Pi
Ti→ Pi+1, Pj Tj→ Pj+1, b ∈ Ti ∩ Tj and
i = j. In contrast, the EBA only allows internal deviations (splits within a
module), and further each agent can only deviate once: Pi
Ti→ Pi+1, Pj Tj→ Pj+1,
b ∈ Ti and i = j ⇒ b /∈ Tj. This single deviation property is captured within
the deﬁnition of RV-reachable, which allows a sequence of deviations, but at
each stage forces newly formed modules to be members of the ﬁnal partition: no
member can be in more than one module in the ﬁnal partition, and so can only
be in (at most) one deviating coalition.
Deﬁnition 83. P´ is RV-reachable from P if there exists a sequence of partitions
P1, P2, ..., Pk , where:
1. P1 = P and Pk = P ′ ; the sequence of partitions needs to start with P and
end with P ′
2. and a sequence of modules (Tj ∈ P ′)k−1j=1 such that
(
Pj
Tj→ Pj+1
)k−1
j=1
; the
deviating coalition at each stage is a module in the ﬁnal partition P ′
There are a number of diﬀerent, but equivalent, deﬁnitions of RV dominance,
the dominance relation used by the EBA. The original Ray and Vohra (1997)
deﬁnition is explicitly recursive. However, Diamantoudi and Xue (2007) prove
that there are two other equivalent formulations, and we use a deﬁnition based
on the second of these.27
27See Diamantoudi and Xue (2007) Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, and Bloch and Datta
(2010) deﬁnition 15.
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Deﬁnition 84. P´ RV dominates P (denoted by P ′ RV P ) if there exists
a sequence of partitions P1, P2, ..., Pk and a sequence of modules T1, T2, ..., Tk−1
such that:
1. P´ is RV-reachable from P through the sequence of partitions and modules.
2. P ≺T1 P´; the initial deviators prefer the end partition P ′ to the starting
partition P .
3. If Q = P2 or Q is RV-reachable from P2 via a strict subset R ⊂ {T2, T2, ...,
Tk−1} then there exists S ∈ {T2, T2, ..., Tk−1} \R s.t. Q ≺S P ′ ; Suppose T1
deviates because they prefer P ′ to P , and there is a sequence of deviators
(Tj)
k−1
j=1 that leads from P to P
′ (in the RV-reachable sense). However,
perhaps not all the other potential deviators deviate: for RV-dominance
we require that whatever subset of the (Tj)
k−1
j=1 do not deviate there is at
least one Tj who has not deviated yet, that prefers P ′ to their current
partition Q.
For its solution concept, the EBA uses the same stable set of von Neumann
and Morgenstein (1944), as the EEBA does; but it uses RV domination instead
of indirect domination. Recall, that intuitively, the stable set requires that:
ﬁrstly, no solution can be preferred to any other solution; and secondly, every
non-solution must be inferior to some solution. Formally:
Deﬁnition 85. Consider a set X and some binary ordering > on X. Then R,
whereØ = R ⊆ X, is a vN–M stable set for (X,>), if it is both internally and
externally stable:
R is vN–M internally stable for (X,>), if there do not exist P, P´ ∈ R such that
P´ > P
R is vN–M externally stable for (X,>), if for any P ∈ X \ R, there exists some
P´ ∈ R such that P´ > P
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Finally, we have the deﬁnition of an EBA:
Deﬁnition 86. P is an EBA, if there exists R s.t. P ∈ R and R is a vN–M
stable set of (P, RV ), where P is the set of partitions.
The Yi (1997) paper gives a number of useful results for partition form games
under negative externalities, including four diﬀerent conditions. The ﬁrst and
most important, (N1) we met in chapter 1:
Deﬁnition 87. (N1) The game satisﬁes negative externalities , if when modules
merge to form a larger module, outside modules not involved in the merger are
strictly worse oﬀ. Speciﬁcally, if x is strictly coarser than y, and xi = yi, then
that implies that vi[x] < vi[y].
And recall:
Deﬁnition 5. Partition x is strictly coarser than y if each module in x can
be formed as a merger of modules in y. Speciﬁcally, if x has k modules
and y has l modules then require k < l and the existence of a mapping
f : Al → Ak s.t.
(
xj =
∑
f(i)=j yi
)k
j=1
where Al = {1, 2, 3, 4.....l} and
Ak = {1, 2, 3, 4.....k}. Conversely, partition x is strictly ﬁner than y, if and
only if, partition y is strictly coarser than x.
We now introduce the next 2 deﬁnitions: which are about the internal eﬀects of
changes in the partition structure (that is the eﬀects on players who are members
of modules which change in size). With (N2), a member of a module becomes
better oﬀ if his module merges with larger or equal-sized module:
Deﬁnition 88. (N2) If x = (xi)ki=1 and x′ = (
∑j
i=1 xi, (xi)
k
i=j+1) are partitions
where (x1 ≤ xi)ji=1 then v1[x′] > v1[x].
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With (N3), a member of a non-singleton module becomes better oﬀ if he leaves
his module to join another module of equal or larger size:
Deﬁnition 89. (N3) If x = (xi)ki=1 and x′ = ((xi)
j−1
i=1 , xj − 1, (xi)l−1i=j+1, xl + 1,
(xi)
n
i=l+1) are partitions and xl ≥ xj ≥ 2 then vj[x] < vl[x′].
Here I introduce the stronger variant condition (N3∗) which removes the require-
ment for the departing and receiving modules to be non-singletons:
Deﬁnition 90. (N3∗) If x = (xi)ki=1 and x′ = ((xi)
j−1
i=1 , xj − 1, (xi)l−1i=j+1, xl + 1,
(xi)
n
i=l+1) are partitions and xl ≥ xj ≥ 1 then vj[x] < vl[x′].
Theorem 91. Under the standard model, (N3∗) holds if and only if P [n] >
P [1]θ.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume j = 1 and l = 2. Recall
v1[x] =
x1
n2
P [x1] +
∑
j =i
θ
xj
n2
P [x1]P [xj]
and similarly
v2[x
′
] =
x2 + 1
n2
P [x2 + 1] + θ
x1 − 1
n2
P [x2 + 1]P [x1 − 1] +
∑
j>2
θ
xj
n2
P [x2 + 1]P [xj]
If v2[x
′
] > v1[x] then D[x, x′] > 0 where
D[x, x′] :=
n2(v2[x
′
]− v1[x])
(1− x1 + x2)P [x1]P [x1 − 1]P [x2]P [x2 + 1]
The term D[x, x′] can be re-arranged to give
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D[x, x′] = 1− γ − θ + γ(1− θ)(x1+x2)+ γ2(1− θ)(x1−1)x2
−Rγθ {1 + γ(x1 + x2−1)+ γ2(x1 − 1)x2}
where R :=
∑
j>2 xjP [xj]. The R coeﬃcient is negative, so it is hardest for D[x,
x′] to be positive when R is maximised: this occurs when the other n− x1 − x2
members are arranged in singleton modules and R = (n − x1 − x2)P [1]. So
x = (x1, x2, 1, 1, 1....1) and x′ = (x1 − 1, x2 + 1, 1, 1, 1...1). This equates to
requiring that the two conditions
θγ
1− γ + γ(x1 + x2) + γ2(x1 − 1)x2 +
γθ (n− x1 − x2)
γ + 1
≤ 1− θ
and
γ
1 + γ(x1 + x2) + γ2(x1 − 1)x2 < 1− θ
both hold for all suitable x1 and x2. However, these conditions are strictly
harder to solve for smaller x1 and x2. So we need only to consider the case
with x1 = x2 = 1, which gives P [n] > P [1]θ: the grand coalition eﬃciency
condition.
Corollary 92. Under the standard model if P [n] > P [1]θ then (N3) holds.
Proof. (N3) is weaker then (N3∗), so this follows directly from Theorem 91.
Further, following the same argument as in that theorem’s proof and considering
the case x1 = x2 = 2, gives the following necessary and suﬃcient condition for
(N3) to hold: γ2(2− 2θ(n− 3)) + γ(3− θn) + 1− θ > 0.
The region where the (N3) condition holds but the grand coalition is ineﬃcient,
is plotted below in green, with n on the x-axis and θ on the y-axis, with plot for
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each value of the shock parameter γ between 0.1 and 1.0 with an increment of
0.1:
Figure 2.7: (N3) holds but Grand Coalition Ineﬃcient Plots
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The ﬁnal condition concerns the eﬀect of a merger between a non-singleton and
a singleton module on the non-singleton module. Formally: 28
Deﬁnition 93. d∗ is the largest integer which satisﬁes (2 ≤ xi ≤ d∗ and x =
(xj)
k
j=1 a partition) ⇒ vi[x] ≥ vi[x′] where x′ := ((xj)i−1j=1, xi − 1, 1, (xj)kj=i+1)
28Yi (1997) has diﬀerent notation and uses k0 for what I have called d∗.
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So intuitively, if there is a module of size smaller than or equal to d∗ and we
split oﬀ a singleton module, then the members of the remaining module can be
no better oﬀ, whatever the initial structure of the other modules.29
Theorem 94. For the standard model, d∗ =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
n θP[1] ≤ P [n]
1 θP[1] > P [n]
Proof. Recall from the standard model that
vi[x] :=
xi
n2
P [xi] +
∑
j =i
θ
xj
n2
P [xi]P [xj]
and
vi[x
′] =
xi − 1
n2
P [xi − 1] +
∑
j =i
θ
xj
n2
P [xi − 1]P [xj] + θ 1
n2
P [xi − 1]P [1]
Hence
n2(vi[x]− vi[x′]) = (xi + θR)P [xi]− (xi + θR− 1 + θP [1])P [xi − 1]
where R :=
∑
j =i xjP [xj]. Without loss of generality we let i = 1 and consider
module 1. Factorising gives:
n2(v1[x]− v1[x′]) = (γ − θ − γ2θR− γθR− γθx1 + 1)P [1]P [x1]P [x1 − 1]
So v1[x] ≥ v1[x′] if and only if (γ−θ−γ2θR−γθR−γθx1+1) ≥ 0. We are looking
for x1 where this condition holds for all possible speciﬁcations (xj)j>1 of the rest
of the partition and hence we want to consider the partition that maximises R.
29Yi (1997) deﬁnes this concept as deﬁnition 4.1 in section 4.1 However diﬀerent notation
and terminology is used: k0 is the maximum module size, C represents a partition (although
the terminology partition is not used), and π(k;C) considers a module of size k and represents
the utility per member of that module.
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This occurs when the other modules are all singletons and R = (n − x1)P [1].
This gives v1[x] ≥ v1[x′] if and only if γ − θ + γθ(−n) + 1 ≥ 0. This equates to
v1[x] ≥ v1[x′] if and only if θP[1] ≤ P [n]
The condition on d∗ is the same as the condition as whether the grand coalition
or the atomistic partition of singletons is eﬃcient. So if the grand coalition is
eﬃcient, then starting from any partition any module that merges with a sin-
gleton module weakly gains. Conversely, if the partition of singletons is eﬃcient
then for any other partition there is at least one module that would strictly gain
from a split where it lost one member.
Now we formulate the Equilibrium Binding Agreement (EBA) solutions. Con-
sider part 1 of Proposition (4.3) from Yi (1997):
Proposition 95. Under (N1) if partition x = (xi)ki=1 is such that (xi ≤ d∗)ki=1
then x is a stable coalition structure under the Equilibrium Binding Agreements
rule.
Corollary 96. If θP[1] ≤ P [n] then every partition x is a stable coalition
structure under the Equilibrium Binding Agreements rule.
Proof. By Theorem 94, if θP[1] ≤ P [n] then d∗ = n. Hence every partition
satisﬁes the (xi ≤ d∗)ki=1 condition of Proposition 95 and the result follows.
This multiplicity of EBAs is not a surprise: the EBA allows for splits of modules
but does not allow mergers between modules. So when the grand coalition is
eﬃcient and we start at a general partition x, then the only feasible change
is for a module to split, and that takes the system further from the eﬃcient
partition. In contrast, when the atomistic partition is eﬃcient, we can derive
the uniqueness of the atomistic EBA from ﬁrst principles:
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Proposition 97. If θP[1] > P [n] then only the atomistic partition {1, 1, 1...1}
is a stable coalition structure under the Equilibrium Binding Agreements rule.
Proof. The atomistic partition is stable as it allows no internal coalitional de-
viations.30 To show uniqueness, consider some other partition x, which must
have at least one non-singleton module. Through a choice of internal coalitional
deviations {1, 1, 1...1} is RV-reachable from x. And as {1, 1, 1...1} is the unique
Pareto eﬃcient partition it RV-dominates x. Hence, due to the internal stability
property of stable sets, x cannot be a stable coalition structure.
With the EBA modules can split, but not merge, resulting in a structural bias
towards the atomistic partition. So, in particular, for all payoﬀ functions by def-
inition the atomic partition is always an EBA. However, ﬁrstly the convention is
to pick the coarsest EBA as the solution. See both Bloch and Dutta (2010), “The
‘solution’ of the game is the set of coarsest EBAs.”, and Ray (2007), “Typically,
many coalition structures admit EBAs. Which of these should be considered as
the set of EBAs for the game? The answer to this question depends on what
we consider to be the ‘initial’ coalition structure under which negotiations com-
mence. In keeping with the spirit of our exercise, which is to understand the
outcomes of free and unconstrained negotiation, we take it that the initial struc-
ture is the grand coalition itself. Under this supposition, it is natural to focus on
the set of equilibrium binding agreements for the grand coalition, or, if this set
is empty, on the next level of reﬁnement for which the set of EBAs is nonempty.”
With this convention, for the standard model, under the generic case of a unique
eﬃcient partition, then the solution EBA is the eﬃcient partition. Secondly if we
had an approach, which was the reverse of the EBA, (where the initial partition
30Deﬁnition 86 deﬁnes EBAs in terms of stable sets. In an earlier equivalent formulation,
Ray and Vohra (1997), the atomistic partition is directly deﬁned to be stable.
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is the atomistic partition; whilst, mergers, but not splits, are allowed), then my
conjecture is that we would get the opposite result: a pro-Grand Coalition bias.
2.4 Social Planner Preferences
2.4.1 Intertemporal Model
The standard model assumed that the system was already at the limiting state
of the Markov process of shocks. This section shows that the results are robust
to considering a model with a uniform inter-temporal distribution of business
opportunities. It considers a model, where welfare is summed over all time
periods, rather than being evaluated just at the limiting state: this is the only
diﬀerence the intertemporal model has compared with the standard model.
Appendix I derives the form of vc1, the intertemporal expected utility function
for a member of module 1; shows it to be of the ratio quadratic form deﬁned
in appendix H; and hence proves that for all parametrisations, vc1 is either
quasi-convex, or quasi-concave (or monotonic and hence both quasi-convex and
quasi-concave). This leads to the following characterisation:
Table 2.53: Intertemporal Model Characterisation Table
condition on vc1 Stationary Points vc1 description x∗1
vc1[1]<vc1[2] vc1[n− 1]<vc1[n] none increasing n
vc1[1]<vc1[2] vc1[n− 1]=vc1[n] 1 local max in range [n− 1, n] quasi-concave n− 1 and n
vc1[1]<vc1[2] vc1[n− 1] > vc1[n] 1 local max quasi-concave interior31
vc1[1]=vc1[2] vc1[n− 1]<vc1[n] 1 local min in range [1, 2] quasi-convex n
vc1[1]=vc1[2] vc1[n− 1]=vc1[n] impossible
vc1[1]=vc1[2] vc1[n− 1]>vc1[n] 1 local max in range [1, 2] quasi-concave 1 and 2
vc1[1]>vc1[2] vc1[n− 1]<vc1[n] 1 local min in range [2, n− 1] quasi-convex 1 or n or both
vc1[1]>vc1[2] vc1[n− 1]=vc1[n] 1 local min in range [n− 1, n] quasi-convex 1
vc1[1]>vc1[2] vc1[n− 1]>vc1[n] none decreasing 1
31Either the ﬂoor or the ceiling of the stationary point
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Now, we evaluate vc1, bank 1’s utility, for a range of diﬀerent parametrisations,
(β, n, θ, q, ρ). There does not appear to be a simple closed form solution for the
vc1 maximisation program, so the behaviour needs to be investigated computa-
tionally; however, there are four reasons why this is not onerous. Firstly, here we
do have closed forms for the expected utility function vc1, and so we can directly
assess the value of each policy option without using a Monte Carlo approach;
conversely, in the propagation mechanism literature, there is no closed form for
the expected utility function, and so it needs to be sampled from the data gen-
erating process using a Monte Carlo approach. Secondly, table 2.53 shows that
x∗1 := argmax x1∈Nvc1[x1] is strictly interior, if and only if, both vc1[1]< vc1[2]
and vc1[n− 1]>vc1[n]: we do not need to evaluate vc1 for all possible partitions
in order to select parametrisations with interior solutions. Thirdly, there are
only n−2 interior cases to evaluate, so the computational search cost is linear in
parameters.32 Fourthly, when vc1 has an interior solution, that solution is also
the unique local maximum: so once a local maximum is found the search can be
terminated.33
For each parametrisation, the utility of the best trivial partition is given by
vB := Max{vc1[1], vc1[n]}; the utility of the best interior partition is given by
vcI := Max{vc1[x1]}n−1x1=2; and g, the percentage gain from choosing an interior
partition, is given by g := 100 ∗ (vI − vB)/vB. Without loss of generality, we
can consider one period to be a year, and we assume that the discount factor β
is 0.97, 0.98 or 0.99.34 The number of banks, n, is one of {10, 20, 30, 40, 50,
100, 1000}. The value of outside matches, θ, has a minimum of 0.1, a maximum
32Certain well known computer science problems, for example the traveling salesman prob-
lem, are believed to only have solutions that are exponential in parameters: making it imprac-
tical to ﬁnd their solutions for large examples.
33This is because in order for vc1 to have an interior maximum, it is necessary that it is
quasi-concave.
34This is without loss of generality as the argmax is homogenous of degree 0 with respect to
jointly Log[β], Log[1− q] and Log[1− ρ].
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of 0.9 and an increment of 0.1. The disabling shock probability, q, comes from
this list of values, {0.001, 0.002, 0.003, 0.004, 0.005, 0.006, 0.007, 0.008, 0.009, 0.01,
0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08, 0.09, 0.1}; and the enabling probability, ρ,
independently comes from this list, {0.001, 0.002, 0.003, 0.004, 0.005, 0.006, 0.007,
0.008, 0.009, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08, 0.09, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3}. The β
parameter is one of 3 values, the n parameter is one of 7 values, the θ parameter
is one of 9 values, the q parameter is one of 19 values, and the ρ parameter is
one of 21 values. This gives a total of 3∗7∗9∗19∗21 = 75411 parametrisations.
In nearly all these parametrisations (74601 out of 75411), vc1 has a boundary
solution and, in such cases, as argued earlier by symmetry, this solution also then
solves the welfare maximisation program. In contrast, only 810 (1.7%) of these
cases have interior solutions. Further, there is only ever a small gain to bank 1
from choosing an interior solution: the highest gain in the table is 3.6%.35 Due to
the existence of negative externalities, we know that at interior solutions, banks
not in module 1 lose out: they prefer {1, 1, . . . , 1, 1, 1, 1} to {x∗1, 1, 1, . . . , 1, 1},
and hence prefer argmaxx1∈{1,n} vc1[x1] to x
∗
1. So, when comparing interior and
boundary partitions, the bank 1 utility percentage gain, is an upper bound to
the welfare percentage gain, and it is possible that even when vc1 does have an
interior solution that Wc does not: the costs of the losers may dominate the
beneﬁts of the winners. In summary, with the intertemporal model, the welfare
program rarely has interior solutions, and when they do occur they only give
a small increase in welfare. Hence, the conclusion is that the standard model
rejection of interior partitions is robust to replacing asymptotic preferences with
intertemporal preferences.
The results can be further broken down in term of each of the ﬁve choice para-
meters. These show that interior solutions are most likely to occur for: low
35This occurs with (β = 0.97,n = 20, θ = 0.1, q = 0.02, ρ = 0.001)
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number of banks, n; low levels of θ, the value of outside matches; low levels of
ρ, the re-enablement probability; low levels of β, the discount factor; and for
intermediate values of q, the disabling shock probability.
Table 2.54: Intertemporal Model n Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by n
n (-100,0) [0,0.5) [0.5,1) [1,1.5) [1.5,2) [2,2.5) [2.5,3) [3,3.5) [3.5,4)
10 10463 160 62 35 26 20 7 0 0
20 10581 105 38 20 15 6 5 2 1
30 10655 69 22 13 7 3 3 1 0
40 10680 52 18 8 7 4 4 0 0
50 10704 41 14 5 6 2 1 0 0
100 10745 21 6 1 0 0 0 0 0
1000 10773 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All 74601 448 160 82 61 35 20 3 1
Table 2.55: Intertemporal Model θ Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by θ
θ (-100,0) [0,0.5) [0.5,1) [1,1.5) [1.5,2) [2,2.5) [2.5,3) [3,3.5) [3.5,4)
0.1 7994 161 84 48 44 25 19 3 1
0.2 8179 113 45 18 15 8 1 0 0
0.3 8272 73 17 13 2 2 0 0 0
0.4 8316 50 10 3 0 0 0 0 0
0.5 8347 28 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.6 8363 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.7 8374 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.8 8377 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.9 8379 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All 74601 448 160 82 61 35 20 3 1
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Table 2.56: Intertemporal Model q Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by q
q (-100,0) [0,0.5) [0.5,1) [1,1.5) [1.5,2) [2,2.5) [2.5,3) [3,3.5) [3.5,4)
0.001 3947 21 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.002 3931 33 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.003 3914 38 13 2 2 0 0 0 0
0.004 3919 30 12 7 0 1 0 0 0
0.005 3916 30 11 8 2 1 1 0 0
0.006 3915 30 12 5 6 0 1 0 0
0.007 3905 36 11 6 6 3 2 0 0
0.008 3899 35 14 8 5 7 0 1 0
0.009 3900 33 14 9 5 4 2 2 0
0.01 3899 34 13 8 9 2 4 0 0
0.02 3917 23 6 6 8 3 5 0 1
0.03 3927 23 9 3 4 3 0 0 0
0.04 3933 14 9 6 4 2 1 0 0
0.05 3936 12 8 3 3 5 2 0 0
0.06 3939 14 5 4 3 2 2 0 0
0.07 3945 14 4 3 1 2 0 0 0
0.08 3948 12 5 3 1 0 0 0 0
0.09 3953 10 4 1 1 0 0 0 0
0.1 3958 6 4 0 1 0 0 0 0
All 74601 448 160 82 61 35 20 3 1
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Table 2.57: Intertemporal Model ρ Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by ρ
ρ (-100,0) [0,0.5) [0.5,1) [1,1.5) [1.5,2) [2,2.5) [2.5,3) [3,3.5) [3.5,4)
0.001 3530 21 15 9 4 8 3 0 1
0.002 3531 24 10 7 8 3 6 2 0
0.003 3531 22 14 9 8 4 2 1 0
0.004 3525 33 14 6 4 6 3 0 0
0.005 3529 31 11 7 8 3 2 0 0
0.006 3534 25 16 7 6 2 1 0 0
0.007 3538 28 11 6 5 2 1 0 0
0.008 3539 26 11 10 1 3 1 0 0
0.009 3541 29 9 4 5 2 1 0 0
0.01 3540 27 10 6 7 1 0 0 0
0.02 3547 23 12 5 3 1 0 0 0
0.03 3557 25 6 2 1 0 0 0 0
0.04 3567 18 4 1 1 0 0 0 0
0.05 3568 19 3 1 0 0 0 0 0
0.06 3567 20 3 1 0 0 0 0 0
0.07 3569 18 3 1 0 0 0 0 0
0.08 3572 16 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.09 3570 18 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.1 3575 14 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.2 3582 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.3 3589 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All 74601 448 160 82 61 35 20 3 1
Table 2.58: Intertemporal Model β Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by β
β (-100,0) [0,0.5) [0.5,1) [1,1.5) [1.5,2) [2,2.5) [2.5,3) [3,3.5) [3.5,4)
0.97 24807 179 66 36 24 14 10 0 1
0.98 24862 155 52 28 18 15 6 1 0
0.99 24932 114 42 18 19 6 4 2 0
All 74601 448 160 82 61 35 20 3 1
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2.4.2 Risk Aversion
2.4.2.1 Risk Averse Social Planner
Suppose we now have a risk averse social planner, but we keep the same distri-
bution for b[x], the business returns as a function of the partition x, as in the
standard model:
b[θ] ∼
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 1− PI [x]− PO[x]
θ PO[x]
1 PI [x]
Here PI [x] and PO[x] are the probabilities of enabled inside and outside matches:
as in the standard model, they are given by PI [x] =
∑k
i=1(
xi
n
)2P [xi] and PO[x] =∑k
i=1
∑
j =i(
xi
n
)(
xj
n
)P [xi]P [xj]; note speciﬁcally, that these functions are inde-
pendent of θ. We model the social planner as penalising high variances in
business returns, and having a quadratic utility function, WRA[x] := E[b[θ]] −
λVar[b[θ]], where 1 > λ > 0 is a ﬁxed parameter.
Theorem 98. A necessary condition for this program to have an interior solu-
tion is that θ < P [n]
P [1]
< θ−λθ
2
1−λ
Proof. As Var[b] = E[b[θ]2] − E2[b[θ]], this means that WRA[x] = E[b[θ]] −
λE[b2[θ]]+λE2[b[θ]]. Further, b2[θ] has the same distribution as b[θ2], and hence
WRA[x] = E[b[θ]] − λE[b[θ2]] + λE2[b[θ]]. Simplifying using and letting W [x, θ]
be the welfare for the standard model with x as the partition and θ as the value
of outside matches, gives: WRA[x] = (1− λ)W [x, θ−λθ21−λ ] + λ(W [x, θ])2.36
As λ < 1, we have an average of standard programs each with positive weights.
We know that standard programs have boundary solutions. So if both the θ−λθ2
1−λ
36The key step is that E[b[θ]] =
∑k
i=1(
xi
n )
2P [xi] + θ
∑k
i=1
∑
j =i(
xi
n )(
xj
n )P [xi]P [xj ] and
E[b[θ2]] =
∑k
i=1(
xi
n )
2P [xi] + θ
2
∑k
i=1
∑
j =i(
xi
n )(
xj
n )P [xi]P [xj ]. So E[b[θ]] − λE[b[θ2]] =
(1− λ)∑ki=1(xin )2P [xi] + θ(1− θλ)∑ki=1∑j =i(xin )(xjn )P [xi]P [xj ]
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and θ standard model programs have the same boundary solution, then the risk
averse WRA[x] will also have that boundary solution. Conversely, in order for the
risk averse program to have an interior solution it is necessary for the 2 standard
programs to have diﬀerent boundary solutions. Recall that in the standard
model, the grand coalition is strictly preferred if and only if P [n] > θP [1].
Further as λ < 1, we have θ−λθ2
1−λ > θ. So in order for the risk averse program
to have an interior solution, it is necessary that the standard model θ program
has a grand coalition solution, and that the θ program has an atomistic solution.
This equates to the required condition, θ < P [n]
P [1]
< θ−λθ
2
1−λ .
The risk aversion model was assessed for a range of parameterisations. As the
welfare function is speciﬁed directly at the social planner level rather than at
the individual bank level, the welfare function is used rather than the per bank
utility function. The number of banks n, has a minimum of 3, a maximum of
100 and an increment of 1. The value of outside matches, θ, has a minimum
of 0, a maximum of 1 and an increment of 0.1. The shock parameter γ has
a minimum of 0, a maximum of 3 and an increment of 0.1. The risk aversion
parameter, λ, has a minimum of 0, a maximum of 1.0 and an increment of 0.1.
This gives a total of 98 ∗ 11 ∗ 31 ∗ 11 = 367598 diﬀerent parametrisations. Only
7925 of these cases satisfy the θ < P [n]
P [1]
< θ−λθ
2
1−λ condition. In each case the best
interior symmetric partition was compared to the best boundary partition. In
every case the best interior partition had lower welfare than the best boundary
partition. Hence, the conclusion is that the standard model rejection of interior
partitions is robust to changing the social planner from being risk neutral to
having quadratic risk aversion. Further, the absence of interior solutions leads
to the following conjecture:
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Conjecture 99. The risk averse social planner program has boundary solutions
for all parameter values.
The following projection tables are produced using the same parameter ranges
as above, except that n is restricted to the standard range, (10, 20, 30, 40, 50,
100, 1000). For each parametrisation, the welfare of the best trivial partition
is given by Wb := Max{WRA[1],WRA[n]}; the welfare of the best symmetric
interior partition is given by Wi := Max{WRA[n/k]}n−1k=2 ; and g, the percentage
gain from choosing an interior partition, is given by 100∗ (W i−W b)/W b. When
either λ = 0 or λ = 1 the social planner has preferences equal to those given
in the θ parametrisation of the standard model. However, with λ = 1 the
welfare function is the square of the standard model’s utility function, and so
the losses from an interior partition are larger. This motivates why in the λ
table, when λ is larger, the losses are larger. In the n table, as n increases the
loss from choosing an interior partition decreases. This is because for nearly
all parametrisations the best boundary partition is the atomistic partition, and
the nearest interior partition occurs with k = n − 1 modules; so as n increases
the nearest interior partition gets closer to the atom partition. In the γ table,
when γ = 0, the eﬃcient partition is the grand coalition and the closest interior
partition has 2 modules each with 0.5n members: this has outside matches half
the time and so there is a big drop in welfare. For small, but strictly positive
γ, the eﬃcient partition rapidly switches to become the atomistic partition, and
the n−1 module interior partition can get close to it, resulting in smaller losses.
However, as γ increases, the cost of larger modules increases, and so the loss
from interior partitions increases.
210
Table 2.59: Risk Aversion Model λ Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by λ
λ [-75,-50) [-20,-10) [-10,-5) [-5,-4) [-4,-3) [-3,-2) [-2,-1) [-1,0]
0.0 49 54 308 162 289 430 511 584
0.1 58 56 327 146 291 435 506 568
0.2 58 66 329 158 286 444 492 554
0.3 58 70 340 168 291 442 477 541
0.4 58 84 350 176 276 464 449 530
0.5 58 105 356 177 287 452 433 519
0.6 58 132 343 191 312 429 414 508
0.7 61 166 331 221 326 384 401 497
0.8 61 199 367 218 324 337 397 484
0.9 63 230 407 215 326 285 387 474
1.0 67 289 462 199 321 269 338 442
All 649 1451 3920 2031 3329 4371 4805 5701
Table 2.60: Risk Aversion Model n Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by n
n [-75,-50) [-20,-10) [-10,-5) [-5,-4) [-4,-3) [-3,-2) [-2,-1) [-1,0]
10 149 1168 1725 250 251 142 53 13
20 103 92 1780 630 454 362 268 62
30 87 56 272 990 1086 645 477 138
40 80 48 62 128 1253 1245 673 262
50 78 40 47 22 273 1934 963 394
100 76 25 23 10 12 43 2367 1195
103 76 22 11 1 0 0 4 3637
All 649 1451 3920 2031 3329 4371 4805 5701
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Table 2.61: Risk Aversion Model θ Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by θ
θ [-75,-50) [-20,-10) [-10,-5) [-5,-4) [-4,-3) [-3,-2) [-2,-1) [-1,0]
0.0 150 149 283 135 204 260 500 706
0.1 110 83 158 105 187 450 710 584
0.2 88 62 209 158 339 535 463 533
0.3 77 69 305 207 311 482 418 518
0.4 77 77 358 195 320 447 412 501
0.5 77 82 406 180 334 418 401 489
0.6 70 109 423 185 334 397 390 479
0.7 0 201 426 201 328 376 389 466
0.8 0 215 434 216 327 350 388 457
0.9 0 175 495 227 334 332 376 448
1.0 0 229 423 222 311 324 358 520
All 649 1451 3920 2031 3329 4371 4805 5701
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Table 2.62: Risk Aversion Model γ Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by γ
γ [-75,-50) [-20,-10) [-10,-5) [-5,-4) [-4,-3) [-3,-2) [-2,-1) [-1,0]
0.0 532 154 77 7 0 0 0 77
0.1 71 65 17 1 5 27 91 570
0.2 27 52 30 25 34 55 201 423
0.3 11 37 69 31 47 95 248 309
0.4 4 31 93 38 56 127 247 251
0.5 2 23 108 43 81 136 222 232
0.6 1 23 115 49 94 147 197 221
0.7 1 23 118 61 91 173 172 208
0.8 0 28 119 64 98 187 155 196
0.9 0 27 131 66 103 190 150 180
1.0 0 30 131 68 114 184 152 168
1.1 0 32 136 72 107 199 150 151
1.2 0 34 140 66 118 198 148 143
1.3 0 38 143 64 120 190 153 139
1.4 0 41 145 64 124 186 151 136
1.5 0 44 146 66 125 182 148 136
1.6 0 45 149 66 127 177 148 135
1.7 0 48 148 68 124 170 155 134
1.8 0 49 150 70 129 159 156 134
1.9 0 49 145 78 134 152 156 133
2.0 0 51 143 85 132 147 148 141
2.1 0 51 145 90 128 144 146 143
2.2 0 52 146 89 131 141 145 143
2.3 0 53 145 92 130 138 146 143
2.4 0 53 144 88 136 137 146 143
2.5 0 53 145 89 136 128 146 150
2.6 0 53 146 87 138 125 146 152
2.7 0 53 148 86 140 122 145 153
2.8 0 53 149 87 139 121 145 153
2.9 0 53 149 86 143 118 146 152
3.0 0 53 150 85 145 116 146 152
All 649 1451 3920 2031 3329 4371 4805 5701
2.4.2.2 General Equilibrium Approach
This section shows that a general equilibrium model, under the assumption of
complete markets, reduces to a standard model, and thus has boundary solu-
tions. The setup is as follows: ﬁrstly, suppose there are n banks, each with T
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businesses and that each business has a risk averse utility function u[.]. Secondly,
compared with the risk neutral model we need 2 parameters, not 1, to model
outside matches: let p be the probability that a match can be made between
matched businesses in 2 diﬀerent modules and let v be the value of a success-
fully completed outside match. This leads to the following welfare function for
symmetric matches: WGE[d] = dnP [d]nT ∗ u[ 1nT ] + (n−d)n P 2[d]pnT ∗ u[ vnT ].
This can be derived as follows: as the businesses are risk averse and there are
complete markets the result will be complete consumption smoothing. So when
there is a successful inside match each of the nT businesses gets 1
nT
units of
consumption, whilst when there is a successful outside match each business gets
v
nT
. Dividing by nT and without loss of generality setting u[ 1
nT
] = 1, gives:
WGE [d]
nT
= d
n
P [d] + (n−d)
n
P 2[d]pu[ v
nT
]. So this program is the same as the standard
model with θ = pu[ v
nT
], and hence has boundary solutions.37
2.4.2.3 Within Module Consumption Smoothing
Suppose that businesses are risk averse and can smooth consumption with other
businesses in the same module, but not with businesses in other modules. As in
the standard model, n is the number of banks, and γ is the shock parameter. And
as in the general equilibrium case in section 2.4.2.2 above, p is the probability
that two businesses in distinct enabled modules can match, v is the value of that
match once made and u[.] is the utility function, where we assume u[0] = 0.
Considering symmetric partitions: in the case of an inside match, the return of 1
is shared equally amongst d businesses and so each has utility u[ 1
d
]; in the case of
an outside match, the return of v is shared equally amongst the 2d businesses in
the 2 modules and so each has utility u[ v
2d
]. This leads to the following welfare
37p is a probability so 0 < p < 1 and v is the value of an outside match so 0 < v < 1. We
have normalised u(0) = 0 and u( 1nT ) = 1, so 0 < u(
v
nT ) < 1. Hence 0 < pu(
v
nT ) < 1. So this
is a valid value for θ.
214
function:
Wcs[d]:=(d/n)P [d]d ∗ u[1/d] + p((n− d)/n)P [d]2 ∗ 2d ∗ u[v/2d]
Risk averse preferences are represented by a utility function of form u[c] = cω,
with 0 < ω < 1, so there is constant relative risk aversion with a coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion of 1− ω.38
This model satisﬁes negative externalities, and so we consider v1,CS[x1], the util-
ity that bank 1 gets when it is in a module of size x1 and all other modules are
singletons.39 The utility function is as follows:
v1,cs[x1]:=(x1/n)2P [x1](1/x1)ω + p(x1/n)((n− x1)/n)2P [x1]P [1](0.5v/x1)ω
The ﬁrst term represents inside matches: there is an inside match involving
module one with probability (x1/n)2, and then each of the module 1 businesses
gets a utility of (1/x1)ω. The second term represents outside matches: this
requires ones of the selected modules to be module 1, a x1/n probability event,
and one module is not module 1, a (n−x1)/n probability event. The 2 is present
because module 1 could be either the ﬁrst or the second module selected. If the
match is completed, then the value v is shared equally between the 2 modules,
and then each of the module 1 businesses gets a utility of (0.5v/x1)ω.
By considering ∂v1,cs[x1]
∂x1
, we can use our usual technique to see if v1,cs[x1] is quasi-
38If the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is greater than or equal to 1 then we can no longer
have u[0] = 0, indeed we require u[0] = −∞. This causes diﬃculties as even in good states
of the world when the match is successfully completed, businesses in other modules get no
return.
39Similarly we know that the model has negative externalities: if an outside module has
more than one member then it is less likely to be enabled and bank 1 is worse oﬀ.
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convex. Re-arrangement gives:
∂v1,cs[x1]
∂x1
=
dv1,cs[x1]P [1]P [x1]
2
n2(xω1 )
where
dv1,cs[x1] := ax
2
1 + bx1 + c
a := (1− ω)γ (γ + 1− 2pυ)
b := (−γω + 2γ − 2γnpυω + 2pυω − 4pυ − ω + 2)
c := 2npυ(1− ω)
υ := (0.5v)ω
Theorem 100. If a = 0 then v1,cs[x1] either has boundary solutions or an
interior solution at x1 =
−b−
√
(b2−4ac)
2a
.
Proof. As ∂v1,cs[x1]
∂x1
= 0 if and only if dv1,cs[x1] = 0, the roots of dv1,cs[x1] equate
to the ﬁrst order points of v1,cs[x1]. So if the quadratic function dv1,cs[x1] does not
have any roots in the range [1, n] then v1,cs[x1] is monotonic and has boundary
solutions. The function dv1,cs[x1] has an x21 term whose coeﬃcient can either
be positive or negative. If a > 0 then x1− :=
−b−
√
(b2−4ac)
2a
is a local maximum
and x1+ :=
−b+
√
(b2−4ac)
2a
is a local minimum: as x1 < x1− ⇒ dv1,cs[x1] > 0,
x1− < x1 < x1+ ⇒ dv1,cs[x1] < 0 and x1 > x1+ ⇒ dv1,cs[x1] > 0. So comparing
dv1,cs[x1−] with dv1,cs[1] and dv1,cs[n] shows if the v1,cs program has an interior
solution or not.40 If a < 0 then x1− :=
−b−
√
(b2−4ac)
2a
is a local maximum and
x1+ :=
−b+
√
(b2−4ac)
2a
is a local minimum: note that as a < 0 that x1+ < x1−, so
x1 < x1+ ⇒ dv1,cs[x1] < 0, x1+ < x1 < x1− ⇒ dv1,cs[x1] > 0 and x1 > x1− ⇒
40If x1− is complex or outside the range [1, n] then we already know that there is no interior
solution.
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dv1,cs[x1] < 0. Again comparing dv1,cs[x1−] with dv1,cs[1] and dv1,cs[n] shows if
the v1,cs program has an interior solution or not.
Theorem 101. If a = 0 then v1,cs[x1] either has boundary solutions or an
interior solution where ω = P [x1].
Proof. If a = 0 then (γ + 1− 2pυ) = 0, so b = −γn(1 + γ)ω < 0, and c = n(1 +
γ)(1 − ω) > 0. Hence dv1,cs[x1] < 0 if and only if bx1 + c < 0 if and only if
−γωx1 + (1 − ω) < 0. Once this condition holds, it stays true for larger x1, so
v1,cs[x1] is quasi-concave (which is expected given the signs of b and c). Hence
v1,cs[x1] has a maximum when x1 = (1−ω)γω , or equivalently when ω = P [x1]. So
an interior solution requires 1 < (1−ω)
γω
< n.
We now consider the within module smoothing model for a range of diﬀerent
parametrisations. The number of banks n, is either 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100 or
1000. The shock parameter γ has a minimum of 0.1, a maximum of 3 and an
increment of 0.1. The outside match completion probability, p, has a minimum
of 0, a maximum of 1.0 and an increment of 0.1. The outside match completion
value, v, has a minimum of 0, a maximum of 1.0 and an increment of 0.1. The
risk aversion parameter, ω, has a minimum of 0.1, a maximum of 1.0 and an
increment of 0.1. This gives a total of 7 ∗ 30 ∗ 11 ∗ 11 ∗ 10 = 254100 diﬀerent
parametrisations.
As noted in Theorem 100 above, we only need to check one value of x1 for a
potential interior global maximum of the v1,cs program. If the v1,cs program has
an interior solution, then the Wcs[d] program is checked at each of its interior
partitions. In each of these cases the percentage gain from the best interior sym-
metric partition over the best boundary partition was computed: the welfare of
the best trivial partition is given by Wb := Max{Wcs[1],Wcs[n]}; the welfare of
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the best symmetric interior partition is given by Wi := Max{Wcs[n/k]}n−1k=2 ;
and g, the percentage gain from choosing an interior partition, is given by
100∗(W i−W b)/W b. In total 20445 cases were found where the v1,cs program has
an interior solution; this total reduced to 2341 (0.92%) cases where the W1,cs[d]
program has an interior solution. This rareness of interior solutions leads to
the conclusion that the standard model rejection of interior partitions is robust
to changing businesses from being risk neutral, to having constant relative risk
aversion and being able to consumption smooth within their own module.
These cases are represented below in ﬁve tables that show how the gain varies
with the value of each of the ﬁve parameters. In the ω table, there are no gains
from interior partitions with either ω = 0.1 or with ω = 0.9. The explanation
is that the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is 1 − ω; so with ω = 0.9, the
level of risk aversion is low and we are close to the risk neutral model (ω = 1.0)
with its boundary solutions; whilst with ω = 0.1, there is a high level of risk
aversion which makes the businesses highly value something over nothing, and
creates a preference for the grand coalition, as then the business is certain to be
part of the module that receives the business opportunity.41 In the γ table, with
the shock parameter γ in the range 0.7 to 3.0 no examples of interior welfare
solutions are found. This can be explained as being due to the low enablement
probability of of non-singleton modules when the shock parameter is high. The
other tables show that conversely increases in the number of banks n, the outside
match completion probability,p, and the outside match completion value v, each
lead to more interior solutions:
41With ω = 0.1 the grand coalition is always preferred to the partition of singletons.
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Table 2.63: Consumption Smoothing Model ω Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by ω
ω (-100,0) [0,5) [5,10) [10,15) [15,20) [20,25) [25,30) [30,35) [35,40) [40,70)
0.1 25410 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.2 25272 79 31 9 15 1 2 1 0 0
0.3 25075 199 68 7 4 39 2 2 3 11
0.4 24939 319 16 87 3 4 0 2 4 36
0.5 24918 353 52 6 5 68 8 0 0 0
0.6 25017 253 8 132 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.7 25163 221 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.8 25145 265 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.9 25410 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.0 25410 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All 251759 1689 201 241 27 112 12 5 7 47
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Table 2.64: Consumption Smoothing Model γ Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by γ
γ (-100,0) [0,5) [5,10) [10,15) [15,20) [20,25) [25,30) [30,35) [35,40) [40,70)
0.1 7631 487 51 147 10 76 10 4 7 47
0.2 7851 420 65 90 5 36 2 1 0 0
0.3 8026 366 62 4 12 0 0 0 0 0
0.4 8194 253 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.5 8341 129 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.6 8436 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.7 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.8 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.9 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.0 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.1 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.2 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.3 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.4 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.5 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.6 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.7 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.8 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.9 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.1 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.2 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.3 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.4 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.5 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.6 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.7 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.8 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.9 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.0 8470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
All 251759 1689 201 241 27 112 12 5 7 47
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Table 2.65: Consumption Smoothing Model n Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by n
n (-100,0) [0,5) [5,10) [10,15) [15,20) [20,25) [25,30) [30,35) [35,40) [40,70)
10 36287 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 36233 64 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
30 36170 113 13 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
40 36111 161 17 11 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 36057 199 25 17 1 1 0 0 0 0
100 35854 335 48 49 2 10 2 0 0 0
1000 35047 804 95 160 24 101 10 5 7 47
All 251759 1689 201 241 27 112 12 5 7 47
Table 2.66: Consumption Smoothing Model p Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by p
p (-100,0) [0,5) [5,10) [10,15) [15,20) [20,25) [25,30) [30,35) [35,40) [40,70)
0 23100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.1 23086 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.2 23057 38 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.3 23022 63 2 9 1 1 2 0 0 0
0.4 22980 94 3 16 1 5 1 0 0 0
0.5 22931 127 12 17 1 8 1 1 1 1
0.6 22881 156 20 23 2 11 1 1 1 4
0.7 22810 207 30 26 2 17 1 0 1 6
0.8 22725 266 39 34 3 20 2 1 1 9
0.9 22629 333 44 48 7 22 2 1 2 12
1.0 22538 391 51 63 10 28 2 1 1 15
All 251759 1689 201 241 27 112 12 5 7 47
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Table 2.67: Consumption Smoothing Model v Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by v
v (-100,0) [0,5) [5,10) [10,15) [15,20) [20,25) [25,30) [30,35) [35,40) [40,70)
0 23100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.1 23029 56 2 10 1 1 1 0 0 0
0.2 22994 76 7 13 0 7 1 0 1 1
0.3 22953 105 12 16 0 10 1 0 0 3
0.4 22917 132 16 16 4 10 0 0 2 3
0.5 22878 163 17 22 2 10 1 2 0 5
0.6 22843 185 23 25 4 13 0 0 2 5
0.7 22809 207 30 27 4 15 1 0 0 7
0.8 22773 238 27 33 4 13 3 2 0 7
0.9 22742 258 33 35 5 16 2 0 2 7
1.0 22721 269 34 44 3 17 2 1 0 9
All 251759 1689 201 241 27 112 12 5 7 47
We have only been able to consider cases where the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion is less than 1. So for robustness reasons the constant absolute risk
aversion case is now considered. With absolute risk aversion u[c] = 1−exp (−αc).
Note that the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion is −u′′[c]
u′[c] = −−α
2exp[−αc]
−αexp[−αc] = −α,
and so the requirement for agents to be risk averse is that α > 0. Outside
matches are modelled using 2 parameters p and v: p is the probability that an
outside match is successfully completed and v is the gross value of the outside
match. With an inside match the value of 1 is spread equally amongst the xi
members; whilst with an outside match the value of 0.5v is shared amongst the
members of each the matched modules xi and xj. This leads to the following
welfare function:
Wcara[x] =
k∑
i=1
x2i
n2
(1−e− αxi )P [xi]+
k∑
i=1
xi
n
∑
j =i
p
xj
n
(
xi(1− e−
αv
2xi ) + xj(1− e−
αv
2xj )
)
P [xi]P [xj]
and for symmetric cases this becomes
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Wcara[d] =
d
n
d
(
1− exp
(
−α
d
))
P [d] + p
(n− d)
n
(2d)
(
1− exp
(
−αv
2d
))
P 2[d]
We consider the absolute risk aversion within module smoothing model for a
range of diﬀerent parametrisations. The number of banks n, is either 10, 20, 30,
40, 50, 100 or 1000. The shock parameter γ has a minimum of 0.1, a maximum
of 3 and an increment of 0.1. The outside match completion probability, p, has a
minimum of 0.1, a maximum of 0.9 and an increment of 0.1. The outside match
completion value, v, has a minimum of 0.1, a maximum of 0.9 and an increment
of 0.1. The risk aversion parameter, α, has a minimum of 0.1, a maximum of
2.0 and an increment of 0.1. This gives a total of 7 ∗ 40 ∗ 9 ∗ 9 ∗ 20 = 453600
diﬀerent parametrisations.
In each of these cases the percentage gain from the best interior symmetric
partition over the best boundary partition was computed: the welfare of the
best trivial partition is given by Wb := Max{Wcara[1],Wcara[n]}; the welfare of
the best symmetric interior partition is given by Wi := Max{Wcara[n/k]}n−1k=2 ; and
g, the percentage gain from choosing an interior partition, is given by 100∗(W i−
W b)/W b. In total 21776(4.8%) cases were found where the Wcara[d] program has
an interior solution, and the highest percentage gain from an internal solution
was 31%. This rareness of interior solutions leads to the conclusion that the
standard model rejection of interior partitions is robust to changing businesses
from being risk neutral, to having constant absolute risk aversion and being able
to consumption smooth within their own module.
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Table 2.68: Consumption Smoothing Model n Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by n
(-60,-50) [-50,-40) [-40,-30) [-30,-20) [-20,-10) [-10,0) [0,10) [10,20) [20,30) [30,40)
10 212 3585 7044 5859 15573 32383 144 0 0 0
20 65 1683 4127 6707 5927 45341 938 12 0 0
30 33 1252 2669 5843 5680 47535 1737 51 0 0
40 20 1022 2006 4307 6405 48523 2407 110 0 0
50 10 869 1703 3358 6616 49129 2959 152 4 0
100 0 840 815 1578 4476 52138 4591 334 28 0
1000 0 840 440 220 100 54891 7552 653 103 1
All 340 10091 18804 27872 44777 329940 20328 1312 135 1
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Table 2.69: Consumption Smoothing Model γ Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by γ
γ (-60,-50) [-50,-40) [-40,-30) [-30,-20) [-20,-10) [-10,0) [0,10) [10,20) [20,30) [30,40)
0.00 306 5776 2963 1507 717 71 0 0 0 0
0.01 34 1987 3676 2426 1135 757 924 302 98 1
0.02 0 945 3116 2986 1638 811 1476 333 35 0
0.03 0 561 2138 3131 2364 1015 1821 308 2 0
0.04 0 398 1550 3243 2551 1290 2105 203 0 0
0.05 0 247 1250 3018 2828 1621 2261 115 0 0
0.06 0 120 1093 2557 3139 2028 2363 40 0 0
0.07 0 45 901 2228 3271 2526 2359 10 0 0
0.08 0 12 771 1949 3184 3133 2290 1 0 0
0.09 0 0 701 1720 3237 3508 2174 0 0 0
0.1 0 0 625 1491 3357 3841 2026 0 0 0
0.2 0 0 20 867 2414 7539 500 0 0 0
0.3 0 0 0 500 1701 9110 29 0 0 0
0.4 0 0 0 199 1436 9705 0 0 0 0
0.5 0 0 0 49 1254 10037 0 0 0 0
0.6 0 0 0 1 1076 10263 0 0 0 0
0.7 0 0 0 0 923 10417 0 0 0 0
0.8 0 0 0 0 803 10537 0 0 0 0
0.9 0 0 0 0 714 10626 0 0 0 0
1.0 0 0 0 0 641 10699 0 0 0 0
1.1 0 0 0 0 581 10759 0 0 0 0
1.2 0 0 0 0 533 10807 0 0 0 0
1.3 0 0 0 0 490 10850 0 0 0 0
1.4 0 0 0 0 454 10886 0 0 0 0
1.5 0 0 0 0 423 10917 0 0 0 0
1.6 0 0 0 0 391 10949 0 0 0 0
1.7 0 0 0 0 363 10977 0 0 0 0
1.8 0 0 0 0 345 10995 0 0 0 0
1.9 0 0 0 0 317 11023 0 0 0 0
2.0 0 0 0 0 299 11041 0 0 0 0
2.1 0 0 0 0 284 11056 0 0 0 0
2.2 0 0 0 0 264 11076 0 0 0 0
2.3 0 0 0 0 249 11091 0 0 0 0
2.4 0 0 0 0 235 11105 0 0 0 0
2.5 0 0 0 0 222 11118 0 0 0 0
2.6 0 0 0 0 210 11130 0 0 0 0
2.7 0 0 0 0 199 11141 0 0 0 0
2.8 0 0 0 0 188 11152 0 0 0 0
2.9 0 0 0 0 178 11162 0 0 0 0
3.0 0 0 0 0 169 11171 0 0 0 0
All 340 10091 18804 27872 44777 329940 20328 1312 135 1
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Table 2.70: Consumption Smoothing Model p Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by p
p (-60,-50) [-50,-40) [-40,-30) [-30,-20) [-20,-10) [-10,0) [0,10) [10,20) [20,30) [30,40)
0.1 195 2534 3020 3690 6034 34137 731 54 5 0
0.2 72 2103 2875 3661 6098 34491 1007 77 15 1
0.3 34 1472 2814 3593 5951 35097 1334 91 14 0
0.4 18 1105 2510 3453 5476 35941 1777 107 13 0
0.5 9 859 2089 3327 4920 36795 2256 132 13 0
0.6 7 655 1703 3105 4554 37490 2718 154 14 0
0.7 4 529 1433 2745 4239 38106 3133 195 16 0
0.8 1 435 1306 2264 3968 38662 3509 236 19 0
0.9 0 399 1054 2034 3537 39221 3863 266 26 0
All 340 10091 18804 27872 44777 329940 20328 1312 135 1
Table 2.71: Consumption Smoothing Model v Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by v
v (-60,-50) [-50,-40) [-40,-30) [-30,-20) [-20,-10) [-10,0) [0,10) [10,20) [20,30) [30,40)
0.1 189 2525 3030 3684 6038 34886 48 0 0 0
0.2 72 2087 2877 3662 6054 35281 367 0 0 0
0.3 35 1456 2802 3600 5739 35946 822 0 0 0
0.4 19 1103 2489 3455 5211 36603 1516 4 0 0
0.5 10 861 2082 3311 4814 37030 2259 33 0 0
0.6 7 664 1701 3094 4580 37311 2945 98 0 0
0.7 5 538 1443 2732 4379 37504 3577 211 11 0
0.8 3 446 1311 2281 4161 37624 4162 376 36 0
0.9 0 411 1069 2053 3801 37755 4632 590 88 1
All 340 10091 18804 27872 44777 329940 20328 1312 135 1
226
Table 2.72: Consumption Smoothing Model α Table
Overall gain percentage distribution broken down by α
α (-60,-50) [-50,-40) [-40,-30) [-30,-20) [-20,-10) [-10,0) [0,10) [10,20) [20,30) [30,40)
0.1 0 427 895 1312 1681 18327 38 0 0 0
0.2 0 441 898 1315 1712 18171 143 0 0 0
0.3 1 445 901 1329 1746 17987 271 0 0 0
0.4 1 456 908 1341 1771 17772 431 0 0 0
0.5 4 461 915 1345 1809 17551 595 0 0 0
0.6 4 473 921 1359 1835 17318 770 0 0 0
0.7 7 480 921 1369 1878 17085 940 0 0 0
0.8 7 481 931 1380 1921 16857 1103 0 0 0
0.9 13 489 935 1381 1981 16671 1205 5 0 0
1.0 13 501 939 1383 2038 16506 1285 15 0 0
1.1 15 516 942 1388 2106 16356 1328 29 0 0
1.2 17 519 950 1401 2177 16211 1356 49 0 0
1.3 21 526 952 1416 2268 16055 1379 63 0 0
1.4 25 531 959 1420 2393 15894 1370 88 0 0
1.5 27 535 960 1435 2531 15712 1368 107 5 0
1.6 28 541 970 1439 2715 15471 1372 133 11 0
1.7 33 557 971 1448 2881 15243 1368 164 15 0
1.8 37 565 972 1462 3022 15055 1352 191 24 0
1.9 42 569 980 1467 3124 14908 1331 223 36 0
2.0 45 578 984 1482 3188 14790 1323 245 44 1
All 340 10091 18804 27872 44777 329940 20328 1312 135 1
2.5 Interpretation
The eﬃciency table 2.73 below assesses the role for interior partitions, and each
row represents a diﬀerent model. Models are split depending on which aspect
they diﬀer from the standard model: the business sector, the ﬁnancial sector
or the social planner. Business models are further broken down into 4 sections:
circular business networks, hypercube business networks, networks with small
numbers of banks, and robust networks. Within each section, models are in order
of decreasing criticality: earlier models diﬀer most from the standard model in
having a large role for interior partitions; later models have less role for interior
partitions.
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Criticality is assessed using the percentage gain distribution, which measures the
role for interior partitions, and there are three diﬀerent types of percentage gain
calculation represented in the table. In the ﬁrst type, the W [x] programme, the
gain is calculated by assessing the social welfare over all partitions. In the second
type, the W [d] programme, the gain is calculated by assessing the social welfare
over all symmetric partitions. As the W [d] programme has a smaller feasible set
the W [d] gain is weakly less than the W [x] gain, but is deﬁnitely a valid measure
when it shows criticality. In the third type, the v1[x1] programme, the gain is
calculated by assessing the utility of bank 1, assessed over partitions of format
{x1, 1, 1, 1, 1}, where outside modules are all singletons. Due to the presence of
negative externalities, bank 1 is weakly better oﬀ than banks not in module 1.
So the v1[x1] programme gain is weakly higher than the W [d] programme gain,
but is deﬁnitely a valid measure when it shows robustness.
For each model, the accumulative distribution of gains is assessed: ﬁrstly, the
(−100, 0] column gives the proportion of cases where the optimal partition is
not an interior partition; secondly, the (−100, 10] column gives the proportion of
cases where either the optimal partition is not an interior partition, or the gain
from the interior solution is less than or equal to 10%; and thirdly, the (−100,
100] column gives the proportion of cases where either the optimal partition is
not an interior partition, or the gain from the interior solution is less than or
equal to 100%. The ﬁnal column of the table indicates which type of programme
(W [x], W [d] or v1[x1]), the gain was assessed using.
In the original circle model, the size of a singleton module is the same as the
match length, and there are many interior solutions (99%). The diﬃculties with
the two boundary partitions are as follows: the atomistic partition has zero
probability of an inside match; whilst the grand coalition has all encompassing
connections, many of which have no business value as there are no distant busi-
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ness matches, but they do have a ﬁnancial cost as banks are exposed to contagion.
The variable minimum module size model shows that the original model has a
minimum module size which results in the largest role for interior partitions. Any
change in the size of singleton modules results in the welfare of the atomistic
partition strictly increasing: when singleton modules are smaller, then the prob-
ability of an inside match is still zero, but exposure to ﬁnancial shocks is reduced;
when singleton modules are bigger, then the atomistic partition moves towards
the optimal partition of the original program. With the variable match length
model, some of the matches will be of length less than 1 and so will be inside a
singleton module, this increases the welfare of the atomistic partition, causes the
welfare function to be quasi-convex (rather than quasi-concave) for small module
sizes, and makes it harder for interior partitions to deliver improvements.
Four diﬀerent hypercube models are considered: ﬁrstly, there are either 4 banks
arranged in a 2-dimensional square, or 8 banks arranged in a 3-dimensional
cube; secondly, the matching is either uniform (the match is equally likely to be
in each dimension), or non-uniform (the match is more likely to be in certain di-
mensions). The result is that there are more gains from interior partitions, either
when the hypercube is of higher dimension, or when matching is non-uniform:
with more dimensions, there are more interior partitions to compare against;
with non-uniform matching, the interior partition can contain the dimensions
where the business match is likely to be made inside the module, and have the
dimensions less likely to to oﬀer business matches outside the module.
With a small number of banks, and non-uniform matching, it is often the case
that an interior partition is best. Conversely, the robust business networks sec-
tion shows ﬁve variations to the standard model which result in models where
the total rejection of interior partitions remains. For four of the models, the
rejection is proven: Increased Probability of Self Matching, Multiple Businesses
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per Bank, and the Star Business Network and Temporal distribution of business
opportunities. For the ﬁfth, Trilateral Business Matches, the result holds for all
the sampled cases, but is not yet proven.
Concerning the ﬁnancial sector, letting larger modules have an increased prob-
ability of an initial banking shock, does not result in signiﬁcant gains for interior
partitions, this is because: ﬁrstly, the welfare of the atomistic partition is un-
altered; secondly, the welfare of all other partitions is reduced; and thirdly the
atomistic partition is preferred to the grand coalition, for nearly all paramet-
risations of the standard model. Considering the social planner, the variant
models show robustness to the rejection result, both when intertemporal utility
is considered and when risk aversion is included.
A signiﬁcant correlation is between model symmetry and the existence of interior
solutions. Here symmetry can be interpreted as occurring when the uncondi-
tional and conditional distributions of the second business in a match are the
same: P (m2|m1) = P (m2) for all choices of m1 and m2 the ﬁrst and second
members of the match. This is consistent with Appendix L which proves that
if the Welfare function is both symmetric and quasi super-modular then the
solutions will be on the boundary.42
42Appendix L uses a diﬀerent deﬁnition of symmetry but the only model that changes status
is 2.2.2.3 the Star Business Network.
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Table 2.73: Banking Models Eﬃciency Table
Interior Partition Gain Case Proportion: none; up to small; up to large.
Model Interior Partition
Percentage Gain Distribution
(−100, 0] (−100, 10] (−100, 100] type
Section Description Symmetric none none,small none,large
1.5 Standard Model Y 100% 100% 100% W [x]
Business
Circular Business Networks
2.2.1.1 Original Circular Model N 1% 57% W [d]
2.2.1.2 Variable Minimum Module Size N 43% 84% W [d]
2.2.1.3 Variable Match Lengths N 91% 96% W [d]
Hypercube Business Networks
2.2.3.2 3D Non-Uniform Matching N 5% 46% W [d]
2.2.3.1 2D Non-Uniform Matching N 10% 21% 100% W [d]
2.2.3.2 3D Uniform Matching N 22% 71% W [d]
2.2.3.1 2D Uniform Matching N 65% 100% 100% W [d]
Small number of banks
2.2.3.4 3 node case N 31% 54% 100% W [x]
2.2.3.5 2 rich 2 poor N 33% 100% W [x]
Robust Business Networks
2.2.2.4 Trilateral Business Matches Y 100% 100% W [d]
2.2.2.1 Increased Self Matching Y 100% 100% W [x]
2.2.2.2 Multiple Businesses per Bank Y 100% 100% W [x]
2.2.2.3 Star Business Network Y 100% 100% W [x]
2.2.2.5 Temporal Business Opportunities Y 100% 100% W [x]
Financial
2.3.1 Variable Shock Initialisation Y 99.6% 99.99% 100% v1[x]
Social Planner
2.4.1 Intertemporal Model Y 99% 100% 100% v1[x]
2.4.2.3 Consumption Smoothing Y 99.1% 99.8% 100% W [d]
2.4.2.1 Risk Aversion Y 100% W [d]
2.4.2.2 General Equilibrium Y 100% W [x]
The below stability table considers the stability of each of the boundary parti-
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tions under each of the diﬀerent partition formation concepts. The ﬁrst model,
EBA (Equilibrium Binding Agreement), does not allow modules to merge and
hence the atomistic partition is always stable.43 In contrast, with the EEBA (Ex-
tended Equilibrium Binding Agreement), or the Unanimity Game, each bound-
ary partition is stable only for parametrisations of the standard model where
it is eﬃcient. This is because ﬁrstly, generically the standard model only has
one Pareto optimal partition, and secondly, there is enough freedom either in
terms of coalition deviations (EEBA), or bargaining (the Unanimity Game), to
reach that eﬃcient partition. So with each of these three concepts, the solution
is eﬃcient.
With the other three concepts, the solutions include ineﬃcient partitions. With
Bilateral Stability, the grand coalition is too stable: an initial deviation from
the grand coalition would give the alternative partition {0.5n, 0.5n}, and it may
be the case that the grand coalition is ineﬃcient, W [{n}] < W [{1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}]
but still beats the alternative, W [{n}] > W [{0.5, 0.5n}]. Whilst with Open
Membership the solution is the Nash Equilibrium of a simultaneous move game,
resulting in the grand coalition being stable, for all parametrisations: if every
other bank is in a single big module, no individual bank wants to deviate to {1,
n− 1}, as the member of the singleton module, for a successful business match,
except in the unlikely case of a self-match, still needs the large module to be
enabled in order to be productive, but then, as an outsider, they only get a low
value θ match. Finally, with Zero Lifetime Bankers, the atomistic partition is
never stable: the zero lifetime means that bankers ignore ﬁnancial risk; they just
want to maximise the value of business matches; and so they always choose the
grand coalition. The Short Run Bankers model, in Section 2.3.2.2, shows that
this bias can last for a few years.
43Although with the EBA it is normally accepted that the ’solution’ of the game is the
partition with the largest modules (Bloch and Dutta (2010)).
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Table 2.74: Banking Models Stability Table
Boundary Partition Stability with each of the diﬀerent market games
Game Payoﬀs Expectations atomistic Grand
Partition Coalition
Stability Stability
2.3.3.4 EBA Farsighted Farsighted Always Correct
1.8 EEBA Farsighted Farsighted Correct Correct
2.3.3.3 Unanimity Game Farsighted Myopic Correct Correct
2.3.3.1 Bilateral Stability Farsighted Myopic Correct Too
2.3.3.2 Open Membership Farsighted Myopic Correct Always
2.3.2.1 Zero Lifetime Bankers Myopic Myopic Never Always
2.6 Conclusion
The policy contribution of the ﬁrst chapter was that it mathematically assessed
the policy proposal of containing ﬁnancial shocks, by partitioning banks into
modules separated by ﬁrewalls: previous authors having relied on analogy or
intuition. The methodological contribution of the chapter was the use of a
theoretical economic model containing a micro-founded welfare function leading
to good interpretability: previous contributions having used behavioural and
computational approaches. In the standard model, where business opportunities
are uniformly distributed, a strong result was derived: the full characterisation
of the optimal structure of the banking industry. Surprisingly, for any choice of
the parameters, the optimal partition took one of two forms, either it was the
grand coalition (one module containing all the banks), or it was the atomistic
partition (each module contains only one bank): the intuition behind this sharp
characterisation was that modules have increasing marginal returns. Section 1.9
went further and argued that for realistic parametrisations, it is the atomistic
partition that will be optimal; whilst Section 1.7 proved that the eﬃciency of
boundary partitions holds for a more general class of models; and ﬁnally, Section
1.8 considered partition formation, and it showed that if agents are farsighted,
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then the Extended Equilibrium Binding Agreement (EEBA), from Diamantoudi
and Xue (2007), results in the eﬃcient partition being formed.
Chapter 2 considered the criticality and robustness of the standard model in four
areas: the business sector, the ﬁnancial sector, the social planner’s preferences
and partition formation. Section 2.2 showed that the eﬃciency characterisa-
tion result is robust in a number of aspects of the business sector including, the
temporal distribution of the business opportunities; the elasticity of the shock
parameter; the number of businesses per bank; and the number of businesses
linked in a match. However, it also showed that there is criticality with respect
to the structure of the business sector in a number of other aspects: varying
the distribution of business opportunities can result in the optimality of proper
partitions, (where there are multiple modules, and each module will have mul-
tiple member banks). Examples constructed that demonstrate this criticality
include circular matching, (businesses are arranged in a circle, and matches are
always between immediate neighbours); hypercube models, (either 4 businesses
arranged in a square, or 8 businesses arranged in a cube); and non-uniform
matching (with 3 or 4 businesses).
Next Sections 2.3 and 2.4 further showed that there is robustness both in the
ﬁnancial sector (where the probability of a bank receiving an initial shock in-
creases with module size), and in the preferences of the social planner (when the
planner is either risk averse or has intertemporal utility): with these variations
the results of boundary solutions remain. Further, Section 2.3.3 applied diﬀer-
ent partition formation concepts to the standard model. This showed that the
eﬃcient partition is again always formed under either the Equilibrium Binding
Agreement (EBA), of Ray and Vohra (1997), or the Unanimity Game of Bloch
(1996). However, ineﬃcient partitions can be formed under bilateral stability
from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), or the Open Membership game from Yi and
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Shin (2000).
The robustness and the criticality of the current work could be assessed in a num-
ber of other areas, and these forms the basis of potential future work. Firstly, the
current models have a static number of banks and businesses; so one extension
would be to develop a dynamic model where the number of banks and businesses
grows over time. Secondly, in this thesis ﬁnancial shocks never cross from one
module to another, and never infect some but not all banks in a module. So a
model with probabilistic contagion and probabilistic ﬁrewalls would be another
extension. Thirdly in the current models banks cannot make bad investments; so
a model with strategic bank investment behaviour would be another extension.
Fourthly, the current models consider ex-ante eﬃciency rather than interim eﬃ-
ciency or ex-post eﬃciency. Speciﬁcally, they assume that after the arrival of a
disabling shock the social planner does not alter the partitioning of banks that
remain enabled: once modules are in place, they are not altered conditional on
shocks, not just for one or two periods but over an inﬁnite time horizon. So an
extension would be to allow the social planner to make such a state conditional
choice of partition, and this could be modelled using a Markov Decision Process.
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Appendix A
An Upper Limit to the Welfare
gain from interior partitions
This section will consider the gain in choosing an interior partition over a bound-
ary partition. This section will show that the gain in the v1 program, which
considers only the utility of banks in module 1, provides an upper bound for
the gain in the full W program. The argument relies on there being negative
externalities.
The setup is as follows. As in all variants of model, consider a partition x =
(xi)
k
i=1. Let Vi[x] be the total utility to all banks in module i. Let vi[x]:=
1
xi
Vi[x]
be the utility of a single bank in module i. Let W [x] :=
∑k
i=1 Vi[x] be the social
planner’s welfare function.
The W program feasibility set is as follows. The decision maker chooses a par-
tition (xi ∈ N1)ki=1 of N = {1, 2, 3....n}, the set of banks, such that
∑k
i=1 xi = n,
and (xi ≥ 1)ki=1 . The ﬁrst constraint means that banks can be grouped, but not
created or destroyed; the second requires a minimum module size of one. Hence
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the feasible set of partitions is
P = {(xi ∈ N1)ki=1 :
k∑
i=1
xi = n and (xi ≥ 1)ki=1 and k ∈ N1}
The maximum of the v1 program can be found in a reduced set: as there are neg-
ative externalities, a module always looses from mergers between other modules;
hence x∗ = argmaxx∈P v1[x] ⇒ x∗ = (x1, 1......1) for some x1 ∈ N1. Exten-
ded the deﬁnition of v1[x1], and let v1[x1] := v1[(x1, 1, 1......1)], where x1 ∈ N1.
Deﬁne, x∗1 := argmaxx1∈An v1[x1].
We now consider the percentage gain from choosing an interior partition over
a boundary.1 With the W program, the welfare of the best boundary partition
is given by W b := Max{W [(1,1....1)],W [(n)]}; the welfare of the best interior
partition is given by W i := Max{W [x] : x ∈ P \ {(1, , , , , 1), (n)}}; and gW ,
the percentage gain in welfare from choosing an interior partition, is given by
gW := 100∗(W i−W b)/W b. With the v1 program, the utility of the best boundary
partition is given by vb1 := Max{v1[1], v1[n]}; the utility of the best interior
partition is given by vi1 := Max{v1[x1]}n−1x1=2; and g1, the utility percentage gain
from choosing an interior partition, is given by g1 := 100 ∗ (vi1 − vb1)/vb1.
Theorem 102. gW ≤ g1
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose not then, gW > g1. By re-arrangement, gW =
100 ∗ (W i/W b) − 100 and g1 := 100 ∗ (vi1/vb1) − 100. So gW > g1 if and only
if (W i/W b) > (vi1/vb1). Recall W b := Max{W [(1,1....1)],W [(n)]} and vb1 :=
Max{v1[1], v1[n]}. But by symmetry W [(1,1....1)] = nv1[1] and W [(n)] = nv1[n].
So W b = nvb1. Hence gW > g1 if and only if (W i/n) > (vi1). But this is a
contradiction: it would mean that the highest utility is less than the average
1Of course, my main thesis is that the standard model, and many variations of it, the
optimal partition is a boundary one. In such cases the gain is negative.
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utility.
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Appendix B
Markov Processes
The disabling, and re-enabling, shocks to the bank network will form a Markov
process.1 In a Markov process the current state, but not the past states, matter
in determining the future state: P (st+1|st, st−1......s1, s0) = P (st+1|st), where
st ∈ S is the state at time t. A Markov chain is a time-homogenous Markov pro-
cess: P (st+1 = j|st = i) = P (s1 = j|s0 = i), for all times t, and all states i and
j. A Markov chain is ergodic if there exists a stationary probability distribution
P ∗ which is the limiting probability distribution irrespective of the initial prob-
ability distribution. The t period transition probability is represented by P (i, j,
t) :=P (st = j : s0 = i), and the 1 period transition probability by Pi,j := P (i, j,
1). A Markov chain is aperiodic, if for all states i ∃ T s.t. t > T ⇒ P (i, i, t) > 0.
A Markov chain is irreducible, if all states communicate; that is for all states i, j
∃t s.t. P (i, j, t) > 0. In order for a ﬁnite state discrete time Markov chain to
be ergodic it is suﬃcient that it is aperiodic and irreducible. For a continuous
time, ﬁnite state-space, Markov chain to be ergodic it is suﬃcient just that it
is irreducible. For a continuous time, inﬁnite state space, Markov chain to be
1For full textbook treatments of Markov processes see Norris (1999), Grimmett and Stirza-
ker (2001) chapter 6, or Ross (2010) chapter 4. For a brief description of Markov Processes,
as well as an another application of them in an economic environment, see Gintis (2012).
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ergodic it is suﬃcient that it is positive recurrent. Positive recurrent means that
for all states i, P (Ti < ∞) = 1 and E[Ti] is ﬁnite, where Ti is the return time
for state i: the ﬁrst time the process returns to state i after having left it.
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Appendix C
Continuous Time Markov Process
Formulation
The ﬁrst section of this appendix derives the unique stationary distribution of the
stochastic process of enabling and disabling shocks. The second section shows
that this stationary distribution is a global attractor: whatever the initial prob-
ability of module enablement is then the asymptotic limit is that the probability
of module enablement is the stationary probability. The third and ﬁnal section
shows that this convergence occurs exponentially fast.
C.1 Stationary distribution
Consider X(t) a continuous time Markov process. Let S be the set of states,
and i, j be typical distinct states. The transitions are speciﬁed by the leaving
rates qij from state i to state j. Then
P (X(t+ h) = j|X(t) = i) = qijh+ o(h) where i = j
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and by symmetry the staying rate is given by
qii = −
∑
j =i
qij
This gives an r period staying probability given by,
P (X(τ) = i ∀τ ∈ (t, t+ r)|X(t) = i) = eqiir
Considering a continuous time formulation of the banking shocks process, there
are two states, (E)nabled and (D)isabled, and four transition rates qEE, qDD,
qED and qDE. By symmetry qED = −qEE and qDE = −qDD. So a general
continuous time shock process can be speciﬁed just by the staying rates qEE and
qDD.
A continuous time Markov process represents the same system as a discrete time
Markov process, if for every state the two processes have the same probability
distributions on both destinations and staying (equivalently leaving) times. Here
both versions have only two states, and so both must have the same trivial
probability distribution on destination states: when the process leaves a state
i, it must be to go the other state j. So equivalence requires us only to equate
staying times. With the discrete time version we know the one period staying
probabilities:
PEE = (1− q)d
and
PDD = 1− ρ
So for the continuous time version this requires
qEE = d log[1− q]
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qDD = log[1− ρ]
and hence
qED = −d log[1− q]
qDE = − log[1− ρ]
For the stationary distribution we need the master balance condition to hold:
PEqED = PDqDE
this requires that the ﬂow rate from state E to state D is the same as the ﬂow
rate from D to E. Further, as there are only 2 states:
PD = 1− PE
Hence
PE =
qDE
(qDE + qED)
=
− log[1− ρ]
− log[1− ρ]− d log[1− q]
This gives the following module enablement probability:
P (d) := PE =
1
1 + γd
where the shock parameter γ := −Log[1−q]−Log[1−ρ] is the ratio of disablement and re-
enablement rates.
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C.2 Convergence
Next we consider the convergence of the Markov process. Let p(t) be the matrix
of transition probabilities from time 0 up to time t. So p(t) has entry (i, j) given
by:
pij(t) := P (Xt = j|X0 = i)
Hence p(t = 0) = I where I is the identity matrix. Next we consider the rate
of change of p(t). At time t = 0 , deﬁne Q := p′(t = 0) = limh→0 p(h)−p(0)h . So
Q = limh→0
p(h)−I
h
. As P (X(t + h) = j|X(t) = i) = qijh + o(h) where i = j,
this gives Qij = qij. As this is a Markov Chain, for general time t the derivative
alters only due to diﬀerences in p[t]. So p′[t] = Q p[t]. This diﬀerential equation
can be solved to get:
p[t] = exp[tQ]
where the exponential of a matrix has its expected deﬁnition: exp[tQ] =
∑∞
k=0
tk
k!
Qk
Let π[t] be the unconditional distribution of X[t] at time t in row vector form,
so
π[t] = π[0]p[t]
If Q has a ’nice’ eigenvalue-eigenvector expansion Q = UΛU−1, where U is
the matrix of eigenvectors and Λ is the diagonal matrix of eigenvectors then
Qk = UΛkU−1 and so
π[t] = π[0]
∞∑
k=0
tk
k!
UΛkU−1 = π[0]U
( ∞∑
k=0
tk
k!
Λk
)
U−1 = π[0]Uexp[tΛ]U−1
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Listing the enabled state ﬁrst and the disabled state second givesQ =
⎛
⎜⎝ +a −a
−b +b
⎞
⎟⎠,
where a := d log[1 − q] and b := log[1 − ρ]. So the eigenvalues are 0 and
a+ b, which have corresponding eigenvectors
⎛
⎜⎝1
1
⎞
⎟⎠ and
⎛
⎜⎝+a
−b
⎞
⎟⎠ respectively.1 So
Λ =
⎛
⎜⎝0 0
0 a+ b
⎞
⎟⎠ and U =
⎛
⎜⎝1 +a
1 −b
⎞
⎟⎠. Then, as required:
UΛU−1 =
⎛
⎜⎝1 +a
1 −b
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝0 0
0 a+ b
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝1 +a
1 −b
⎞
⎟⎠
−1
UΛU−1 =
⎛
⎜⎝1 +a
1 −b
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝0 0
0 a+ b
⎞
⎟⎠ 1
a+ b
⎛
⎜⎝b +a
1 −1
⎞
⎟⎠
UΛU−1 =
1
a+ b
⎛
⎜⎝1 +a
1 −b
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝ 0 0
a+ b −a− b
⎞
⎟⎠
UΛU−1 =
⎛
⎜⎝1 +a
1 −b
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝0 0
1 −1
⎞
⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎝+a −a
−b +b
⎞
⎟⎠ = Q
So using π[t] = π[0]Uexp[tΛ]U−1
π[t] = π[0]
⎛
⎜⎝1 +a
1 −b
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝1 0
0 exp[(a+ b)t]
⎞
⎟⎠ 1
a+ b
⎛
⎜⎝b +a
1 −1
⎞
⎟⎠
π[t] =
π[0]
a+ b
⎛
⎜⎝1 +a ∗ exp[(a+ b)t]
1 −b ∗ exp[(a+ b)t]
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝b +a
1 −1
⎞
⎟⎠
1The Internal Examiner has pointed out that as the eigenvalues have negative real parts
that the system will converge exponentially to the stable solution.
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π[t] =
π[0]
a+ b
⎛
⎜⎝b+ a ∗ exp[(a+ b)t] a− a ∗ exp[(a+ b)t]
b− b ∗ exp[(a+ b)t] a+ b ∗ exp[(a+ b)t]
⎞
⎟⎠
Using a = d log[1 − q] = log[(1− q)d] and b = log[1 − ρ] gives exp[(a + b)t] =
(1 − q)dt.(1 − ρ)t = ((1− q)d.(1− ρ))t. As (1 − q) < 1 and (1 − ρ) < 1 we get
limt→∞ exp[(a+ b)t] = 0. So
π∗ := lim
t→∞
π[t] =
(
πE[0] πD[0]
)
a+ b
⎛
⎜⎝b a
b a
⎞
⎟⎠
π∗ =
(
b a
)
a+ b
=
(
P [d] 1− P [d]
)
Hence irrespective of the initial distribution the limiting state is the stationary
distribution.
C.3 Rate of Convergence
Further:
π[t]− π∗ = exp[(a+ b)t] π[0]
a+ b
⎛
⎜⎝+a −a
−b +b
⎞
⎟⎠
π[t]− π∗ = exp[(a+ b)t]
(
πE[0] 1− πE[0]
)
a+ b
⎛
⎜⎝+a −a
−b +b
⎞
⎟⎠
π[t]− π∗ = exp[(a+ b)t]
(
− b
a+b
+ πE[0]
b
a+b
− πE[0]
)
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π[t]− π∗ = exp[(a+ b)t]
(
−π∗E + πE[0] π∗E − πE[0]
)
π[t]− π∗ = exp[(a+ b)t]
(
−π∗E + πE[0] π∗E − 1 + 1− πE[0]
)
π[t]− π∗ = exp[(a+ b)t]
(
−π∗E + πE[0] −π∗D + πD[0]
)
π[t]− π∗ = exp[(a+ b)t](π[0]− π∗)
So the process converges exponentially fast. This can be re-stated as follows: if
P0(d) is the initial enablement probability, Pt(d) is the probability of enablement
at a general time t and P∞(d) = P (d) is the limiting distribution then:
Pt(d)− P∞(d) =
[
(1− q)d(1− ρ)]t [P0(d)− P∞(d)]
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Appendix D
Distribution of Re-enablements
The standard model has a simple representation of the re-enablement process,
and assumes that re-enablements are distributed memorylessly : in each unit of
time there is the same conditional probability of a re-enablement. So in discrete
time formulation this means,
P [re-enablement at time t+ 1 |no re-enablement by time t] = P [re-enablement at time 1]
This implies that the crisis lengths should be distributed geometrically. The
empirical data in table 6 of Frydl (1999), extracted by from Caprio and Klingebiel
(1996), has the following distribution:
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Table D.1: Frydl (1999) Crisis Length Table
Crisis length (t) Observations (x(t)) Geometric probability
1 17 ρ
2 9 ρ(1− ρ)
3 7 ρ(1− ρ)2
4 6 ρ(1− ρ)3
5 4 ρ(1− ρ)4
6 1 ρ(1− ρ)5
7 2 ρ(1− ρ)6
8 2 ρ(1− ρ)7
9 1 ρ(1− ρ)8
10 1 ρ(1− ρ)9
The mean crisis length is 3.1. With a geometric distribution, the Maximum
Likelihood Estimator is the reciprocal of the mean and so ρˆ = 0.32 (2.d.p.). The
resulting probability function is a good ﬁt for the empirical data:
Figure D.1: Frydl (1999) Banking Crisis Length Plot
2 4 6 8 10
Crisis Length
0.05
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Appendix E
Typical Shock Parameter Values
From Appendix C, the probability of a module remaining disabled for at least r
periods is e−rLog[1−ρ], where ρ is the module enablement probability. So if Tρ is
the median time for a module to remain disabled, then 0.5 = e−TρLog[1−ρ], and
hence Tρ = Log[0.5]Log[1−ρ] . Similarly the median time we expect a module of d banks to
remain enabled is Tq[d] = Log[0.5]d*Log[1−q] , where q is the bank disablement probability.
The table below plots three things: ﬁrstly, for each value of ρ, it gives the median
recovery time Tρ; secondly, for each value of q, it gives the median enabled time
Tq[1] for a singleton module; and ﬁnally, for each combination of q and ρ it gives
the shock parameter γ := −Log[1−q]−Log[1−ρ] .
1 We would expect the median recovery time
to be less than 20 years, and the median enablement time of a singleton module
to be greater than 10 years.2 In the table when ρ = 0.03, (where Tρ = 22.8),
and q = 0.07, (where Tq = 9.6), we get that γ = 2.38. This motivates the levels
of γ studied in chapters 1 and 2, where γ is in the range 0 to 3.
1The median enablement time for a module of size d is Tqd .
2For example, using historical US data, there often periods of 10 years when there are no
bank failures leading to ﬁnancial contagion: 1857, Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company;
1873, Northern Paciﬁc Railroad and Jay Cooke and Company, +16 years; 1884, Grant and
Ward, +11 years; 1893, National Cordage Company, +9 years; 1907, Knickerboker Trust Com-
pany, +14; 1930, Bank of United States, +23 (data from both Mishkin (2007) and Calomiris
(2010)).
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Table E.1: Shock Parameter Table
How the shock parameter γ depends on q and ρ
ρ 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.2 0.3
Median Recovery Tρ 69.0 34.3 22.8 17.0 13.5 11.2 9.6 8.3 7.4 6.6 3.1 1.9
q Median Enablement Tq
0.001 692.8 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.002 346.2 0.20 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.003 230.7 0.30 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
0.004 172.9 0.40 0.20 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01
0.005 138.3 0.50 0.25 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.01
0.006 115.2 0.60 0.30 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.02
0.007 98.7 0.70 0.35 0.23 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.02
0.008 86.3 0.80 0.40 0.26 0.20 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.02
0.009 76.7 0.90 0.45 0.30 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.03
0.01 69.0 1.00 0.50 0.33 0.25 0.20 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.03
0.02 34.3 2.01 1.00 0.66 0.49 0.39 0.33 0.28 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.09 0.06
0.03 22.8 3.03 1.51 1.00 0.75 0.59 0.49 0.42 0.37 0.32 0.29 0.14 0.09
0.04 17.0 4.06 2.02 1.34 1.00 0.80 0.66 0.56 0.49 0.43 0.39 0.18 0.11
0.05 13.5 5.10 2.54 1.68 1.26 1.00 0.83 0.71 0.62 0.54 0.49 0.23 0.14
0.06 11.2 6.16 3.06 2.03 1.52 1.21 1.00 0.85 0.74 0.66 0.59 0.28 0.17
0.07 9.6 7.22 3.59 2.38 1.78 1.41 1.17 1.00 0.87 0.77 0.69 0.33 0.20
0.08 8.3 8.30 4.13 2.74 2.04 1.63 1.35 1.15 1.00 0.88 0.79 0.37 0.23
0.09 7.3 9.38 4.67 3.10 2.31 1.84 1.52 1.30 1.13 1.00 0.90 0.42 0.26
0.1 6.6 10.48 5.22 3.46 2.58 2.05 1.70 1.45 1.26 1.12 1.00 0.47 0.30
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Appendix F
Quasiconvexity Results
Deﬁnition 103. Suppose f : S → R where S is a convex subset of Rl. Then, f is
weakly quasiconvex if and only if the lower level set P a = {x : f(x) ≤ a} is convex
for each real number a . Similarly, f is weakly quasiconcave if and only if the
upper level set P a = {x : f(x) ≥ a} is convex for each number a. Equivalently
f is weakly quasiconcave if and only if f(λx+(1−λ)x0) ≥ min{f(x), f(x0)} for
all λ ∈ (0, 1) and (x, x0) ∈ S2
f is strictly quasiconcave if f(λx+ (1− λ)x0) > min{f(x), f(x0)} for all λ ∈ (0,
1) and (x, x0) ∈ S2 where x = x0. f is strictly quasiconvex if and only if
−f is strictly quasiconcave. So f is strictly quasiconvex if and only if f(λx +
(1− λ)x0) < max{f(x), f(x0)} for all λ ∈ (0, 1) and (x, x0) ∈ S2 where x = x0.
Proposition 104. Consider f : [1, n] → R . If f is weakly quasiconvex then f
does not have a strict interior local maximum.
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Suppose f has some strict local interior maximum
x∗ and f(x∗) = a. It is a strict maximum, so there exists some δ > 0 such that
if x ∈ [x∗ − δ, x∗ + δ] and x = x∗ then f(x) < f(x∗). The set P := {x : f(x) ≤
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max{f(x∗− δ), f(x∗+ δ)}} contains both x∗− δ and x∗+ δ but does not contain
x∗. Hence it is not convex.
Corollary 105. Consider f : [1, n] → R . If f is weakly quasiconvex then
argmax f includes a boundary solution.
Proof. By Proposition 104 no interior point can be a strict local maximum. And
if it is not a strict local maximum then it is not a strict global maximum. So
the argmax includes at least one of 1 and n.
Theorem 106. Suppose f is C1. Then in the following conditions, (1) ⇒(2)
⇒(3):
(1) f ′(x) > 0 and y > x⇒ f ′(y) > 0.
(2) f weakly quasi-convex.
(3) f ′(x) > 0 and y > x⇒ f ′(y) ≥ 0
Proof. (1) ⇒ (2)
Proof by contradiction. Suppose not: then there exists level a s.t. P a = {x :
f(x) ≤ a} is not convex and so ∃ x0, x1, x2 s.t. x0 < x1 < x2, f(x0) ≤ a, f(x1) > a
and f(x2) ≤ a. So the average gradient between x0 and x1 is positive and
the average gradient between x1 and x2 is negative. Hence ∃x01s.t. x0 ≤ x01 ≤
x1andf
′(x01) > 0. Similarly ∃x12s.t. x1 ≤ x12 ≤ x2andf ′(x12) < 0. So f ′(x01) > 0
and x12 > x01 but f ′(x12) < 0. This contradicts (1).
(2) ⇒ (3)
Proof by contradiction. Suppose not: then there exist y > xs.t.f ′(x) > 0 > f ′(y).
Then, as f is C1, ∃x∗s.t. x < x∗ ≤ y and f ′(x∗) = 0 and x∗ is a local maximum.
This contradicts Proposition 104.
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Theorem 107. Suppose f : R → R. Then:
i) if f is a monotonic function, then it is both weakly quasiconvex and quasicon-
cave.1
ii) if f increases monotonically to a global maximum and then falls monotoni-
cally, then f is weakly quasiconcave.
ii) if f decreases monotonically to a global minimum and then increases mono-
tonically, then f is weakly quasiconvex.
Proof. i) See Simon and Blume (1994), example 21.11 p524. ii) See Simon and
Blume (1994), example 21.12 p524. iii) consider −f and apply result ii).
Theorem 108. W [d], the welfare function from the standard model evaluated
at symmetric partitions, has boundary solutions.
Proof. By diﬀerentiation, W ′ [d] = (−θ−2γθn+1)+d(γθ+γ)
(1+γd)3
. So W ′[d] = t[d]/l[d]
where: t[d] =(−θ − 2γθn + 1) + d(γθ + γ) and l[d] = (1 + γd)3. As l[d] > 0 ∀d,
by Theorem 106 we get that W is weakly quasi-convex if t[d] > 0 and e > d ⇒
t[e] > 0. This is true as (γθ + γ) > 0. Hence W [d] is weakly quasiconvex and
has a boundary solution as required.
Corollary 109. The general welfare function W [x] has boundary solutions
Proof. From Theorem 108, symmetric welfare W [d] has boundary solutions.
From Theorem 115 in appendix G, the symmetric and general programs have
the same maximal value. Hence, the general program also has a boundary solu-
tion.
1Monotonic means a function that is either: weakly decreasing or weakly increasing.
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Appendix G
Asymmetric Partitions
This section proves that for the standard model, the symmetric partitions max-
imise welfare: no asymmetric partition has higher welfare than the best sym-
metric partition.
Recall, that the welfare for symmetric partitions (where d ∈ R++ is the module
size), is given by, Wsym[d] := dnP [d] + θ
n−d
n
P [d]2 and P [d] := 1
1+γd
. Let N :=
{1, 2, 3, .....n}. The number of (non-empty) modules, k will be in N and we
need n = kd. So the welfare maximising program over symmetric partitions is:
max
k∈NWsym[
n
k
]
The welfare for (generally) asymmetric partitions is given by, W [(xi)ni=1] :=∑n
i=1
x2i
n2
P [xi]+θ
∑n
i=1
xi
n
P [xi]
∑n
j =i
xj
n
P [xj]. In this section, we force there always
to be exactly n modules, but we allow empty modules: so module i is of size xi ∈
{0}⋃[1, n]. Further, we need to only specify the size of the ﬁrst n−1 modules, as
the total has to be n. So,
∑n
i=1 xi = n. So, the welfare maximisation program for
general partitions is argmaxx∈AW [x] where A := {(xi ∈ R+)n−1i=1 : xi ∈ {0}
⋃
[1,
n] and
(∑n−1
i=1 xi ≤ n− 1 or
∑n−1
i=1 xi = n
)}.
The proof of the main theorem uses the Extreme-Value Theorem:
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Proposition 110. Let f : C → R , be a continuous function and C ⊆ Rn−1 be
a closed bounded set. Then f has a maximum point in C.
Proof. See Sydsæter, K., Hammond, P., Seierstad, A, and Strøm, A. (2005)
Theorem 3.1.3.
Deﬁnition 111. For A, use the metric based on the L1 norm: so d : Rn−1 ×
Rn−1 → R s.t. d(x, y) = ∑ni=1 | xi − yi | where xn := n −∑n−1i=1 xi and yn :=
n−∑n−1i=1 yi.
Lemma 112. A is compact: closed and bounded
Proof. A is bounded as it is contained within the ball of radius n+ 1 centred on
the origin.
LetAf := {(xi ∈ R+)n−1i=1 : xi ∈ [f(i), nf(i)]and
(∑n−1
i=1 xi ≤ n− 1 or
∑n−1
i=1 xi = n
)},
where f ∈ F = {f : {1, 2, 3...n− 1} → {0, 1}}. So if f [i] = 0 then xi = 0 and if
f [i] = 1 then xi ∈ [1, n]. Hence A =
⋃
f∈F
Af (a ﬁnite union as the function f can
only take 2n−1 diﬀerent forms). Each Af is closed as it is deﬁned by inequalities
satisﬁed by continuous functions. Hence A is also closed. (See Theorem 12.10
in Simon and Blume (1994) p268).
Lemma 113. W is continuous (with the absolute metric on C)
Proof. W [(xi)ni=1] =
∑n
i=1 Vi[x] where Vi[(xi)
n
i=1] := x
2
iP [xi]+θxiP [xi]
∑n
j =i xjP [xj].
So W is the sum of continuous functions, and hence is continuous itself.
Theorem 114. The supremum of the general programs exists and is achieved
so: Maxx∈AW [x] exists, Supx∈AW [x] exists and Maxx∈AW [x] = Supx∈AW [x]
Proof. 1 is an upper bound in 1 for W [x]. So Supx∈AW [x] exists. By lemma
112 A is a compact set, and by lemma 113 W is a continuous function, so by
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Proposition 110 W must achieve its maximum. So Maxx∈AW [x] = Supx∈AW [x].
Theorem 115. The symmetric and general programs have the same maximum:
max x∈AW [x] =
max
k∈NWsym[
n
k
]
Proof. From Theorem 114 sup x∈AW [x] exists and max x∈AW [x] = sup x∈AW [x].
Further, W [(d)ki=1, (0)
n−1
i=k+1] = Wsym[d], and so sup x∈AW [x] ≥ maxk∈NWsym[nk ].
Suppose W ∗ := supx∈AW [x] >
max
k∈NWsym[
n
k
] =: W ∗sym. Then deﬁne the set
of asymmetric partitions that strictly dominate the best symmetric partition,
S0 := {x : W [x] > W ∗sym} = Ø. And by Theorem 114, there is a non-empty set
of partitions that maximise W , S1 := {x : x ∈ A and W [x] = W ∗} = Ø. Deﬁne
k(x) to be the number of non-empty modules in x, and deﬁne k∗ to be the least
number of modules in a partition that achievesW ∗. So k∗ := min{k(x) : x ∈ S1}.
Now consider the set of partitions that maximise W , with this minimal number
of non-empty modules, S2 := {x : x ∈ S1 and k[x] = k∗} = Ø.
Take x ∈ S2. Then there must exists i, j s.t. 0 = xi = xj = 0. WLOG assume
i = 1 and j = 2, so: 0 = x1 = x2 = 0. We now consider 2 alternative partitions
that re-assign the members of the ﬁrst 2 modules: the merged partition xm and
the averaged out partition xa. Partition xm merges the banks from the ﬁrst 2
modules into a single module, so xm := (0, x1+x2, (xi)n−1i=3 ). k(xm) = k(xm)−1 <
k∗ so xm /∈ S2 and hence W [x] > W [xm]. Conversely partition xa averages
out the diﬀerences between the size of the ﬁrst 2 modules, so xa := (0.5(x1 +
x2), 0.5(x1 + x2), (xi)
n−1
i=3 ). x ∈ S2 ⇒ x ∈ S1, so W [x] ≥ W [xa]. Algebraic
manipulation gives that:
W [x] > W [xm] ⇔ P [0.5t]
P [t]
> −2γR + 1
θ
and
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W [x] ≥ W [xa] ⇔ P [0.5t]
P [t]
≤ −2γR + 1
θ
where t := x1 + x2 is the total number of banks in the ﬁrst two modules, and
R :=
∑n
i=3 xiP [xi] is the total expected number of enabled banks in the other
modules.
This is a contradiction, hence Maxx∈AW [x] = maxk∈NWsym[
n
k
] as required.
So there cannot be an asymmetric sized partition that has a strictly higher
welfare than the best symmetrically sized partition. 1
1Corollary 26 in section 1.7 goes further and shows that, for no parameterisations, can
there be a partition with asymmetrically sized modules that has the same welfare as the best
symmetrically sized partition.
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Appendix H
Ratio Quadratic Welfare
This appendix considers a general class of welfare functions: the ratio quadratic
where both the numerator and the denominator are quadratic functions of the
policy variable x:1
Deﬁnition 116. Deﬁne the class of ratio quadratic functions to be h : [1, n] → R
such that h[x] = ax2+bx+c
ex2+fx+g
where (a, b, c, e, f, g) ∈ R6 and e > 0.
A ﬁrst example of this class occurs when we have continuous time welfare, see
section 2.4.1. A second occurs when we take the standard model, but then alter
the probability of inside and outside matches.
Theorem 117. If h0 is ratio quadratic and the denominator has negative roots,
then h0 is at least one of quasi-convex and quasi-concave. Further it has either
0 or 1 stationary points.
The proof of this theorem relies of simply transforming the objective function
into partial fraction format giving h[x] = σ+ β1
x−α1 +
β2
x−α2 . However, despite this
the proof is still quite lengthy: ﬁrstly, because of the need to consider a range of
1Hopefully, it is not too confusing that in this appendix that, x is a single number, whilst
in the main text it is a partition.
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special cases, such as double roots, and secondly because of the need to consider
a wide range of diﬀerent parameter values.
Proof. This proof relies on the fact that quasi-convexity and quasi-concavity
properties only rely on the sign of the h′ derivative, and not the level of the
derivative. Hence, we will be able to take a sequence of normalisations (h1, h2,
h3, h4 and h5), that each leave the sign of the derivative unaltered.
Start with h0[x] = a0x
2+b0x+c0
e0x2+f0x+g0
= a0
e0
+ b1x+c1
e0x2+f0x+g0
, where b1 = b0 − a0f0e0 and
c1 = c0 − a0g0e0 . Now let h1[x] := b1x+c1e0x2+f0x+g0 . As e0 = 0, h1[x] = b2x+c2x2+f2x+g2 , where
b2 =
b1
e0
, c2 = c1e0 , f2 =
f0
e0
and g2 = g0e0 . So let h2[x] :=
b2x+c2
x2+f2x+g2
. Factoring
the denominator gives: h3[x] := b2x+c2(x−α1)(x−α2) , where we know that α1 < 0 and
α2 < 0.
Starting with the special case of a double root (α1 = α2): h′3[x|α = α1 = α2] =
−b2x−αb2−2c2
(x−α)3 . Note that x1 > 0 and α < 0, so x − α > 0. So, if b2 < 0 then h
is quasi-convex; if b2 > 0 then h is quasi-concave; and ﬁnally if b2 = 0 then h is
both quasi-convex and quasi-concave.
In the general case of distinct roots (α1 = α2), then without (further) loss of
generality, α2 > α1, and h3[x] = 1(α2−α1)
[
r
(x−α1) +
s
(x−α2)
]
, where r = −α1b2 − c2
and s = α2b2 + c2. Let h4[x] := r(x−α1) +
s
(x−α2) . So h
′
4[x] =
−r
(x−α1)2 − s(x−α2)2 , and
hence: h′4[x] > 0 ⇔ −r(x− α2)2 > s(x− α1)2.
Therefore, h4[x] has 4 parameters: r, s, α1 and α2. One can be removed by a
change in the variable: let h5[y] := r(y+δ)+
s
y
, where y := x−α2, δ := α2−α1 > 0,
h5 : [L,U ] → R, L := 1 − α2 > 1 > 0, and U := n − α2 > n > 1 > 0. Then
h′5[y] > 0⇔ h′n[y] := −(r + s)y2 − 2δsy − sδ2 > 0.
The next 6 results covering certain special cases, come from evaluating the sign
of the [y2] and [y] coeﬃcients. Firstly, if r + s > 0 and s > 0, then once h′5[y]
becomes negative it stays negative: if z > y and h′5[y] < 0, then h′5[z] < 0. So
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h is quasi-concave. Secondly and conversely, if r + s < 0 and s < 0, then h′n[y]
is monotonic increasing. So h is quasi-convex. Thirdly, if r + s = 0 and s ≥ 0,
then h is quasi-concave. Fourthly, if r+ s = 0 and s ≤ 0 then h is quasi-convex.
Fifthly, if r = 0 then r + s = s, and so r + s and s will have the same sign: this
is covered by the previous 4 cases. Sixthly, if s = 0 then h′n[y] = −ry2 and h is
monotonic.
More generally, we need to consider the roots of h′n[y]. The (real) roots of h′n[y]
are the only points at which the sign of h′ can change. As h′n[y] is quadratic,
there are at most 2 such points. If there are no real roots in the range [L,U ], then
h is monotonic, and hence both quasi-concave and quasi-convex. If, there is one
(single) root in the range [L,U ], and increasing y causes h′n[y] to go from negative
to positive, then h is quasi-convex. If there is one (single) root in the range [L,
U ], but conversely increasing y causes h′n[y] to go from positive to negative, then
h is quasi-concave. If there is a double root in the range [L,U ], then h has a
point of inﬂection and so h is (weakly) monotonic. Only if there are 2 roots in
the range [L,U ], will h be neither quasi-concave nor quasi-convex: with 2 roots
there will be both a local maximum and a local minimum. We show that this is
not possible by considering the ﬁrst order conditions.
We dealt with the cases where s = 0 or r = 0 above, so we now assume that
s = 0 and r = 0, and consider the cases where r and s have the same, or
diﬀerent, signs (Sign[a] = + if a > 0; Sign[a] = − if a < 0). Note that,
h′5[y] = − r(y+δ)2 − sy2 and h′′5[y] = 2r(y+δ)3 + 2sy3 . So for yˆ to be a ﬁrst order point of
h5, requires that − syˆ2 = r(yˆ+δ)2 . If Sign[r] = Sign[s], then this has no solutions,
and h is monotonic. As s = 0 and r = 0, the ﬁrst order condition becomes
− yˆ2
s
= (yˆ+δ)
2
r
. So h′′5[yˆ] =
2r
(yˆ+δ)2
(
−δ
(yˆ+δ)yˆ
)
, and Sign[h′′5[yˆ]] = Sign[−r] = Sign[s].
If Sign[−r] = Sign[s] = +, then any ﬁrst order point is a local minimum.
Conversely, if Sign[−r] = Sign[s] = −, then any ﬁrst order point is a local
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maximum. So all the ﬁrst order points of h are of the same type. So h5 cannot
have both local minima and local maximum, and hence it has either 0 or 1
ﬁrst order condition points. Hence h0 is either quasi-convex, quasi-concave or
both.
So when h : [1, n] → R, there is a strict interior solution if and only if h′[1] > 0
and h′[n] < 0.2
If x is now restricted to being an integer, so that h : An = {1, 2, 3, 4.....n} →
R, then there is a strict interior solution if and only if both h[1] < h[2] and
h[n− 1] > h[n].
The decision maker decides the partition of banks into modules; the partition
is then regarded as ﬁxed. One justiﬁcation for this assumption would be that,
when any module is disabled it is not feasible to alter the partition, and when
all modules are enabled there is no incentive to alter the partition.
2A strict interior solution just means that the argmax excludes both the boundary solutions:
there is an interior solution that is strictly preferred to both boundary solutions.
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Appendix I
Intertemporal Model
The intertemporal model has the same stochastic process as the standard model:
there are ﬁnancial shocks (disabling shocks hitting enabled banks at rate log[1−
q]; enabling shocks hitting disabled modules at rate log[1− ρ]), and business op-
portunities (business matches are distributed uniformly, so (P (b1, b2) = 1/n2)
n
b1,b2=1
.
The enablement probability converges exponentially, meaning that
(Pt[d]−P∞[d]) =
(
(1− q)d(1− ρ))t (P0[d]− P∞[d]) where: d is the module size,
P0[d] is the initial enablement probability, Pt[d] is the probability of enablement
at a general time t, and P∞[d] is the limiting distribution.1 This intertemporal
model, considers a system that starts with fully enabled banks, so P0[d] = 1,
and has the same Markov process of shocks as the standard model, and so has
the same limiting probability: P∞[d] = P [d] = 11+γd . Hence, for general time t,
Pt[d] = P [d] +
(
(1− q)d(1− ρ))t (1− P [d]).
When the partition is of form {x1, 1, 1, ....1, 1, 1}, the expected utility function
for bank 1 at time t is: vt1[x1] := βt(1/n) ((x1/n)Pt[x1] + ((n−x1)/n)θPt[x1]Pt[1]).2
1See Appendix Cfor more details.
2Similarly, the social welfare at time t for a general partition x = (xi)ki=1, is given by
Wt[x] := βt
(∑k
i=1(
xi/n)2Pt[xi] + θ
∑k
i=1
∑
j =i(xi/n)(xj/n)Pt[xi]Pt[xj ]
)
.
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The explanation for this speciﬁcation is as follows. The leading βt term gives
the time t discount factor. Without loss of generality, we assume that all the
utility goes to the ﬁrst bank in a match: this is bank 1 with probability 1/n. The
match is inside with probability x1/n; it is then productive if and only if module
1 is enabled: this occurs with probability P [x1]. The match is outside with
probability (n−x1)/n, and it is then of value θ. Outside matches are productive
if and only if both modules are enabled: the two modules are independently
enabled with probabilities P [x1] and P [1].
Assuming that business matches occur at all times with the same intensity, we
integrate vt1[x1] from time 0 to time inﬁnity to get vc1[x1].3 This can be arranged
into ratio quadratic format, so vc1[x1] =
ax21+bx1+c
e(x1−α1)(x1−α2) where the denominator
coeﬃcients are: e = Log[β]Log[β(q−1)(ρ−1)]Log2[1−q]n2, α1 = −1−(Log[β]+
2Log[1 − ρ])/Log[1 − q], and α2 = −(Log[1 − ρ] + Log[β])/Log[1 − q].4 We see
that e > 0 and α1 < α2 < 0, so Theorem 117 from appendix H holds. This
gives the results given in table 2.53 in section 2.4.1, including that vc1 is either
quasi-convex, or quasi-concave (or both).
3Similarly Wc[x] is the integral of Wt[x], so Wc[x] :=
´ t=∞
t=0
Wt[x]dt
4For completeness, the numerator coeﬃcients are:
a = 2θ log(β) log(1 − ρ) log(1 − q) + (θ − 1) log(β) log(1 − q) log(β − βq) − 2 log(β) log(1 −
ρ) log(1− q) + θ log2(1− ρ) log(1− q)− log(1− ρ) log2(1− q)− log2(1− ρ) log(1− q),
b = 5(θ− 1) log(β) log2(1−ρ)+4θ log2(β) log(1−ρ)− 4 log2(β) log(1−ρ)+2(θ− 1) log3(1−
ρ)−2θn log(β) log(1−q) log(1−ρ)−θn log(β) log(1−q) log(β−βq)−θn log(1−q) log2(1−ρ)+
2θ log(β) log(1−q) log(1−ρ)+θ log2(β) log(β−βq)−5 log(β) log(1−q) log(1−ρ)−log(β) log2(β−
βq) + θ log(1− q) log2(1− ρ)− 3 log(1− q) log2(1− ρ)− log2(1− q) log(1− ρ),
and c = −5θn log(β) log2(1−ρ)−4θn log2(β) log(1−ρ)−2θn log3(1−ρ)−2θn log(β) log(1−
q) log(1− ρ)− θn log2(β) log(β − βq)− θn log(1− q) log2(1− ρ)
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Appendix J
Club Goods
Buchanan (1965) introduces the economic analysis of joint consumption via club
membership. He considers a setup where for such club goods, the utility of agent
i depends on the level of good acquired by i’s club and the number of members
of that club. This can be modelled mathematically as follows.1 The setup is that
there is a set S of agents (index i or k) and n diﬀerent goods (index j) that each
agent can consume. Consumption can be private (individual i consumes quantity
xij separate from the rest of society); public (individual i consumes quantity xj
jointly with the rest of society and so we need xij = xkj , for each pair of agents i
and k), or within a club (clubs are formed endogenously and consumption takes
place within them). We can capture the preferences of agent i using a utility
function of the form
U i[(xij,m
i
j)
n
j=1]
where xij ∈ R is an amount of good j that person i has access to shared amongst
the club mij. With a society that allows such club consumption we need to both
update the clearing conditions from private goods and to introduce consistency
1This is a generalisation of the original Buchanan (1965) setup in that I allow agent i to care
about the identity of his fellow club members. This makes it easier to specify the conditions
for both consistency of choice and clearing.
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of choice criteria:
• Consistency of choice
1. You have to belong to your own club. So i ∈ mij. Note that, someone
who might describe themselves as not being in a club can be described
as being in their own singleton club {i}.
2. Everyone is in one and only one club. So the mij collectively form a
partition of S. All agents need to agree on the implementation of the
same partition: there exists pj ∈ Pj such that
(
i ∈ mij ∈ pj ∈ Pj
)
i∈S.
3. Here Pj is a list of allowable partitions (of the agents S) for good j.
Two special cases are as follows:
– If Pj consists just of the grand coalition then good j is public and
this forces that mij = S for all i.
– If Pj consists just of the atomic coalition then good j is private
and this forces that mij = {i} for all i.
4. Everyone within a club has the same access to a pool of resources: so
mij = m
k
j ⇒ xij = xkj
– In a slight abuse of notation let xmj represent this common quant-
ity, the amount of good j consumed jointly by the members of
club m. Precisely, m = mij ⇒ xmj := xij, whilst m = mij ∀i ⇒
xmj := 0
• Clearing
– Suppose the gross endowment of good j is ωj
– Aggregate consumption of good j is
∑
m∈pj x
m
j : we only need to count
the consumption by each club once.
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– So the clearing conditions are
(
ωj =
∑
m∈pj x
m
j
)n
j=1
But note this is diﬀerent from the partition function model. With the club model
agent i’s utility depends only on the members of the clubs he is in
(
mij
)n
j=1
and
how much resource his clubs has
(
xij
)n
j=1
. It is independent of the resource levels
of other clubs
((
xkj
)
i/∈mkj
)n
j=1
, and the membership of those clubs
((
mkj
)
i/∈mkj
)n
j=1
.
So a club model could capture the notion that the probability that a module is
enabled depends on the membership list of that module; but it could not capture
that the utility of bank i depends not only on the membership of its own module
but also of the membership of the other modules. Although later papers allow
an agent to be a member of multiple clubs for a single good (see for example
Ellickson, Grodal, Scotchmer and Zame (1999, 2001)); they do not remove the
restriction that externalities are contained within a club.
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Appendix K
Mathematica Appendix
Mathematica was used to support this work in a number of ways. Firstly it
was used to sketch graphically the welfare function for symmetric partitions.
Secondly it was used to do algebraic manipulation. Thirdly it was used to derive
the parametrisation tables that show for each model how the percentage gain (or
loss) from choosing the best interior partition over the best boundary partition.
The code for forming every gain table is not given as the code is very similar in
the diﬀerent models. As examples, the explanation of how this was down for the
standard model, the original circular model and the variable shock initialisation
model are given below:
K.1 Standard Model
First the Welfare and module enable probability functions are deﬁned:
W [d_, n_, θ_, γ_]:=d ∗ P [d, γ] + θ ∗ (n− d) ∗ P [d, γ]2
P [d_, γ_]:=(1 + γ ∗ d)−1
Then a data matrix is formed:
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StdModelData = Flatten[Table[{n, θ, γ, P [n, γ]/P [1, γ],W [1, n, θ,
γ],W [n, n, θ, γ], 100 ∗ (W [1, n, θ, γ]−W [n, n, θ, γ])/W [n, n, θ, γ]},
{n, {10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100, 1000}}, {θ, 0.1, 1, 0.1}, {γ, 0.1, 3.0, 0.1}], 2];
Each row is a diﬀerent parametrisation. The columns are 1) n, 2) θ, 3) γ, 4)
P [n]/P [1], 5) W [1], 6) W [n], 7) 100 ∗ (W [1]−W [n])/W [n].
Next a function is deﬁned that for each row categories the percentage gain into
one of 12 bins:
StdCounts[data_]:=BinCounts[Flatten[Drop[data, None, 6]],
{{−100, 0, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 900, 1000, 25000}}]
Finally each output table is produced:
StdnOutput = Map[StdCounts, Sort[GatherBy[StdModelData,
#[[1]]&],#1[[1, 1]] < #2[[1, 1]]&]];(* this forms table 1.5 *)
StdθOutput = Map[StdCounts, Sort[GatherBy[StdModelData,
#[[2]]&],#1[[1, 2]] < #2[[1, 2]]&]];(* this forms table 1.6 *)
StdγOutput = Map[StdCounts, Sort[GatherBy[StdModelData,
#[[3]]&],#1[[1, 3]] < #2[[1, 3]]&]];(* this forms table 1.7 *)
Taking the n table as an example the output is produced as follows. Starting
from the inside and working out, The GatherBy command forms separate n10,
n20, n30, n40, ... matrices from the data matrix: one matrix for each value of
n. So for example the n10 matrix has one row for each parametrisation where
n = 10 and the same columns as the data matrix. Next the Sort command
ensures that the n matrices are in numerical order. Finally the Map command
evaluates the StdCounts function for each n matrix: each n matrix producing a
row of output. The θ and γ tables are produced similarly.
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K.2 Original Circular Model
The circular welfare function is deﬁned as:
WC[n_, n_, θ_, γ_]:=P [n,
γ] (* include special rule for single module case with no boundaries*)
WC[d_, n_, θ_, γ_]:=(1− d−1)P [d, γ] + θd−1P [d, γ]2 (* for the gen-
eral case, there is an inside match with probability d−1
d
; an out-
side match with probability 1
d
*)
where P [d, γ]has the same deﬁnition as in the standard model.
The percentage gain from an interior partition is deﬁned as follows:
WCperc[n_, θ_, γ_]:=Module[{Wi, Wb},
Wi=Max[Table[WC[n/k,n,θ,γ],{k,2,n-1}]];
(*best interior option*)1
Wb=Max[WC[1, n, θ, γ], WC[n, n, θ, γ]];
(*best boundary option*)
100 ∗ (Wi− Wb)/Wb
(*what % the best interior option is higher than best boundary op-
tion*)
]
The data matrix is formed as follows:
Circledata = Flatten[Table[{n, θ, γ, WCperc[n, θ, γ]}, {n, {10, 20,
30, 40, 50, 100, 1000}}, {θ, 0.1, 0.9, 0.1}, {γ, 0.1, 3, 0.1}], 2];
1Note that with this model it is necessary to check all the interior partitions. However,
with certain models, such as the variable shock initialisation model below, it is possible to run
a pre-process that excludes parametrisations where it is certain the best interior partition has
lower welfare than the best boundary partition.
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The bin categorisation function used is:
CircleCounts[data_]:=BinCounts[Flatten[Drop[data, None, 3]],
{{−100, 0, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 900, 1000, 1100}}]
Then ﬁnally the three output tables are formed:
CirclenOutput = Map[CircleCounts, Sort[GatherBy[Circledata,
#[[1]]&],#1[[1, 1]] < #2[[1, 1]]&]];
CircleθOutput = Map[CircleCounts, Sort[GatherBy[Circledata,
#[[2]]&],#1[[1, 2]] < #2[[1, 2]]&]];
CircleγOutput = Map[CircleCounts, Sort[GatherBy[Circledata,
#[[3]]&],#1[[1, 3]] < #2[[1, 3]]&]];
K.3 Variable Shock Initialisation Model
The payoﬀ per member of module 1 when the other modules are all singletons,
v1α[x1], is given by the mathematica code:
v1α[x1_, n_, θ_, α_, γ_]:=x1P [x1, α, γ]+θP [x1, α, γ](n−x1)P [1, α, γ]
and the module enablement probability is given by:
P [d_, α_, γ_]:=(1 + γdα)−1
The percentage gain in v1α[x1] from the best interior partition over the best
boundary partition is given by
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v1αperc[n_, θ_, α_, γ_]:=Module[{vi, vb, Perc, x1},
vi = Max[Table[v1α[x1, n, θ, α, γ], {x1, 2, n− 1}]];
(*best interior option*)
vb = Max[v1α[1, n, θ, α, γ], v1α[n, n, θ, α, γ]];
(*best boundary option*)
100 ∗ (vi− vb)/vb
(*what % best interior option is higher than best boundary option*)
]
The data matrix is formed as follows:
v1αdata = Map[Append[#, v1αperc[#[[1]],#[[2]],#[[3]],#[[4]]]]&,
Select[Select[Flatten[Table[{n, θ, α, γ, v1α[2, n, θ, α, γ]− v1α[1,
n, θ, α, γ], v1α[n, n, θ, α, γ]− v1α[n− 1, n, θ, α, γ]}, {n, {10, 20, 30,
40, 50, 100, 1000}}, {θ, 0, 0.9, 0.1}, {α, 1.0, 30, 0.1}, {γ, 0.1, 3, 0.1}], 3],
#[[5]] > 0&],#[[6]] < 0&]];
Note, that from Theorem 72 the α model is quasi-concave when α ≥ 1. So in
order to get an interior solution we need v1α[n − 1] > v1α[n − 1] and v1α[1] <
v1α[2]. The v1αdata code therefore discards parametrisations from either of these
conditions does not hold: this makes the code more eﬃcient as it does not waste
time looking check for interior gains when this is not feasible.
The bin categorisation function is given by:
v1αCounts[data_]:=BinCounts[Flatten[Drop[data, None, 6]],
{{−100, 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 250}}]
The four output matrices are given by:
272
v1αnOutput = Map[v1αCounts, Sort[GatherBy[v1αdata,#[[1]]&],
#1[[1, 1]] < #2[[1, 1]]&]];
v1αθOutput = Map[v1αCounts, Sort[GatherBy[v1αdata,#[[2]]&],
#1[[1, 2]] < #2[[1, 2]]&]];
v1ααOutput = Map[v1αCounts, Sort[GatherBy[v1αdata,#[[3]]&],
#1[[1, 3]] < #2[[1, 3]]&]];
v1αγOutput = Map[v1αCounts, Sort[GatherBy[v1αdata,#[[4]]&],
#1[[1, 4]] < #2[[1, 4]]&]];
At this stage it is necessary to reform correctly the ≤ 0 column in the output
table by adding back in the deleted cases:
TableForm[Map[Prepend[#,
(611100/7)−#[[1]]−#[[2]]−#[[3]]−#[[4]]−#[[5]]−#[[6]]−#[[7]]]&,
Drop[v1αnOutput, None, 1]], TableHeadings → {Table[n, {n, {10,
20, 30, 40, 50, 100, 1000}}], {−100, 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90,
100, 250}}]
TableForm[Map[Prepend[#,
(611100/9)−#[[1]]−#[[2]]−#[[3]]−#[[4]]−#[[5]]−#[[6]]−#[[7]]]&,
Drop[v1αθOutput, None, 1]], TableHeadings → {Table[θ, {θ, 0.0, 0.5,
0.1}], {−100, 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 250}}]
TableForm[Map[Prepend[#,
(611100/21)−#[[1]]−#[[2]]−#[[3]]−#[[4]]−#[[5]]−#[[6]]−#[[7]]]&,
Drop[v1ααOutput, None, 1]], TableHeadings → {Table[α, {α, 1.1,
30, 0.1}], {−100, 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 250}}]
TableForm[Map[Prepend[#,
(611100/30)−#[[1]]−#[[2]]−#[[3]]−#[[4]]−#[[5]]−#[[6]]−#[[7]]]&,
Drop[v1αγOutput, None, 1]], TableHeadings → {Table[γ, {γ, 0.1, 3,
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0.1}], {−100, 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 250}}]
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Appendix L
Lattice Appendix
This appendix ﬁrst deﬁnes what a lattice is. It then compares two diﬀerent rel-
evant lattice formations: the partition lattice and the embedded coalition lattice.
The implications for the use of the Topkis (1978) supermodularity approach are
then drawn out.
A partial ordering ≤ is a binary relation that satisﬁes the following conditions:
• (reﬂexivity) a ≤ a
• (antisymmetry) if a ≤ b and b ≤ a then a = b.
• (transitivity) if a ≤ b and b ≤ c then a ≤ c.
A poset consists of a set L, together with such a partial ordering ≤. If two
elements, a and b, of a poset have a (unique) least upper bound (or supremum),
denoted, a∨b, it is their join. If two elements, a and b, of a poset have a (unique)
greatest lower bound (or inﬁmum), denoted a∧b, it is their meet. A poset (L,≤)
is a lattice if it satisﬁes the following two closure axioms:
• Existence of binary joins: for any two elements a and b of L, the set L
contains the join a ∨ b.
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• Existence of binary meets: for any two elements a and b of L, the set L
contains the meet a ∧ b.
One condition that a lattice function f : L → R may satisfy is supermodularity :
for any two elements a and b of L, f [a ∧ b] + f [a ∨ b] ≥ f [a] + f [b].
The partition lattice is a well known and important example of lattices: see for
example Gratzer (2005) pp250–263 and Roman (2008) pp110–120. The present-
ation given here in terms of equivalence relations is based on section 4 of Nation
(1991). An equivalence relation on a set Y is a binary relation E satisfying, for
all x, y, z ∈ Y :
1. (reﬂexivity) xEx
2. (symmetry) xEy implies yEx
3. (transitivity) if xEy and yEz then xEz.
We think of an equivalence relation as partitioning the set Y into blocks of E-
related elements, called equivalence classes: x and y are in the same equivalence
class if and only if xEy. Conversely, any partition of Y into a disjoint union of
blocks induces an equivalence relation on Y : xEy if and only if x and y are in
the same block. So, in a slight abuse of notation, we write xEy and (x, y) ∈ E
interchangeably. We will be deﬁning a lattice on X, the set of all partitions of Y ,
(or alternatively let X be the set of all equivalence relations on Y so X = EqY ).
The next stage is to deﬁne an ordering on X. The ordering used is the reﬁnement
ordering: E1 ≤ E2 if and only if xE1y implies xE2y. So E1 is a reﬁnement of
E2 if and only if each E1 equivalence class is contained entirely within a single
E2 equivalence class. The greatest element of X is the universal relation Y 2:
xEY 2y iﬀ (x, y) in Y 2; so the only equivalence class is the grand coalition Y .
The least element of X is the equality relation =, so: xE=y iﬀ x = y; this
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gives atomic equivalence classes each containing a single member of Y . The
meet operation on X is set intersection, which means that x(E1 ∧ E2)y if and
only if xE1y and xE2y.1 The join operation is given by transitive closure, which
means that x(E1 ∨ E2)y if and only if there exists a ﬁnite sequence from x to
y using other members of Y as intermediate points and equating using either E1
or E2 at each stage; so formally, there exists a ﬁnite sequence (xj ∈ Y )kj=0 such
that x0 = x,
(
xj−1Eijxj for some ij ∈ {1, 2}
)k
j=1
, and xk = y.2 Finally, here is a
Hasse diagram for the case where Y has 4 elements.
Figure L.1: Partition Lattice with 4 elements ordered by reﬁnement
from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Set_partitions_4;_Hasse;
_circles.svg
A related but distinct lattice of embedded coalitions is formed in section 3 of
Grabisch (2010). Let N be the set of n players, let Π(N) be the set of partitions
of the n players. Two speciﬁc partitions are the grand coalition partition πGC :=
{N}, and the atomistic partition of singletons πAtom := {{i} : i ∈ N}. An
1See Nation (1991) page 35
2Again, see Nation (1991) page 35
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embedded coalition consists of a partition and an equivalence class from that
partition. Formally, it is a pair (S, π), where π ∈ Π(N) and S ∈ π. Let C(N)
denote all such pairs and thus be the set of embedded coalitions. A naturally
ordering on C(N) is the product ordering which requires the ordering to apply
both to the subset S and the partition π: (S, π)  (S ′, π′) iﬀ S ⊆ S ′ and
π ≤ π′, where ≤ is the reﬁnement ordering on partitions speciﬁed above.3 With
this ordering the top element of C(N) is (N, πGC). However, partitions do not
include empty classes and so C(N) has no least element, since all elements of the
form ({i}, πAtom) are minimal. So for mathematical convenience, we introduce
an artiﬁcial bottom element b := (Ø, πAtom), and deﬁne Cb(N) = C(N) ∪ {b}.
Proposition 2 of Grabisch (2010) shows that, for any n > 2,
(
Cb(N), ) is a
lattice where the meet and the join are given by:
• (S, π) ∧ (S ′, π′) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(S ∩ S ′, π ∧ π′) if S ∩ S ′ = ∅
b if S ∩ S ′ = ∅
• (S, π)∨(S ′, π′) = (T ∪T ′, ρ), where T , T ′ are the blocks of π∨π′ containing
respectively S and S ′, and ρ is the partition obtained by merging T and
T ′ in π ∨ π′.
This is a Hasse diagram for the 3 player case:
3Similarly, π∧π′ is the meet given by the reﬁnement ordering on partitions speciﬁed above
and, π ∨ π′ is the join given by the reﬁnement ordering on partitions speciﬁed above.
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Figure L.2: Embedded Coalition Lattice with 3 elements
This is Figure 1 from Grabisch (2010) and elements with the same partition are
framed in blue.
Note that Topkis (1978, 1998) gives results on the maximisation of a super-
modular function speciﬁed on a lattice; speciﬁcally how the argmax alters with
parameter variation. However, whilst there are clean conditions for the module
worth Vi to be supermodular with respect to the embedded coalition lattice (see
Deﬁnition 29 and Theorem 30); there are not clean results for the welfare function
W to be supermodular with respect to the partition lattice (the supermodularity
conditions need to be solved separately for each value of n). Partition Lattice
Supermodularity for the Welfare function W requires that for all partitions S
and T that:
W[S∧T]+W[S ∨ T ] ≥ W [S] +W [T ]
If n = 3 then the only potentially non-trivial case is when S and T are distinct
interior partitions for example S = {12, 3} and T = {1, 23}. This leads to
the requirement W [1, 2, 3] +W [123] ≥ W [12, 3] +W [1, 23], which holds for all
parametrisations.
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If n = 4 then the four potentially non-trivial cases are
W [123, 4] +W [1, 2, 3, 4] ≥ W [12, 3, 4] +W [13, 2, 4]
W [1234] +W [1, 2, 3, 4] ≥ W [12, 3, 4] +W [234, 1]
W [1234] +W [1, 2, 3, 4] ≥ W [12, 3, 4] +W [14, 23]
W [1234] +W [1, 4, 23] ≥ W [123, 4] +W [14, 23]
In order for all 4 conditions to hold need that either θ ≤ γ+1−6γ2+3γ+1 or 3γ ≥ 1.
Hence the partition supermodularity approach was not used in this thesis. How-
ever, Milgrom and Shannon (1994) introduced the weaker condition of quasi-
supermodularity :
Deﬁnition 118. a lattice function f : L → R is quasi-supermodular if for any
two elements a and b of L, f [a] − f [a ∧ b] ≥ 0 ⇒ f [a ∨ b] − f [b] ≥ 0 and
f [a]− f [a ∧ b] > 0 ⇒ f [a ∨ b]− f [b] > 0
and proved the following characterisation theorem:
Theorem 119. Milgrom and Shannon (1994) Theorem 4 Let f : L × T → R,
where L is a lattice, T is a partially ordered set and S ⊆ L. Then argmax f(l,
t)l∈S is monotone non-decreasing in (t, S) iﬀ both f is quasi-supermodular in L
and satisﬁes the single crossing property
which uses two additional deﬁnitions. Firstly,
Deﬁnition 120. Let L be a lattice (choice set), let T a partially ordered set (of
parameters), and f : L × T → R. Then f satisﬁes the single crossing property
iﬀ
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if l′ > l′′ and t′ > t′′ then f(l′, t′′) > f(l′′, t′′) ⇒ f(l′, t′) > f(l′′, t′) and f(l′,
t′′) ≥ f(l′′, t′′) ⇒ f(l′, t′) ≥ f(l′′, t′)
and secondly,
Deﬁnition 121. Suppose that M : T → 2L and T is a lattice. Then the set
function M is monotone nondecreasing if t′ ≥ t implies that M(t′) ≥S M(t) with
respect to the set ordering. if m ∈ M(t) and m′ ∈ M(t′) then m ∧m′ ∈ M(t)
and m ∨m′ ∈ M(t′)
In the case of symmetric functions, quasi-supermodularity with respect to the
partition lattice is suﬃcient to give boundary solutions. A symmetric function
is one where the value depends only on the number of members in each module
and does not depend on the sequencing of modules:4
Deﬁnition 122. Suppose f : P n → R where P n is the lattice of partitions of n
objects. Then f is symmetric iﬀ there existsfX : Nn → R such that
1. f(l) = fX(x) where x = (xi)ki=1 and (xi = |li|)ki=1, where k is the number of
modules in partition l and |li| represents the number of elements in module
li.
2. If x′ = τ(x) and τ is a permutation then fX(x′) = fX(x).
This leads to the following characterisation theorem:
Theorem 123. If f : P n → R where P n is the lattice of partitions, f is quasi-
supermodular with respect to the partition lattice and f is symmetric then the
argmax is a subset of the 2 boundary partitions (the grand coalition and the
atomic partition of singletons).
4The use of the term symmetric functions is from the mathematics literature, see for ex-
ample MacDonald (2005). In economics equivalently a welfare function would be described as
having anonymity, which is the term I used in Section 1.7.
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Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose p ∈ argmaxp∈Pn f(p) and p =
(pi)
k
i=1 is an interior partition. Let (xi = |pi|)ki=1.Without loss of generality we
can assume that the modules in p are arranged in non-increasing size so xi ≥ xi+1.
And as there are only a ﬁnite number of partitions in P n we can assume that
p has the (weakly) largest module. So q ∈ argmaxp∈Pn f(p) and qj ∈ q implies
|qj| ≤ x1. Without loss of generality we can assume the n objects are assigned to
modules in increasing order. So p1 = {1, 2, 3, ....x1 − 1, x1},p2 = {x1 + 1, x1 + 2,
x1+3, ....x1+x2} and in general pi = {1+
∑i−1
r=1 xr, 2+
∑i−1
r=1 xr, .....xi+
∑i−1
r=1 xr}.
Now consider the partition pm where a single member is switched around between
the ﬁrst and mth modules. So, pm1 = {1, 2, 3, ....x1 − 2, x1 − 1,
m∑
r=1
xr} and pmm =
{1+∑m−1r=1 xr, 2+∑m−1r=1 xr, .....xm−2+∑m−1r=1 xr, xm−1+∑m−1r=1 xr, x1}. Whilst
a general element is unaltered, so pmi = pi = {1 +
∑i−1
r=1 xr, 2 +
∑i−1
r=1 xr, .....xi +∑i−1
r=1 xr} when i = 1 and i = m.
So |p ∧ pm| = (x1 − 1, 1, x2, x3..., xm − 1, 1, xm+1, ...xk) and |p ∨ pm| = (x1 + xm,
x2, x3..., xm−1, xm+1, ...xk).
As p ∈ argmaxp∈Pn f(p), f [p] ≥ f [p ∧ pm]. So by quasi-supermodularity f [p ∨
pm] ≥ f [pm] and as f symmetric, fX [|p ∨ pm|] ≥ fX [|pm|]. But as pm is a
permutation of p, fX [|pm|] = fX [|p|]. So as p ∈ argmaxp∈Pn f(p), we require
p ∨ pm ∈ argmaxp∈Pn f(p), but p ∨ pm has a module of size x1 + xm > x1 which
is a contradiction.
However in practice it is diﬃcult to show that a partition lattice function is
quasi-supermodular as the number of partitions of n objects is given by the nth
Bell number and this sequence grows very quickly: 1, 1, 2, 5, 15, 52, 203, 877, 4140,
21147, 115975,... An alternative approach that involves considering less cases is
to use the fX(.)function directly. Suppose that for all x:
fX [x1+x2, x3, x−3] ≥ fX [x1, x2, x3, x−3] ⇒ fX [x1+x2+x3, x−3] ≥ fX [x1+x2, x3, x−3]
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where x−3 := (xi)ki=4
So if merging the ﬁrst 2 modules of x increases f then repeating the process
increases f further. This quasi-supermodularity type condition is similarly suﬃ-
cient for boundary solutions. Let g[r] := f [x1+x2+rx3, 0, x3−rx3, x−3]−f [x1+
rx2, x2− rx2, x3, x−3]. Then the condition becomes g[0] ≥ 0 ⇒ g[1] ≥ 0. For the
standard model:
g[0] ≥ 0 ⇔ θ ≤ θc0
where
θc0 :=
(γ0.5s+ 1) (γx3 + 1)
2γR + γ2Rs+ γ3Rsx3 + 2γ2Rx3 + γs+ 2γ2sx3 + 3γx3 + 1
which uses the substitutions R :=
∑k
i=5 xiP [xi] and s := x1 + x2. Similarly:
g[1] ≥ 0 ⇔ θ ≤ θc1 :=
γ0.5t+ 1
2γR + γ2Rt+ γt+ 1
where t := x1 + x2 + x3.
Comparison of θc0 and θc1 gives that:
θc1−θc0 =
γ(γs+ 1)x3(γt+ 3)
2(γR(γt+ 2) + γt+ 1) (γR(γs+ 2)(γx3 + 1) + 2γ2sx3 + 2γx3 + 2γt+ 1)
> 0
So this provides an alternative proof that the standard model has boundary
solutions. Unfortunately attempts to apply the same method to some of the
other models were unsuccessful.
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